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ABSTRACT 
 
Scholarship on tribunals for mass human rights violations overlooks how the presence or 
absence of conflict influences its effectiveness. I argue that implementing a tribunal 
during conflict undermines its ability to effectively pursue justice—as I demonstrate with 
a case study of the Yugoslav Tribunal.  Ongoing conflict makes challenges of transitional 
justice more acute.  The absence of conflict eases a tribunal’s ability to carry out certain 
necessary activities such as collecting evidence.  I demonstrate this using a case study of 
the Rwanda Tribunal. Examining tribunals in Sierra Leone and Cambodia suggests that 
hybrid structures influence the effectiveness of these accountability mechanisms.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The 20th century was witness to the deaths of millions of civilians.  The majority 
of these deaths were not a byproduct of war; they were a result of systematic targeting of 
civilian populations. In the aftermath of mass human rights violations in Rwanda, the 
former Yugoslavia, Cambodia, and elsewhere, the horrors of genocide and other crimes 
against humanity entered into mainstream consciousness.  In the years after these 
tragedies, human rights organizations, scholars of international criminal law, and certain 
state governments have pressured the international community to focus on ending 
impunity for the perpetrators of such crimes. Accountability mechanisms such as ad hoc 
international criminal tribunals, national trials, newly developed ‘hybrid’ tribunals, and 
truth and reconciliation commissions, attempt to come to terms with the past by 
punishing those responsible for the pain and suffering of hundreds of thousands of 
people.  Crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes, and torture fall under the 
jurisdiction of the aforementioned trial-based courts.  In the 1990s, ad hoc international 
criminal tribunals were established in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. Currently, 
there are also various types of accountability mechanisms operating in Sierra Leone, 
Liberia, East Timor, Cambodia, and elsewhere.  
With the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC), it is likely that 
prosecutorial accountability mechanisms will be more frequently implemented during 
ongoing conflict.1 If this does in fact turn out to be the case then scholars and advocates 
of human rights will be ill-prepared to determine what effect ongoing conflict has on an 
                                                
1 In July 2008, the ICC issued an indictment for the arrest of Omar Hassan al-Bashir, the President of 
Sudan.  Al-Bashir is charged with genocide and his indictment is the first ever issued against an incumbent 
head of state. This indictment is also notable since Sudan is still in the throes of war and mass violations of 
human rights. It is too soon to tell whether or not the ICC will successfully apprehend and prosecute al-
Bashir. 
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accountability mechanism’s ability to effectively pursue justice. This project is driven by 
a desire to seriously consider the influence of timing on prosecutorial accountability 
mechanisms. Two principal questions drive this research paper:  
• How does implementing a tribunal during conflict influence its ability to achieve 
its objectives? 
• How does implementing a tribunal after conflict has ended influence its ability to 
achieve its objectives?  
An effective judicial organ must be able to conduct the following activities: collect 
evidence, gather witness testimony, apprehend suspects, carry out trials that are viewed 
as fair and efficient, retain close contact with the people for whom justice is rendered (i.e. 
those that suffered, witnessed, and/or participated in the atrocities), disable institutions 
responsible for supporting or perpetuating human rights violations, augment and support 
the domestic judicial system in the area where the relevant crimes were committed.  
In order to answer my two research questions, I utilize case studies of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).2 My case studies indicate the following. The 
ICTY case shows that when a tribunal is established in the presence of conflict, timing is 
important in that it leads to the following conditions: inability for the tribunal to be 
located in the region in which the violations of human rights are taking place, lack of 
security for staff and tribunal personnel, difficulty apprehending suspects, and difficulty 
collecting evidence and gathering witness testimony. These conditions negatively 
influence the effectiveness of the ICTY.  The ICTR case shows that when a tribunal is 
                                                
2 The ICC has only recently begun issuing indictments, and in consideration of the fact that this project 
examines circumstances of implementation, there are not enough cases of ICC action.  Thus, I refrain from 
discussing the ICC and instead focus on the two existing ad hoc international criminal tribunals. 
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established after violence and in the absence of conflict, timing is important in that it 
allows for the following conditions to arise: greater security for staff and tribunal 
personnel, the consolidation of a stable government, increased likelihood of locating the 
tribunal in or close to the region where the relevant crimes took place, greater access to 
evidence and witnesses.  My findings from the ICTR case indicate that when a tribunal 
operates in the absence of conflict, it is less likely to encounter conditions that hinder its 
ability to achieve its goals and be an effective judicial organ. However, despite the 
ICTR’s implementation in the aftermath of conflict, the Tribunal still struggled to achieve 
some of its objectives. In light of this, I suggest that factors outside of timing should be 
considered in the hopes that such an examination will strengthen future tribunals.  
This project concludes by examining how hybrid structure influences tribunals’ 
ability to achieve the four objectives of prosecutorial accountability mechanisms.  I use 
brief case studies of hybrid tribunals in Sierra Leone and Cambodia to assess this 
influence.  The Special Court in Sierra Leone (SCSL) and the Extraordinary Chambers in 
the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) demonstrate that two elements of hybrid structure help 
determine the tribunals’ effectiveness: location of the tribunals, and the mixed 
composition (foreign and domestic judges) of the tribunals.  An assessment of how 
hybrid structure influences the SCSL and ECCC’s ability to successfully pursue justice, 
may lead to future tribunals that are more efficient and effective.  
Significance of Research 
 This project is motivated by what I see as a gap in the literature on prosecutorial 
accountability mechanisms for mass human rights violations.  Although the extant 
scholarship evaluates the successes and failures of tribunals from many different angles, 
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no in-depth research has been conducted on the particular influence that timing may have 
on a tribunal.  When the timing of a tribunal is discussed, it is only peripherally 
mentioned. Thus far, there has been little to no scholarship focusing on the potential 
influence that implementation during conflict and implementation after conflict have on a 
tribunal’s ability to achieve its goals.  This project seeks to fill this gap. I employ case 
studies that allow me to analyze how the presence or absence of conflict impacts a 
tribunal’s effectiveness.  There are many comparative case studies that have been 
conducted in this field.  The most frequent of which compares the ICTY and the ICTR.  
This project lends a new angle to this scholarship.  Instead of a broad comparison, this 
project focuses more narrowly on the influence that the presence or absence of conflict 
has on the two tribunals’ ability to succeed in attaining the central objectives of 
individual accountability, re-establishment of rule of law, creation and dissemination of 
an accurate historical record, and deterrence of future crimes.   
This project also hopes to contribute to the advancement of prosecutorial 
accountability mechanisms.  In the last part of this project, I examine the hybrid tribunals 
in Sierra Leone and Cambodia.  Implementing a conflict after violence does not erase all 
the challenges of pursuing justice. This project suggests that the hybrid structure is 
worthy of further in-depth research.  As a new development in prosecutorial 
accountability mechanisms, hybrid tribunals may provide some remedies to the problems 
that continued to plague the ICTR. This project will provide a base from which scholars 
and policy makers can begin to determine how to improve future prosecutorial 
accountability mechanisms.   
 
 10 
Methodology 
Tribunals have been established in two different circumstances: 1) during conflict 
and continued human rights violations; 2) in the aftermath of mass human rights 
violations.  In this paper I examine how these two contexts influence a tribunal’s ability 
to achieve the four objectives elaborated on below. Comparative case studies are central 
to this project.  In order to assess the influence that ongoing conflict and absence of 
conflict has on the effectiveness of tribunals, I compare four case studies. Conducting 
case studies of existing tribunals allows me to explore how a variable like timing, 
influences the effectiveness of a justice organ.  Ultimately, this project will provide 
another lens through which to view the logic and mechanisms of tribunals for mass 
human rights violations.  This project is less concerned with contributing to theories of 
transitional justice, and more with providing studies that will contribute to the future 
development of more effective and efficient accountability mechanisms.  Case studies 
allow me to use real-world examples to draw conclusions about how the presence or 
absence of conflict influences the effectiveness of tribunals.   
Determining whether or not a tribunal is effective is a difficult but necessary task. 
First, an effective tribunal must be able to achieve certain objectives.  For the purposes of 
evaluation I identify and use four goals that are the most frequently articulated in the 
literature on prosecutorial accountability mechanism, and in the statutes of the tribunals 
examined. All four objectives are extremely complex, but this project does not set out to 
examine all aspects of each.  The next paragraph will briefly set out the criteria upon 
which each objective will be assessed.  
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The first goal of prosecutorial mechanisms is individual criminal responsibility.3 
Central to this objective is the determination to prosecute those ‘most responsible’ for the 
atrocities committed.  I evaluate this objective based on the number of people indicted, 
arrested, and convicted and based on the level of responsibility these perpetrators 
represent. The second goal is re-establishing rule of law.  This objective has the potential 
to consist of numerous elements. For the purposes of this project I evaluate a tribunal’s 
ability to re-establish rule of law based on two factors.  The first factor is a tribunal’s 
ability to dismantle institutions that perpetuated or facilitated mass human rights 
violations (i.e. government bureaus, media sources distributing propaganda). The second 
factor looks at a tribunal’s ability to support the domestic judicial system. This support 
can come in many forms, however this project will only assess if a tribunal can ease the 
prosecutorial burden placed on a domestic legal system in the wake of mass participation 
in human rights violations. The third objective is the creation and distribution of an 
accurate historical record. Prosecutorial accountability mechanisms seek to establish this 
record through individual accountability and legal redress for victims.  The focus on 
individuals and criminal prosecutions necessarily leads to an historical record that 
provides a legal account of the conflict.  Evaluating a tribunal’s success in this area varies 
on a case-to-case basis. As my cases will reveal, success usually has a correlation to a 
tribunals’ proximity to the most affected population and the successful use of outreach 
programs to educate this population about its activities.  The final goal I examine is the 
desire to deter mass human rights violations from being committed in the future.  There 
are two types of deterrence: specific deterrence and general deterrence.  Specific 
                                                
3 See: Article 7 of the ICTY Statute, Article 6 of ICTR Statute, Article 6 of SCSL Statute, Article 1 of 
ECCC  
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deterrence seeks to prevent a specific individual or group, who may have already 
committed a crime, from doing so again.  General deterrence seeks prevention on a 
society-wide level—to deter future atrocities from ever being committed by anyone or 
any group.4 
The majority of this project draws from secondary sources such as scholarly 
journals and academic books.  As the literature review will show, these secondary 
sources are not exclusive to the disciplines of Political Science, International Relations, 
and International Law.  Instead, this project is based on research conducted in various 
fields and across multiple disciplines.  I will also be utilizing official documents issued 
by the United Nations, the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals in the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda, and the Statutes from the hybrid tribunals in Sierra Leone and Cambodia. 
As is evidenced by the literature, accountability mechanisms demand constant 
research by scholars across multiple disciplines.  Justice, as a principle and as an 
objective sought by accountability mechanisms, deserves study in and of itself.  The 
complexity of these subjects makes it necessary for me to discuss the scope and 
limitations of this project. 
This project only examines prosecutorial accountability mechanisms, and will not 
touch upon truth and reconciliation commissions or other forms of restorative justice.  
The main limitation to this project can be attributed to time constrains and limited 
resources.  Although I was able to use a wide variety of secondary sources, I did not 
conduct field research.  This project was conducted during an academic year and the 
scope of this project reflects this time constraint.  Despite these limitations, the use of two 
                                                
4 Payam Akhavan, “Justice in the Hague, Peace in the former Yugoslavia? A Commentary on the United 
Nations War Crimes Tribunal,” Human Rights Quarterly 20 (1998): 737-816. 
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major case studies and two brief case studies allow me the opportunity to explore the 
depth of the subject matter—something that would have been impossible if this project 
simply provided a broad overview of all existing prosecutorial accountability 
mechanisms.  
Outline of argument 
 The project consists of four parts.  Chapter I provides a summary of the extant 
literature on accountability mechanisms and justice.  This chapter will provide a brief 
chronology tracing the development of prosecutorial accountability mechanisms.  Using 
the literature, it will introduce two major themes of justice—restorative justice and 
retributive justice.  Chapter I will present some of the most important arguments and 
opinions on the enforcement of human rights.  This chapter will explore one of these 
debates in detail.  This debate is one that pits peace against justice.  This subject is of the 
utmost important to this project because this debate arises when tribunals are 
implemented in ongoing conflict. Some scholars believe that pursuing justice during 
conflict will upset the possibilities for peace; others believe that lasting peace in 
unattainable without justice.  
Chapter II consists of an in-depth case study of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. This case study will advance my argument that the 
ongoing conflict in the former Yugoslavia negatively influenced the ICTY’s 
effectiveness. The presence of conflict obstructed the following activities: initiating 
investigations; accessing and collective evidence; gathering witness testimony; 
apprehending suspects; and engaging with the most affected population.  The conflict had 
a particularly noticeable influence on the pre-trial phase of the Yugoslav Tribunal.  The 
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case of the ICTY supports my argument that many of the activities necessary to an 
effective tribunal are made considerably more difficult when conducted during conflict 
and continued human rights violations.  
Chapter III presents a case study of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda.  In contradistinction to the ICTY, the Rwanda Tribunal was established in the 
aftermath of mass violence. This section of the project demonstrates how the ICTR’s 
delayed timing allowed time for certain conditions to arise that proved favorable to the 
Tribunal’s operations.  Chapter III concludes that in the case of Rwanda, the delayed 
timing of the ICTR allowed for the following conditions to arise: the installation of a 
stable, cooperative government, and increased security for ICTR staff and personnel. The 
stable government in Rwanda facilitated the ICTR’s ability to conduct the following 
activities: access and collect evidence; gather witness testimony; ensure the security of 
witnesses; and apprehend suspects.  However, the case study of the ICTR makes it clear 
that implementing a tribunal in the aftermath of violence does not ease all problems.  The 
ICTR failed to adequately distribute a historical record to the most affected populations, 
and it had no measurable deterrent effect.  The failings of the ICTR indicate that the 
timing of a tribunal does not cause all problems, nor does it solve them.   
Chapter IV consists of two brief case studies of hybrid tribunals currently 
operating in Sierra Leone and Cambodia.  The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) 
and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) are two examples of 
prosecutorial mechanisms with a hybrid structure.  These cases show that even in 
tribunals established after conflict, structure is important in determining its ability to 
achieve the four objectives of prosecutorial accountability mechanisms.  This chapter 
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argues that in the case of hybrid tribunals, structure is more influential than timing in 
determining effectiveness. Chapter IV assesses how two aspects of hybrid structure 
influence effectiveness.  These are: location of the tribunals and the mixed composition 
of the tribunals.  These two factors offer possible solutions to the problems that continued 
to plague the ICTR, even in the absence of conflict. Hybrid tribunals will continue to be 
used in the future and thus, the strengths and weaknesses of these tribunals must be 
explored. This SCSL and ECCC are two such tribunals deserving of further research.  
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Chapter I 
Justice and Enforcement: 
Accountability Mechanisms and the Debates They Inspire 
 
Introduction 
This chapter surveys the literature in this field and reflects on the history, themes, 
goals, and debates surrounding accountability mechanisms for mass human rights 
violations.  The existing literature bridges a multitude of disciplines including but not 
limited to Sociology, Political Science, International Relations, International Law, 
Philosophy, and Anthropology.  In order to limit the scope of this essay and for purposes 
of argumentation, I focus on the literature that directly pertains to prosecutorial 
accountability mechanisms.  Mechanisms in this category put primacy on legal 
prosecution through such measures as international and domestic trials. Prosecutorial 
accountability mechanisms emphasize individual criminal responsibility and seek an end 
to impunity for perpetrators of mass human rights violations. These mechanisms are at 
the center of this project.  Non-prosecutorial measures such as truth and reconciliation 
commissions and national policies of lustration are also part of this broad literature, but 
will not be discussed in full. 
The literature attributes the rise of accountability mechanisms to three 
developments or reactions. The first is the development of international law, specifically 
international humanitarian law (IHL). The second was a reaction to the nature and extent 
of the abuses perpetrated in places such as Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.  The third 
is the development of a global human rights movement and the rise of various civil 
society groups as the impetus behind accountability mechanisms.  A review of the 
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chronology shows that the development of the literature often corresponds with the 
evolution of accountability mechanisms and changing attitudes, prompted in part by the 
United Nations, toward the global protection and advancement of human rights. I begin 
with the literature on the Nuremberg Trials, which were instated in 1945 in the wake of 
World War II.  I then move to the ad hoc international criminal tribunals represented by 
the ICTY and ICTR, and follow this discussion with an introduction to the literature on 
internationalized domestic (also called ‘hybrid’) tribunals.  I conclude with a brief 
introduction to the scholarship on the International Criminal Court (ICC), which entered 
into force in 2002. This chronology reveals a trend in the literature in which authors 
identify two broad themes of justice that are intertwined with the implementation of 
accountability mechanisms.  These themes are retributive justice and restorative justice. 
Engaging with these two themes allows me to situate my extensive study of prosecutorial 
accountability mechanisms, within the larger framework of justice.  
The final section of this essay introduces a debate within the literature, which 
juxtaposes justice and peace.  This debate arises when justice mechanisms are employed 
during ongoing conflict.  Some scholars express concern that the decision to pursue 
justice in the midst of conflict will have detrimental effects on peace efforts.  Numerous 
questions are voiced in relation to this debate.  What are the drawbacks of pursuing 
justice during ongoing conflict?  Alternatively, what are the moral implications of 
waiting to pursue justice until after a conflict has ended—by which time many thousands 
of people may have been murdered, raped, and tortured? If justice is not pursued in the 
face of mass human rights violations, can a society ever recover enough to enjoy lasting 
peace? The questions prompted by the debate on the seeming incompatibility of peace 
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and justice, are important to the development of this project.  I suggest that the existence 
of such a debate necessitates an in-depth analysis of how the timing of a tribunal 
influences its ability to achieve its objectives. In order to secure justice, accountability 
mechanisms require access to evidence and witness testimony.  The safety of those 
participating in the accountability mechanism must be ensured.  The indictees must be 
apprehended.  Each of these issues and many more are influenced by the circumstance in 
which a tribunal is implemented. 
The rise of accountability mechanisms 
 The proliferation of literature surrounding accountability for mass human rights 
violations is evidence of a developing, albeit at times uneven, trend in global governance. 
In the post Cold War era the ratification of numerous conventions and declarations signal 
that many states, influenced by supranational organizations such as the United Nations 
(UN), as well as by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and domestic advocacy 
groups, are increasingly receptive to the global promotion and protection of human rights. 
The extant literature attributes the rise of accountability mechanisms to three key 
developments: the development of international law, and international humanitarian law5 
(IHL) in particular, broader developments in global governance, and a reaction to the 
atrocities committed in places like Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. 
 Scholars point out that IHL demands some form of legal remedy for those who 
                                                
5 The International Committee of the Red Cross provides a definition of IHL. “International humanitarian 
law is a set of rules which seek, for humanitarian reasons, to limit the effects of armed conflict. It protects 
persons who are not or are no longer participating in the hostilities and restricts the means and methods of 
warfare. International humanitarian law is also known as the law of war or the law of armed conflict.” 
Available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/humanitarian-law-factsheet (accessed 23 
October, 2008).  
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have suffered human rights violations.6  M. Cherif Bassiouni, a prominent scholar and 
practitioner in the field of human rights, argues that certain international conventions, 
covenants, and declarations that form the base of IHL, impose duties on states to provide 
these remedies.  He cites the Hague Convention Regarding the Laws and Customs of 
Land Warfare, The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and others for ensuring that states provide 
effective remedy in the wake of human rights abuses.7  Bassiouni writes that it is “well 
grounded in the conventional and customary law that a state is under a duty to provide 
reparations for its violations of human rights and international humanitarian laws”.8 Some 
of the existing literature looks upon treaties with a critical eye—how effective are they in 
preventing or promoting human rights, and why are states motivated to sign them?9 
Further, why are these treaties gaining more legitimacy with states now, and not earlier?  
One author acknowledges, “the average state has ratified a steadily increasing percentage 
of available human rights treaties, creating a world space characterized by the rapid and 
nearly universal acceptance of international human rights law”.10 The United States 
                                                
6 Diane F. Orentlicher, “Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior 
Regime”, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 100 (June, 1991). 2555-2615. See also: Michael P. Scharf and Nigel 
Rodley, “International Law Principles on Accountability,” in Post-Conflict Justice, ed. M. Cherif Bassiouni 
(Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers Inc., 2002): 91. See also: W.J. Fenrick, “International 
Humanitarian Law and Criminal Trials,” Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 7 (Spring, 1997): 
23-43.   
7 M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Accountability for Violations of International Humanitarian Law”, in Post-Conflict 
Justice, ed. M. Cherif Bassiouni (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 2002): 44.; Orentlicher, 
“Settling Accounts,” 2555-2615.  
8 Bassiouni, “Accountability for Violations” in Post-Conflict Justice, 49. 
9 Emilie M. Hafner-Burton and Kiyoteru Tsutsui, “Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of 
Empty Promises,” American Journal of Sociology 110 (March 2005): 1374. See: George Downs, David M. 
Rocke, and Peter Barsoom, “Is the Good News about Compliance Good News for Cooperation?” 
International Organization 50 (1996): 379-406.  
10 Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, “Empty Promises,” 2. 
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advocated for the creation of the ICTY and many European states are enthusiastic 
supporters of the ICC. However, the scholarship on human rights points to other factors 
that helped give rise to the human rights movement—the growth in civil society, the new 
technologies of media and communication, and supranational organizations such as the 
United Nations. 
  In the past fifteen years, a number of changes have taken place in the structures 
of global governance. Most scholars of International Relations now accept that states are 
not the sole actors on the international stage. Mary Kaldor defines civil society as  
the process through which individuals negotiate, argue, struggle against or 
agree with each other and with the centres of political and economic 
authority…global civil society is a platform inhabited by activists…NGOs 
and neoliberals, as well as national and religious groups, where they argue 
about, campaign for (or against), negotiate about, or lobby for the 
arrangements that shape global developments.11  
 
Many of the various actors that comprise civil society choose to focus their activities on 
issues pertaining to human rights.  Various associations and organizations such as TRIAL 
(Track Impunity Always) Watch, the International Crisis Group, Global Policy Forum 
and others contribute to advancing international justice issues. These organizations 
publish reports on human rights practices in countries around the world, and monitor 
reported human rights abuses.  Scholars who focus on the changing nature of global 
governance also cite the advent of media and technology systems that can instantaneously 
transmit news to people all over the world.  The global media reports, albeit in varying 
degrees, on human rights abuses and opens the door for civil society groups to pressure 
                                                
11 Mary Kaldor, “The Idea of Global Civil Society,” International Affairs 79 (2003): 590. 
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state governments to take action.12  Similarly, bodies within broader supranational 
organizations such as the UN13 seek to enforce or advance the norms of international law 
that have helped lead to the development of accountability mechanisms. It is accepted in 
the literature that without the existence of the UN it is unlikely that the ICTY and ICTR 
would have been established. Accountability mechanisms, in all their manifestations, 
have benefited from this movement to advance the cause of human rights. 
Chronology of accountability mechanisms 
Nuremberg Trials 
Scholars of international law trace the origins of the present-day accountability 
mechanisms to the Nuremberg Trials established in 1945, after the conclusion of World 
War II. These trials sought to punish certain German individuals for inciting and waging 
a war of aggression, and for crimes against humanity.  In the existing literature it is rare 
that Nuremberg is not at least mentioned in an examination of contemporary justice-
seeking measures.14  Ruti Teitel argues that the Nuremberg Trials established a legacy 
that continues to influence prosecutorial accountability mechanisms.  She calls attention 
to two crucial contributions: the introduction of the principle of individual accountability 
into international law, and the overarching ideal of criminal justice on an international 
level.15   The Nuremberg Trials’ indictment of Nazi leaders marked a shift from a legal 
paradigm that largely focused on collective accountability, toward a system that placed 
                                                
12 Neil Kritz, “Progress and Humility: The Ongoing Search for Post-Conflict Justice,” in Post-Conflict 
Justice, ed. M. Cherif Bassiouni (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 2002): 56. 
13 Some of these UN bodies include the Human Rights Council, Committee Against Torture, Committee 
on the Rights of the Child, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 
14 Jose E. Alvarez, “Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda,” The Yale Journal of 
International Law 24 (Summer, 1999): 366-8.  
15 Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000) 1615. 
 22 
guilt on individual perpetrators.  Additionally, Nuremberg set a precedent for trials of 
individuals on the international stage.  Of central importance to future accountability 
mechanisms was the designation of crimes against humanity—a new type of crime that 
was created in the context of the Nuremberg Trials.16 In an article written in 1949, 
immediately after the conclusion of the Nuremberg Trials, Hans Ehard references the 
final judgment.  He states, “[t]he responsibility of individuals under international law is 
affirmed by the court.  In its opinion international law imposes duties and liabilities upon 
individuals as well as upon states”.17  Although it was not explicitly articulated at the 
time, much of the existing literature argues that the Nuremberg Trials advanced the idea 
that some crimes are so heinous that their perpetrators should be prosecuted regardless of 
where the crime was committed or the nationality of the perpetrator or victim. Today, jus 
cogens crimes are those that “threaten the peace and security of humankind…[and] shock 
the conscience of humanity”.18  The norms of jus cogens are non-derogable.  Crimes of 
jus cogens include genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, torture, and others.  
Unfortunately, although the Nuremberg Trials were heralded as a major step toward 
accountability for these crimes, another trial of its kind would not take place until 1993, 
forty-four years after the end of Nuremberg.  
Ad hoc international criminal trials 
International criminal tribunals were implemented in the 1990s in the aftermath of 
massive human rights abuses in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. As the first of their 
                                                
16 Quincy Wright, “The Law of the Nuremberg Trial,” The American Journal of International Law 41 
(Jan., 1947): 38-72. 
17 Hans Ehard, “The Nuremberg Trial Against the Major War Criminals and International Law,” The 
American Journal of International Law 43 (April 1949): 223-245.  
18 M. Cherif Bassiouni, “International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes,” Law & 
Contemporary Problems 59 (Autumn, 1996): 5-6.  
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kind they justifiably are given substantial attention in the literature.  The ICTY and ICTR 
emerged from the tradition of the Nuremberg Trials but their objectives are specifically 
focused on enforcing human rights through legal punishment of perpetrators. The 
literature examining the creation and function of these trials runs the gamut from those 
scholars that praise the achievements of these trials, to those that condemn both as 
inefficient, expensive tools created to assuage the guilt of states that did nothing to 
prevent the atrocities the ICTY and ICTR seek to condemn.19  I provide a brief 
background of both the ICTY and ICTR and introduce major debates in the literature.   
The ICTY was established in 1993, by the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) under powers granted it by Chapter VII of the UN Charter. As a result of the 
continued hostilities in the former Yugoslavia, the court was located in The Hague, in the 
Netherlands. The ICTR, established by the UNSC in 1994 in response to the genocide in 
Rwanda in which approximately 800,000 people were killed, was created as a result of 
the precedent set by the ICTY.20  The literature abounds with critical evaluations of the 
these two ad hoc international criminal tribunals, but there is consensus that both were 
essential in creating and advancing legal precedents that continue to shape the use of 
prosecutorial accountability mechanisms.21 Rape as a war crime and the prosecution of 
incumbent heads of state are but two examples that continue to affect contemporary 
approaches to international criminal justice.  However, the literature points out that 
                                                
19 Kenneth A. Rodman, “Darfur and the Limits of Legal Deterrence,” Human Rights Quarterly 30 (2008): 
534.  
20 Payam Akhavan, “The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The Politics and Pragmatics of 
Punishment”, The American Journal of International Law 90 (July, 1996): 501.  See also: Martha Minow, 
Between Vengeance and Forgiveness (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1998). 34.  
21 Kritz, “Progress and Humility,” 55-88. 
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despite certain important contributions, both the ICTY and ICTR are not without faults.22  
Three issues are the most frequently discussed: the politicized nature of the ICTY and 
ICTR, their ability to fairly and efficiently execute justice, and their lack of engagement 
with the people most affected by the atrocities. The debates surrounding these three 
issues have been central to shaping the development of new types of accountability 
mechanisms.   
Due to the Tribunals’ connections to the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC), many scholars identify the ICTY and ICTR as political devices that were 
created first and foremost to relieve pressure to act (in the case of the ICTY), or guilt at 
inaction (ICTR).23  This assertion is fleshed out in the literature in various ways.  
Scholars focus on the often-contradictory role that Western powers took in dealing with 
conflict in the territories of the former Yugoslavia—there were public denunciations of 
the crimes committed but a strong resistance to any decisive action to stop such 
violence.24  In the case of Rwanda it is frequently argued that the creation of the ICTR 
was a largely empty concession in the aftermath of a genocide that the world did nothing 
to stop.25 Scholars’ criticisms of the ICTY cite its lack of enforcement capability as a 
major weakness to its potential effectiveness.  Richard Goldstone, a former Chief 
Prosecutor for the ICTY refutes this argument.  He writes that the issue of enforcement 
was not a failure of the ICTY itself.  Rather, the general “lack of political will on the part 
                                                
22 Katie Zoglin, “The Future of War Crimes Prosecutions in the Former Yugoslavia: Accountability or 
Junk Justice?” Human Rights Quarterly 27 (2005): 41-77.  
23 Minow, Vengeance and Forgiveness, 37. See also: Paul R. Williams and Michael P. Scharf, Peace with 
Justice?: War Crimes and Accountability in the Former Yugoslavia (Oxford, UK: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc., 2002). 92. See also: Ralph Zacklin, “The Failings of Ad Hoc International Tribunals,” 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 2 (2004): 542. 
24 Akhavan, “Justice in The Hague,” 744.  
25 Alvarez, “Crimes of States/Hate”. 
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of leading Western nations to support and enforce the orders of the tribunal” severely 
curtailed its ability to successfully pursue justice.26   
Scholars who study the ICTY and ICTR also grapple with the tribunals’ ability to 
execute justice. High operational costs and lack of efficiency have been raised as major 
concerns that existing tribunals continue to struggle with.27 The scholarship also laments 
the gap between the geographic location of the tribunals and the population that suffered 
the crimes being prosecuted. Scholars who debate the effectiveness of the ICTY raise 
concern that its physical distance from the scene and victims of the abuses has impeded 
the successful operation of the court.28 Global and local media have joined scholars in 
drawing attention to the perceived disengagement between the courts and the people that 
suffered the atrocities.29  
As evidenced by the debates mentioned above, both the ICTY and ICTR are 
complex structures with numerous shortcomings.  Interestingly, it is likely that 
scholarship detailing the (in)effectiveness of these ad hoc tribunals has led those who 
advocate for accountability mechanisms to attempt to address some of these weaknesses. 
The shortcomings of the ICTY and ICTR helped pave the way for developments in the 
structure of prosecutorial mechanisms.  The most recently established prosecutorial 
accountability mechanisms in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Cambodia, attempt to 
address some of the failings of the ad hoc tribunals that preceded them.     
                                                
26 Richard Goldstone, “Bringing War Criminals to Justice during an Ongoing War” in Hard Choices: 
Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention, ed. Jonathon Moore (New York, NY: Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998). 202.  
27 Zacklin, “Failings of Ad Hoc Tribunals,” 543.  
28 Kritz, “Coming to Terms, 131.  See also: Laura A. Dickinson, “The Promise of Hybrid Courts,” The 
American Journal of International Law 97 (April, 2003): 302. 
29 Kritz, “Progress and Humility,” 59; Dickinson, “The Promise of Hybrid Courts,” 295; Zacklin, “Failings 
of Tribunals,” 541-545.  
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Hybrid tribunals 
Hybrid tribunals are the most recent development in prosecutorial accountability 
mechanisms. The structure of such tribunals is evidence of a move to address the 
weaknesses of the ICTY and ICTR. Sierra Leone,30 East Timor,31 and Cambodia32 are 
three of the few places where hybrid courts have been implemented.  The literature on 
hybrid courts continues to develop along with new indictments and charges issued by the 
existing hybrid tribunals. Scholars see potential for these courts to improve on some of 
the shortcomings that were evident in the ICTY and ICTR. Much of the literature on 
hybrid tribunals details their strengths and weaknesses in relation to the tribunals 
implemented before them.33 Proponents of hybrid courts argue that there are two main 
advantages to this structure: the ability for the hybrid court to better domestic legal and 
judicial systems that may have been destroyed during a conflict, and a hybrid court’s 
proximity to the affected population.34  Advocates of hybrid tribunals suggest that the 
mixed composition of local and international judges could potentially correct worries of 
                                                
30 Following the mass killings that took place in Sierra Leone from 1991 to 2000, the (UNSC) issued 
approval of a hybrid court that would try the people who were most responsible for the huge number of 
deaths in Sierra Leone. Sylvia de Bertodano, “Current Developments in Internationalized Courts,” Journal 
of International Criminal Justice 1 (2003): 242. See also: William A. Schabas, “The Relationship between 
Truth Commissions and International Courts: The Case of Sierra Leone,” Human Rights Quarterly 25 
(2003): 1037. See also: Kritz, “Progress and Humility,” 72.  
31 East Timor, with the help of the United Nations Transitional Authority (UNTAET), has established a 
Special Crimes Unit to investigate and prosecute those responsible for the mass human rights violations in 
August of 1999. This criminal tribunal is a hybrid model similar to that in Sierra Leone in that it operates 
locally and combines international and domestic staff. See: De Bertodano, “Current Developments,” 229-
230; James Rae, “War Crimes Accountability: Justice and Reconciliation in Cambodia and East Timor?” 
Global Change, Peace & Security 15 (June, 2003): 157-178. See also: “Special Tribunal for Cambodia”, 
Global Policy Forum, available at: http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/camindx.htm (accessed 11 
October, 2008).  
32 Similarly, in March 2003, the United Nations along with the Cambodian government approved plans to 
implement a Special Tribunal for Cambodia to try former Khmer Rouge leaders. 
33 Rae, “War Crimes Accountabiilty,” 158. 
34 Dickinson, “Promise of Hybrid Courts,” 307.  
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Western powers’ dominance over court proceedings, a concern which plagued the ICTY 
and ICTR.35 
In large part, scholars of transitional justice and human rights seem optimistic 
about the possible successes of these hybrid tribunals.  Lower costs, proximity to affected 
population, and involvement of both local and international parties, are cited as positive 
steps in the creation of effective mechanisms for accountability.36  The literature that 
articulates concerns about the hybrid courts suggests that hybrid models based in the 
country where atrocities occurred could be too easily politicized and/or manipulated by 
domestic groups.  It is also suggested that without reliable international funding support 
these courts may find themselves without the money needed to achieve full 
effectiveness.37  Importantly, scholars note that while hybrid courts may address some of 
the weaknesses revealed in the functioning of the ICTY and ICTR, problems of delayed 
implementation and general operational efficiency are still unsolved. The inability of the 
international community to quickly respond to human rights atrocities through 
implementation of accountability mechanisms is cited as a major impediment to ending a 
culture of impunity.  This is in part why the International Criminal Court has been 
advocated for and supported by various human rights organizations, scholars, and states. 
 
 
 
                                                
35 Ibid., 295. 
36 Kritz, “Progress and Humility,” 70; Dickinson, “Promise of Hybrid Courts,” 310; De Bertodano, 
“Current Developments,” 244.  See also: Federic Megret, “In Defense of Hybridity: Towards a 
Representational Theory of International Criminal Justice,” Cornell International Law Journal 38 (Fall, 
2005): 25-751.  
37 Dickinson, “Promise of Hybrid Courts,” 307.  
 28 
International Criminal Court 
A wide swath of the literature on the enforcement of human rights argues that 
with the entry into force of the International Criminal Court38 on 1 July 2002, the dreams 
of a truly functional international criminal justice system were realized.  Proponents 
argue that a permanent court solves issues of delayed implementation—it is an 
established court with the resources and expertise necessary to issue indictments of 
human rights violators as they occur. Of course, the opinions of those who oppose the 
ICC are also evident in the literature. Two articles best represent the most heated debate 
in the literature surrounding the ICC: Henry Kissinger’s “The Pitfalls of Universal 
Jurisdiction” ,39 and Kenneth Roth’s response titled, “The Case for Universal 
Jurisdiction”.40 Henry Kissinger’s now-famous article outlines the dangers that the ICC 
holds.  Kissinger cites the ICC’s universal jurisdiction over individuals and the ability for 
hostile states to use this breadth of jurisdiction for political maneuverings.  He labels this 
as a threat to powerful nations (read, the United States) whose service-members are 
stationed all over the world and who are thus more likely to be prosecuted by the ICC.  
Kenneth Roth’s article refutes all of Kissinger’s main points but focuses specifically on 
the built-in checks-and-balances that the ICC includes. Roth asserts that nationals of 
powerful countries are not more susceptible to prosecution because the ICC statute allows 
domestic courts the first chance to prosecute perpetrators in lieu of a trial held by the 
                                                
38 The idea of forming a permanent court to try individuals for mass human rights violations dates back to 
1989, when the General Assembly proposed that the International Law Commission explore the possibility 
of an international court. See: Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, “The Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court,” The American Journal of International Law 93 (Jan., 1999): 22. 
39 Henry Kissinger, “The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction,” Foreign Affairs (July/August 2001). 
40 Kenneth Roth, “The Case for Universal Jurisdiction,” Foreign Affairs (Sept/Oct. 2001). 
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ICC.41 Kissinger and Roth are not the only two people to confront this debate.  The 
literature abounds with variations on this discussion.  Most notably, scholars focus on the 
US opposition to the ICC and the potentially devastating effect this has on its future. 
According to much of the literature on the ICC, the court has been stymied in its 
efforts in large part because of the United States’ opposition and active attempt to 
undermine the ICC.42  The position taken by the US threatens the ability for the ICC to 
successfully carry out indictments against perpetrators of mass human rights violations.  
Scholars argue that crimes of this nature become more difficult to prosecute when 
powerful nations oppose mechanisms such as the ICC.  This debate will continue to 
develop as the ICC pursues its first indictments and becomes a more established actor in 
the enforcement of human rights.  Despite such setbacks in some circles enthusiasm for 
the ICC has not been dampened and its existence as the first and only permanent court of 
its time stands as a testimony to the efforts of various groups, individuals, and states.  It 
remains to be seen how it will affect the progressive development of international 
criminal justice in the coming years.  
The chronology of accountability mechanisms provided in the previous 
paragraphs is not exhaustive.  Numerous countries, most notably in Latin America, have 
turned to accountability mechanisms in the wake of human rights abuses.  However, the 
majority of mechanisms employed in Latin America are of a non-prosecutorial nature.  
Measures to end impunity and provide relief for victims come in many different forms.  
                                                
41 This provision is known as the Rome Statute’s complementarity principle.  
42 See: William A. Schabas, “United States Hostility to the International Criminal Court: It’s All About the 
Security Council,” European Journal of International Law 15 (2004): 701-720; David P. Forsythe, “The 
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Most scholars categorize accountability mechanisms according to the form of justice to 
which they most closely follow.  The Nuremberg Trials, ad hoc international criminal 
tribunals, hybrid tribunals, and the ICC are all most closely associated with retributive 
justice.  Truth commissions, national lustration policies, and culturally specific 
approaches to reconciliation are categorized as examples of restorative justice.  
Retributive justice and restorative justice are not mutually exclusive, but they do differ 
somewhat in their emphasis and objectives. 
Restorative and retributive justice 
Accountability mechanisms come in many forms, but the ones most frequently 
identified in the literature are truth and reconciliation commissions and international trials 
such as those in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. There is a consensus in the literature 
that two broad types of justice encompass these different types of accountability 
mechanisms: retributive justice and restorative justice.  Retributive justice refers to a type 
of justice that underscores legal proceedings and punishments.  Retributive justice is 
concerned with placing guilt on individuals and taking the appropriate measures to 
prosecute them.43  This latter category of justice operates under the belief that in order to 
move forward the past must be recognized and properly addressed. Prosecutorial 
accountability mechanisms advance what Darryl Robinson calls a “climate of 
accountability”.44  In Martha Minow’s seminal book Between Vengeance and 
Forgiveness, she contends that retributive justice in its purest form “insists on 
punishment not necessarily in search of deterrence or any other future effects, but instead 
                                                
43 Minow, Vengeance and Forgiveness, 12-13. 
44 Darryl Robinson, “Serving the Interests of Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions and the International 
Criminal Court,” European Journal of International Law 14 (2003): 2. 
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as a way of denouncing previous wrongs and giving persons their deserts”.45  Minow 
makes a valid point in this observation on pure retributive justice, yet it does not 
completely apply to the contemporary use of accountability mechanisms.  Today, 
proponents of international criminal justice articulate specific objectives that the ideal 
accountability mechanism would accomplish.  Deterrence, strengthening of weakened 
domestic legal systems, and acknowledgment of the past are but a few of these goals.46 
Although contemporary prosecutorial mechanisms are increasingly concerned 
with issues of societal reconciliation, it is restorative justice that is focused primarily on 
the needs of the victim and the restoration of society.  Restorative justice measures 
acknowledge the past but ultimately seek to relieve some of the pain and suffering 
victims have endured.47  This category of justice emphasizes reconciliation and a desire 
to move forward after atrocities have been committed—these goals are privileged over 
the desire to punish perpetrators for crimes committed.  Proponents of restorative justice 
mechanisms often urge their use in situations where internal conflict has occurred 
between two or more groups of people (ethnic, religious, or otherwise).  It is argued that 
in such situations it is more important for societies to acknowledge the truth of what 
happened, and then move forward, than it is to focus on the past and punish 
perpetrators.48 The most prominent scholars who study human rights and international 
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criminal justice identify truth and/or reconciliation commissions (TRCs) as the type of 
accountability mechanism that best fits the category of restorative justice.49  The 
restorative nature of TRCs resides in their ability to create an official record of the truth.  
In ideal circumstances these TRCs operate at the site of the atrocities and with the 
participation of local populations.50 TRCs have been used in South Africa51 in the years 
after apartheid, and in the aftermath of conflicts in El Salvador, Argentina, and now in 
Sierra Leone and Liberia.52     
It is important to note that when applied to accountability mechanisms these broad 
themes of justice rarely operate in exclusive realms.  Rather, most accountability 
mechanisms, prosecutorial and non-prosecutorial alike, combine retributive justice with a 
desire for reconciliation and redress for victims. Neil J. Kritz, a prominent scholar of 
transitional justice states, 
Societies shattered by the perpetration of atrocities need to adapt or design 
mechanisms to confront their demons, to reckon with these past abuses. 
Otherwise, for nations, as for individuals, the past will haunt and infect the 
present and future in unpredictable ways. The assumption that individuals 
or groups who have been the victims of hideous atrocities will simply 
forget about them or expunge their feelings without some form of 
accounting, some semblance of justice, is to leave in place the seeds of 
future conflict.53 
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Kritz’ scholarship notes the diverse range of goals that accountability mechanisms often 
seek.  These goals include: the pursuit of individual criminal accountability, deterrence of 
future crimes, and a forum through which the past can be documented and acknowledged. 
In recent years however, a debate has arisen over whether the desire for justice and the 
subsequent use of prosecutorial accountability mechanisms, has come at the detriment of 
peace and lasting stability.54 The use of accountability mechanisms in cases of human 
rights abuses is being employed more frequently as human rights advocates, legal 
practitioners, and scholars argue for its legitimate and important contribution to ending 
impunity.  This debate concerning peace, justice, and accountability mechanisms must be 
confronted if these mechanisms are to remain a respected tool in international criminal 
justice.   
Peace and Justice 
 When a society has been torn apart by large-scale violence and death that is often 
perpetrated by one subset of society against another, an end to the conflict is crucially 
important and much desired.  The literature on accountability mechanisms and 
transitional justice has reflected a normative dilemma that began to be raised in the 
context of the ICTY.  This debate centers on the seeming tension between the need to 
establish peace and the desire to pursue justice. Two different viewpoints dominate this 
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exchange: 1) sustainable peace cannot be achieved without the successful pursuit of 
justice; 2) the pursuit of justice will damage the possibilities for lasting peace.  
 In the existing literature certain scholars fiercely advocate for legal accountability 
for perpetrators of mass human rights violations.55  They argue that there can be no 
sustainable peace if justice is not sought.  Bassiouni, a leading proponent of justice in all 
circumstances, argues “justice is far too often bartered away for political settlements…the 
practice of impunity has become the political price paid to secure an end to the violence 
of ongoing conflicts”.56  The victims, he suggests, are the ones that suffer the 
consequences of this politically expedient exchange.  Other scholars join Bassiouni in 
criticizing those that would forgo justice in order to obtain peace.57  They argue that 
prosecutions can provide an important account of past or ongoing events, and serve to 
strengthen the domestic judicial systems.  Additionally, “[h]olding the violators 
accountable for their acts is a duty owed to the victims both living and dead”.58  Of 
foremost importance to these scholars, is their argument that in the long term, peace 
cannot be maintained if justice is not pursued.   
 On the other side of the debate are those that see justice as a possible impediment 
to the cessation of violence and the achievement of peace.  This side is frequently 
identified as a pragmatist or realist conception of accountability for human rights abuses. 
Richard Goldstone, although he does not adhere to this side of the debate, provides a 
helpful summary of this position.  He states that those who believe that justice could 
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derail peace are concerned with “the political expediency and morality of pursuing such 
justice during the life span of an ongoing conflict at the apparent expense of a negotiated 
peace and the lives of further innocent victims.”59 A pragmatic examination of 
accountability mechanisms warns that such measures could undermine stability and/or 
incite retaliation by the groups who are most likely to face prosecution.60  In direct 
contrast to Bassiouni’s assertions mentioned above, pragmatists contend that 
“[p]reventing atrocities and enhancing respect for the law will frequently depend on 
striking politically expedient bargains that create effective political coalitions to contain 
the power of potential perpetrators of abuses”.61 Scholars that write from this position 
argue that indictments against existing heads of state could ignite increased hostilities in 
situations already fraught with tension, ill will, and mistrust. Much of the literature 
representative of this side of the debate advances the idea that limited amnesties for 
prosecutors of human rights violations are sometimes necessary for the establishment and 
preservation of peace.62  Of course, not all scholars who confront this debate choose a 
clear-cut side.  Occasionally a scholar will resist the strict justice versus peace 
dichotomy.63  Considering the complexity of situations where mass human rights 
atrocities have been committed, this position seems wise.   
Given the ever-changing nature of world politics, the literature on justice and the 
mechanisms used to achieve justice must be constantly updated.  The literature must also 
                                                
59 Goldstone, in Hard Choices. 197.  
60 Sriram, “International Law, International Relations,” 473; Snyder and Vinjamuri, “Trials and Errors,” 
12-15.  
61 Snyder and Vinjamuri, “Trials and Errors,” 6.  
62 Manisuli Ssenyonjo, “Accountability of Non-State Actors,” 405-434. See also: Jack Snyder and Leslie 
Vinjamuri, “Advocacy and Scholarship in the Study of International War Crime Tribunals and 
Transnational Justice”, Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 7 (2004). 345-362.   
63 Sriram, “International Law, International Relations,” 476; Leebaw, “Irreconcilable Goals,” 97-98.  
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strive to explore these complicated judicial organs from every possible angle.  This 
project contributes to the literature by providing analysis of how the timing of a tribunal 
influences its effectiveness.  Thus far, scholarship on tribunals has not provided a 
comprehensive assessment of how the circumstances in which a tribunal is established 
may impact its ability to achieve its objectives. By conducting in-depth case studies of 
existing tribunals, this project hopes to provide analysis that will help in the future 
development of tribunals that operate more efficiently and effectively.  
Conclusion 
In this overview of the literature on prosecutorial accountability mechanisms, I 
have confronted the dominant themes and debates that are present in this area of study.  
However, I do not find the scholarship pertaining to the peace and justice debate fully 
satisfying.  I argue that if a tribunal is established during conflict, the challenges of 
achieving justice become more acute.  In turn, implementing a tribunal in the aftermath of 
mass violence allows certain favorable conditions to arise.  The timing of tribunals is an 
important factor to consider, especially in light of the recent indictments issued by the 
ICC.  The recent indictment issued for Omar Hassan al-Bashir, the President of Sudan, 
indicates that with the existence of the ICC accountability mechanisms will be more 
frequently implemented in situations of ongoing conflict.  If this is indeed true, it is 
essential that scholars and actors in the field of human rights consider how pursuing 
justice in the midst of ongoing conflict can impact its effectiveness.  
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Chapter II: The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
Complicating the Pursuit of Justice: 
Ongoing Conflict and its Influence on the ICTY 
 
Introduction  
Nearly a half-century after the Nuremberg Trials of 1945-46, which riveted the 
world’s attention on war crimes and retributive justice, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was created to bring to justice those 
responsible for the numerous atrocities committed during the conflicts that raged in the 
splintering Yugoslav Republic throughout the 1990s. It is estimated that over 200,000 
lives were lost in the conflict.64  Created in 1993, the ICTY is scheduled to conclude 
proceedings in 2010. Many criticisms have been leveled at the ICTY, yet the tribunal has 
also garnered praise for taking steps to replace a “culture of impunity” with a “culture of 
accountability”65.  As a prosecutorial accountability mechanism, the ICTY has four 
objectives: to pursue individual criminal accountability; to create and disseminate an 
accurate historical record; to re-establish rule of law; to deter future atrocities. The ICTY 
was established in the midst of ongoing conflict.  I argue that the decision to implement 
the Tribunal during conflict negatively affected the ability of the ICTY to achieve its four 
objectives. This case study suggests that the effectiveness of the ICTY suffered due to the 
fact that it was implemented and operated during active conflict. 
The timing of the Tribunal made the already numerous challenges of pursuing 
justice even more acute. The presence of conflict hindered the ability for the ICTY to 
                                                
64 “At a Glance: Hague Tribunal”, BBC News, 23 July 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1418304.stm, (accessed 21 February 2009). 
65 Kritz, “Coming to Terms,” 127. 
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achieve the following goals: the creation and distribution of an accurate historical record 
and the re-establishment of rule of law. Specifically, the ongoing conflict produced on-
the-ground conditions, which negatively influence the Tribunal’s ability to do the 
following: ensure the physical security of staff, personnel, and witnesses; collect 
evidence; gather witness testimony; apprehend suspects; and access the most affected 
population (i.e. the people who suffered, witnessed, and participated in the atrocities). 
The ongoing conflict in the former Yugoslavia made the activities necessary for an 
effective tribunal, difficult to complete.  The timing of the ICTY also dictated its physical 
location.  Due to active conflict, the ICTY is based in The Hague, the Netherlands. The 
physical distance from the former Yugoslavia hindered the ICTY’s efforts to educate the 
local populations about the proceedings and developments of the Tribunal.  Although the 
successes and failures of the ICTY are not entirely reducible to its having been 
established in the midst of the conflict, this case study indicates that there is a correlation 
between the two.  
The decision to implement the ICTY while atrocities were ongoing led to a heated 
debate on the goals of peace and justice—goals that some viewed as being mutually 
exclusive. Two sides to the debate emerged. One side argued that only by pursuing 
justice would there be lasting peace.  On the other side were those who worried that by 
pursuing justice in the context of ongoing conflict, the chances of a peace agreement 
would be diminished. A justice mechanism could de-rail the peace process and lead to 
more deaths. The conflict in the former Yugoslavia was one of the first situations where 
the apparent tensions between peace and justice were publicly recognized and discussed.  
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The ICTY is a significant development in the field of international criminal law, 
and has appropriately received much academic attention.  Thus far however, scholars 
have not adequately addressed how the ongoing conflict in the former Yugoslavia 
influenced the effectiveness of the ICTY. Part of this chapter analyzes the difficulties of 
the ICTY in terms of the aforementioned debate on peace and justice. I begin this chapter 
with an overview of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Next, I examine the process 
that led to the creation of the ICTY, its basic structure, composition, and mandate.  I 
engage with the debate that arose over the pursuit of justice in the midst of conflict. 
Before providing a complete analysis of the ongoing conflict’s influence on the ICTY 
ability to achieve its four goals, I present the judicial proceedings thus far. This will help 
establish the foundation upon which I will examine the Tribunal’s successes and failures 
in achieving individual criminal accountability, rule of law, an historical record, and a 
deterrent effect. 
History of the Conflict 
After World War II, Yugoslavia consisted of six republics established by leader 
Josip Tito: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia66, and 
Slovenia. A number of ethnic groups were represented in—Albanians, Bosniacs (Bosnian 
Muslims), Croats, Hungarians, Roma, Jews, Serbs, Slovenes and more. After Tito’s death 
in 1980, the Republics of Croatia and Slovenia began to push for greater autonomy and 
possible independence. In response, Serbian leaders who opposed this goal began to 
consolidate Serbian power over Yugoslavia as a whole.  
                                                
66 The Republic of Serbia included two autonomous provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina. 
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In 1986, the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences (SAAS) issued a 
memorandum that attacked the Yugoslavian constitution and suggested that Tito 
discriminated against Serbs during his time in power. The memorandum accused Tito of 
engaging in “physical, political, legal and cultural genocide against the Serb population in 
Kosovo”.67  The SAAS Memorandum argued that Serbian interests should be pursued by 
any means necessary.  During this time Serb-nationalism reached a peak, due in large part 
to the Serbian elite who used a massive propaganda campaign to stoke the fires of ethnic 
hatred.68 Later the same year, Slobodan Milošević became the chief of the Serbian 
Communist Party.  Tensions between the Serbian nationalist government and the 
Republics of Croatia and Slovenia reached a breaking point.   
On 25 June 1991, Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence. Milošević, 
now the President of the Republic of Serbia, cited the importance of protecting the Serb 
populations in these regions. With the help of the Serb-dominated Yugoslav army (JNA), 
Milošević began a political and military campaign to stop the secession and consolidate 
Serb power. In November of 1991, Serbian forces occupying the Croatian town of 
Vukovar massacred 200 patients in a local hospital and deposited their bodies in a mass 
grave.  Despite the threat of invasion by Serb forces and insurgents, the Bosniac and 
Croatian populations of Bosnia-Herzegovina voted for independence on 1 March 1992.  
Shortly after this declaration, the independent nation of Bosnia-Herzegovina was 
recognized by the European Community and the United States (US).69  The Serbian 
attack on Croatian and Bosniac populations that followed this recognition is now 
                                                
67 Ivo Banac, “The Fearful Asymmetry of War: The Causes and Consequences of Yugoslavia’s Demise” 
Daedalus, 141 (Spring 1992): 150-151. 
68 Aryeh Neier, War Crimes: Brutality, Genocide, Terror, and the Struggle for Justice. (New York, NY: 
Random House, Inc., 1998), 112.  
69 Ibid., 121. 
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acknowledged to be a pre-planned campaign of ethnic cleansing against non-Serb 
peoples.   
As the crisis in the former Yugoslavia continued members of the Security Council 
came under pressure to act. News stations around the world reported on the human rights 
violations being committed in the disintegrating Yugoslav state.70  Human rights 
organizations and advocacy groups monitored the situation and used the information to 
try to force a response from the international community. No UN member-state that was 
ignorant of the events that were occurring in the former Yugoslavia. Yet, in the early 
phases the international community did little to bring about an end to the conflict.  
Michael Scharf and Paul Williams identify two phases in the international 
community’s response.  The first lasted from the beginning of the conflict until early 
1995.  This phase was categorized by actions that amounted to accommodation.71 Scharf 
and Williams identify the second phase, which began in the spring of 1995 and helped 
pave the way for the Dayton Negotiations, as one in which accommodation was replaced 
with forceful intervention.72 UN resolutions meant to stem the fighting—and perhaps 
dilute international pressure to act forcefully—were adopted throughout the initial phase 
of accommodation.73 In the following sections I present the debates and decisions within 
the UN on the appropriate reaction to the Yugoslav conflict.  Other scholarly work 
provides in-depth analysis of the discussions that led up to the creation of the ICTY. I 
                                                
70 Ibid., 124.  
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and Patricia Taft, “The Role of Justice in the Former Yugoslavia: Antidote or Placebo for Coercive 
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72 Williams and. Scharf, Peace with Justice, 153.  
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introduce them briefly.  My intention is not to saddle the international community with 
blame for its inaction.  Rather, I hope to demonstrate how the UN decisions made during 
this period, do not exist in isolation from the debate on balancing the need for peace with 
the desire for justice.  
When fighting broke out in 1991, the United States had lost interest in 
Yugoslavia.  After the end of the Cold War the country was no longer viewed as 
strategically important and so the United States was content to let European states handle 
the situation.  Throughout the early stages, the U.S. excused their inaction as the 
appropriate response to a conflict that involved the equal participation of both sides. 
Scharf and Williams explain that this position allowed the United States to avoid direct 
action.  This in spite of the fact that by mid 1995 it was well known that the majority of 
the ethnic cleansing was being carried out by nationalist Serbs.74 
The US was not the only member of the international community to delay action. 
The United Kingdom (UK) and other European states also participated in this initial 
phase of accommodation. A series of joint UN and European Union (EU) peace processes 
were attempted from 1992 until late 1994, but by then it was clear that attempts at peace 
had failed.75 Paul Williams and Patricia Taft suggest that these failures resulted from 
several interacting factors. First, differences of opinion in the EU meant that coordination 
was difficult to achieve. Second, the administrations in the US and EU were not eager to 
pump mass amounts of money and resources into ending a conflict, which at least 
                                                
74 Williams and Scharf, Peace with Justice?, 67.  
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initially did not provide a direct threat to Western nations. Deploying troops to the region 
and risking causalities was not viewed as a politically viable option.76 Instead, the EU and 
US relied on ad hoc decision making processes that stood-in for military action. Initial 
efforts to end the conflict also included a legitimization of key players in the conflict—
most notably Slobodan Milošević and Radovan Karadžić .77 The willingness on the part 
of the international community to engage in peace talks with these men suggests that 
leaders in the US and UK thought that these negotiations would constitute a valid path to 
peace.78  Including Milošević and Karadžić in high-level diplomatic talks also indicate 
just how desperately the UK and US sought to avoid the use of force. Former George 
H.W. Bush Ambassador, Warren Zimmerman, argues that Western states were largely 
apathetic to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. Zimmerman posits that Western-led 
negotiations led “to a kind of cynical theater, a pretence of useful activity, a way of 
disguising a lack of will.  Diplomacy without force became an unloaded weapon, 
impotent and ridiculous.”79  As Western powers attempted to secure a political peace, the 
UN took action in the form of Security Council resolutions. These resolutions spanned 
the breadth of four years and culminated in the establishment of an ad hoc international 
tribunal—the ICTY.   
                                                
76 On 21 May 1993 President Bill Clinton, in relation to sending troops into Bosnia to stop the killing 
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On 20 May 1992 UNSC Resolution 757 was passed. This Resolution called for a 
trade embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in an attempt to force an 
end to Serbian interference in Bosnia.  After this proved ineffective the UNSC issued 
Resolution 770 in August of 1992, which authorized governments to take “all measures 
necessary” to ensure that aid safely reached the Bosnian population.80 This was followed 
by Resolution 781, which established a no-fly zone over Bosnia.  After much political 
posturing, the UNSC adopted Resolution 808 on 22 February 1993.  This resolution 
marked the decision to create an international tribunal—what would become the ICTY.81  
A little over a month later, UNSC Resolution 819 declared the city of Srebrenica 
a safe-area on 16 April 1993. The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), 
established earlier in February 1992,82 was assigned the task of overseeing the 
demilitarized safe-areas, which had been expanded to include the cities of Sarajevo, 
Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, and Bihac.  However, UNPROFOR was not permitted to use force 
and when Serb forces under the command of Ratko Mladić attacked the safe-areas in 
mid-July 1995, UNPROFOR retreated and thousands of civilians were massacred.  It is 
estimated that over 8,000 Muslim boys and men were murdered in the twelve-day period 
when Serbian forces occupied Srebrenica.83  Media attention increased in the wake of the 
massacre, and more and more people around the world were made aware of the reported 
abuses.  These atrocities included “mass forced population transfers of Bosniacs, 
organized massacres and the physical destruction of whole towns, the systematic and 
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repeated rape of thousands of Bosniac women and young girls, and the existence of over 
400 Serb-run detention centers.”84  
The policy of accommodation had clearly failed to deter the Serbs from 
continuing their campaign of violence. The Srebrenica massacre and the continued Serb 
occupation of parts of Croatia, led to the use of force as a viable political option. 
Williams and Scharf explain that the US policy reversal was prompted by “the continuing 
atrocities and the intense public criticism of a failed policy”.85  On 30 August 1995, the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization86 (NATO) launched air strikes against Serbian targets 
as part of Operation Deliberate Force.87 The NATO air strikes are generally regarded as 
the impetus for Serbian agreement to meet in Dayton, Ohio to discuss a peace accord.  
Unfortunately, the Dayton negotiations resulted in a peace that marginalized justice.  
Serbian interests, represented by Slobodan Milošević, were prioritized in an attempt to 
achieve a cease-fire.88  One of the major decisions resulting from the Dayton Accords was 
the division of Bosnia into two sections: Republika Srpska, a Serb stronghold, and the 
Bosniac-Croat Federation.89 The Dayton Accords and their poor implementation over the 
months following the negotiations resulted in a shaky peace.90  Three years after the 
Dayton Accords, Serbian forces entered Kosovo and began a campaign of ethnic 
cleansing against the non-Serb population. “Retaliatory and armed action, torture and ill-
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treatment, arbitrary detention, forced disappearances, harassment and discriminatory 
treatment [were] widely reported.”91  
The International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
Resolution 808 stated the need for an international tribunal that “would contribute 
to the restoration and maintenance of peace”.92 This tribunal became a reality in May of 
1993 when UN Security Council Resolution 827 established the International Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).93 This Resolution expressed concern over the reported 
atrocities and declared the UN’s intent to create an ad hoc international criminal tribunal 
to try those responsible for the commission of violations of human rights.  The ICTY 
became the first tribunal since the Nuremberg Trials to prosecute individuals for 
violations of international humanitarian law.94 Many people in the human rights 
community regard the creation of the ICTY as a momentous occasion. There was hope 
that justice would be rendered and a respect for human rights enforced. The ICTY was 
created using Chapter VII provisions of the UN Charter. These powers allow the UN to 
call on member states to take the necessary measures “to maintain or restore international 
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peace and security.”95  In theory, Chapter VII powers make it obligatory for states to fully 
cooperate with the Tribunal.  States must provide any and all relevant evidence to 
facilitate investigations.  Third party states also have a responsibility to apprehend 
Tribunal indictees and extradite them to The Hague for prosecution. In practice however, 
the ICTY has no enforcement power so this cooperation is requisite in theory only. The 
ICTY marked the first instance in which Chapter VII powers were invoked in the creation 
of an international tribunal.96 The Tribunal also enjoys primacy over national courts.  
 The ICTY Statute was adopted on 25 May 1993. The ongoing conflict in 
Yugoslavia was influential from the very beginning.  The continuing violence prompted 
the UN to seat the ICTY in The Hague, the Netherlands. This decision is evidence that 
even before the ICTY began proceedings, the ongoing conflict was already influencing 
key decisions such as location of the Tribunal. The first four Articles in the Statute for the 
ICTY gives the court jurisdiction over four categories of crimes that violate international 
law.  These include: 1) grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 194997, 2) 
violations of the laws or customs of war98, 3) genocide99, and 4) crimes against 
                                                
95 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945. Chapter VII, Art. 42, available at: 
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humanity100. The prosecutorial power of the ICTY resides in its jurisdiction over 
individuals—specifically those “most responsible” for the aforementioned crimes.  
Article 7(2) establishes prosecutorial jurisdiction over incumbent heads of state.  Article 
7(3) establishes command responsibility and Article 7(4) states that the ‘obedience to 
orders’ defense will not relieve the individual of criminal responsibility.  The ICTY’s 
temporal jurisdiction mandates it to investigate and prosecute those crimes committed in 
the former Yugoslavia since 1991. Article 32 of the Statute ensures that funding for the 
Court is provided through the General Assembly’s annual budget.101  
 The Tribunal was created in 1993, but it was not until the 26 April 1995 that the 
first trial commenced.  The early years of the ICTY were spent in preparation for the 
huge task that loomed before it. A Chief Prosecutor and judges had to be chosen, staff 
hired, materials prepared, statute drafted.  This was made more complicated by the 
politics inherent to such a process.  UN member-states campaigned for their own national 
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judges to be selected and they protested the nomination of others.102 It was not until 6 
April 1994, that the War Crimes Commission, comprised of experts selected to gather 
information and provide documentation to the ICTY, submitted its full report.  The 
report, along with all its annexes, totaled over 3,300 pages of detailed information on the 
crimes that occurred, suspected perpetrators, and more.103   
As a prosecutorial accountability mechanism, the ICTY’s objectives include: to 
pursue individual criminal responsibility; to re-establish rule of law; to create and 
distribute an accurate historical record; and to deter future crimes. However, before these 
objectives could be pursued, the ongoing conflict in the former Yugoslavia prompted a 
debate that pitted justice and peace against one another.   
Peace, Justice, and the ICTY 
The ICTY’s goals centered on the pursuit of justice, but it was also “set up as a 
mechanism for the restoration of peace while the conflict continued to rage in the former 
Yugoslavia.”104 Because the conflict was labeled a “threat to international peace and 
security” the Tribunal was expected to both pursue justice and contribute to the peace 
process.105 This enhanced mandate coupled with the ICTY’s status as an UN-created 
mechanism made it essential that it “strictly [adhere] to the requirements of impartiality 
and fairness”.106  The complex relationship between peace and justice emerged as a 
prominent debate amongst those who study transitional justice and accountability 
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mechanisms. Early in the process (before the Tribunal itself was created) it became 
apparent that not everyone agreed that peace and justice were complementary goals.  In 
fact, many of those involved in initial negotiations to end the conflict, viewed the creation 
of an international tribunal as a serious threat to the peace-process. 
 In initial deliberations about the practicality of an international tribunal, two main 
opinions were expressed regarding the tenuous balance between peace and justice.  Both 
opinions were inextricably linked to the timing of the proposed ICTY.  On one side were 
those arguing that any tribunal established during conflict would face possibly 
insurmountable obstacles.  Further, to pursue justice at such a time could lead to a 
collapse in the peace process or worse yet, an incitement to violence.  Many of those 
involved with the ongoing peace processes were particularly concerned that any Security 
Council approved attempt at justice would signal the immediate end to negotiations.107  
Richard Goldstone summarizes this argument,  
How…could one expect that such leaders [Milošević and Karadžić] would 
negotiate a peace agreement when one of the consequences of that 
agreement would be their prosecution and possible life imprisonment for 
war crimes?108 
 
Those who feared the breakdown of negotiations were hesitant to establish an 
international tribunal at such a critical point in the conflict. This is not to say that those 
who were proponents of this position were against justice.  Rather, this position held that 
justice should be temporarily delayed in order to ensure that a peace agreement was 
successfully reached.109  
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Those who represented the opposing opinion sought to impress upon the Security 
Council that without justice there would be no lasting peace. Proponents of this view 
argued for the immediate implementation of an international tribunal such as the ICTY.  
Those on this side of the debate argued that justice would help lead to and maintain peace 
for two main reasons: justice counters impunity and contributes to the deterrence of 
future atrocities.  The initiation of a judicial process would signal to the perpetrators of 
mass atrocities that the international community was serious about enforcing human 
rights. Additionally, adherents of this position hoped that the pursuit of justice would 
have a lasting deterrent effect. Akhavan explains, “unchecked atrocities against civilians 
send the message to potential aggressors elsewhere that they can commit such crimes 
with impunity…thus encouraging or even providing an incentive to resort to large-scale 
violence as an instrument of attaining power.”110  This side of the debate argued that 
without a serious attempt at justice, any peace that was achieved would be temporary and 
ultimately inconsequential. The debate prompted by the possibility of a tribunal indicates 
that the ongoing conflict prompted concern, even before the creation of the ICTY. Once 
the ICTY was established, its timing continued to impact its ability to achieve its four 
objectives.   
Judicial Proceedings 
 Since its creation in 1993, the ICTY has indicted over 161 persons for committing 
serious violations of international humanitarian law.111 As of 11 February 2009, there are 
45 ongoing proceedings. Goran Hadžić and Ratko Mladić both remain at large. Only six 
of the 161 accused remain at a pretrial stage. Excluding these five cases, all trials are set 
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to conclude by the end of 2009.112 To date, approximately 70 percent of all indictees are 
Bosnian Serbs, 20 percent Croats, and the rest a mix of Bosniacs, Albanians, and 
Macedonians.  It follows that the majority of convictions have been issued for crimes 
committed against (in large part) Bosniacs by Bosnian Serbs. 
This section provides an overview of the most important judicial proceedings of 
the ICTY. I begin by discussing the early years of the Tribunal, a time period that was 
mainly preparatory. I then discuss several key trials. I focus on Duško Tadić, Slobodan 
Milošević, Ratko Mladić and Radovan Karadžić.  After an introduction to these notable 
cases I conclude by specifying issues that have affected the judicial proceedings of the 
ICTY.  I mention several factors such as a delayed start to investigations and a lack of 
enforcement power, but I argue that the ongoing conflict in the region proved the greatest 
influence on the overall effectiveness of the Tribunal.  I introduce this assertion at the end 
of this section and begin the next section with a full analysis of timing’s influence on the 
ICTY’s effectiveness.  
  The first indictment of the ICTY was issued for Dragan Nikolic on 4 November 
1994.  Nikolic was the first person to be indicted, but Duško Tadić, a low-level 
perpetrator, was the first to be tried.113  Tadić’s trial was significant not only because of 
its historic nature as the ICTY’s first, but also because the Tadić trial helped develop a 
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context in which his and others’ crimes could be viewed.114 It also revealed two potential 
drawbacks to the ICTY, namely the cost of the trial, which totaled approximately $20 
million and the lengthy proceedings, which concluded over a year after it had started.115 
 Slobodan Milošević is without doubt the name that calls forth the bloodiest 
images of the conflict in Bosnia and Kosovo. Milošević was President of Serbia from 26 
December 1990 and President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from 15 July 1997 
until 6 October 2000. He was implicated in horrific crimes committed in Kosovo, Bosnia 
Herzegovina and Croatia. Despite the overwhelming evidence linking Milošević to 
crimes committed against non-Serb populations, he was not indicted by the ICTY until 24 
May 1999—nearly six years after the Tribunal was established.116 In spite of this delay, 
the indictment and corresponding arrest of Milošević on 1 April 2001, was viewed by 
many as a defining moment for the ICTY. Michael Scharf suggests that  
[a]lthough the Yugoslavia Tribunal has tried…other indicted war 
criminals, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević is clearly the trial for which 
the Ad Hoc Court was created. [Its results] may dictate the ultimate 
success or failure of the Tribunal itself as a mechanism for restoring peace 
in the Balkans.117 
 
Unfortunately, Milošević died of poor health on 11 March 2006, before he could be 
charged.118  
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Indictments for Ratko Mladić, the commander of the Bosnian Serb Army, and 
Radovan Karadžić, the president of Republika Srpska and head of the Serbian 
Democratic Party, were issued on 25 July 1995.  Both men were instrumental in carrying 
out the campaign of ethnic cleansing.  The crimes for which they were indicted are 
similar in nature to those of Milošević. Radovan Karadžić was apprehended 21 July 2008 
and is now facing trial in The Hague.119 Mladić is still at large.  If Karadžić is found 
guilty it is likely that he will face over 30 years imprisonment. Karadžić’s arrest boosted 
hopes that the full scope of crimes committed in Bosnia would be publicly revealed and 
acknowledged.  His trial would also help to establish the link between a high-level 
official and the mass violations of human rights that occurred.120 
The use of sexual violence and rape as a tool of warfare is an additional aspect of 
the conflict that deserves mention. Much is written about this subject and it is not within 
the scope of this paper to address it in detail.  However, the ICTY’s June 2004 indictment 
of eight Bosnian Serb officers for rape and enslavement of Bosnian Muslim women was 
an important development in International Humanitarian Law.  These indictments marked 
the first time that rape and sexual assault were included as distinct forms of war 
crimes.121 
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The proceedings of the ICTY are ongoing, but after over 15 years in operation the 
effectiveness of the Tribunal must be analyzed.  The next section examines how the 
ongoing conflict influenced the Tribunal’s success in achieving its four objectives.  
Analysis 
The accomplishments of the ICTY are outnumbered by its failures. Overall, the 
ICTY was much more successful as a symbol of justice than it was as an effective 
judicial organ.  Many factors impeded the ability of the ICTY to achieve success.  Its ad 
hoc structure necessarily meant an extended process of planning and implementation.  
The search for a Chief Prosecutor, the need to draft a Statute, and collection of funds 
contributed to the delayed start to investigations and trials. However, the ICTY’s 
implementation conflict proved to have the most significant impact on its effectiveness. 
The following section analyzes the influence that the ongoing conflict had on the ICTY’s 
ability to fulfill its goals of individual criminal accountability, rule of law, creation and 
dissemination of an accurate historical record, and deterrence of future atrocities. Due to 
the ongoing conflict it was decided that the ICTY would be based out of The Hague, the 
Netherlands.  The impact of this decision will be discussed in the assessment of the 
ICTY’s ability to achieve its four objectives. Although I argue that the timing greatly 
influenced the ICTY’s effectiveness, I acknowledge that not all of the failures of the 
Yugoslav Tribunal can be attributed to the ongoing conflict. When appropriate I also 
discuss how the ad hoc structure of the Tribunal contributed to its accomplishments and 
failures.  I suggest that the influence of structure is most evident in the pre-trial stages of 
the ICTY.  However, because structure is not the focus of my study, I do not seek to 
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provide a full analysis of its impact. Ultimately, I conclude that the ongoing conflict in 
the region negatively influenced the ICTY’s ability to achieve its four objectives. 
Individual Accountability 
 The ICTY seeks to prosecute those most responsible for the mass violations of 
human rights committed in the territories of the former Yugoslavia.  The timing of the 
ICTY presented three major hurdles to achieving this goal.  First, the active conflict 
immensely complicated the processes that precede legal prosecution.  Gathering witness 
testimony, collecting evidence, and apprehending suspects became a chaotic and hugely 
complex job. Second, and in direct relation to the aforementioned challenges, the ICTY 
spent its early years prosecuting low-level soldiers rather than the leaders who 
masterminded the campaign of ethnic cleansing. Thirdly, the ICTY faced accusations of 
bias due, in large part, to the violent tensions between ethnic groups—tensions that were 
stoked daily by murders, rapes, and other atrocities.  Serbs in particular feel 
disproportionately targeted for arrest and prosecution. 
  The complexity of the conflict in Yugoslavia and the large number of crimes to 
be investigated added a heavy burden to the newly created tribunal.  Due to the ongoing 
violence in the region, the Tribunal staff was hindered in its most important task—the 
steps involved in preparing for legal prosecution. In order to build a case against 
indictees, the Tribunal needed sufficient and accurate evidence.  The on-the-ground 
situation in the region made this evidence difficult to obtain.  The ongoing violence 
meant that important documents were nonexistent, destroyed, or withheld by hostile 
governments122. Additionally, the conflict in the region and the political tensions inherent 
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to such a conflict complicated the relationships between the Tribunal and neighboring 
states. Because the ICTY has no enforcement powers of its own, and because evidence 
could potentially implicate heads of state in the campaign of ethnic cleansing, the 
Tribunal frequently faced direct opposition from certain states when it tried to obtain 
documents.  Jacob Cogan addresses this issue. He states,  
[t]he difficulty of obtaining evidence…is nowhere more complicated than 
in the former Yugoslavia, where the alleged crimes were often conducted 
by (or under instructions from) state actors and where the evidence of 
these crimes remains within the jurisdiction of interested parties.123 
 
Lack of enforcement powers also had a negative influence on the Tribunal’s ability to 
gather witness testimony.  Witnesses were not easily accessible due to the conflict, and 
the security of witnesses and those gathering and translating their testimonials was 
difficult to ensure.  Apprehending indictees was also hindered by the active conflict. 
Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslava were highly reluctant (to the point of 
hostility) to cooperate with the ICTY by handing over suspects for prosecution in The 
Hague.124  The challenges the ICTY faced in its early years were clearly affected by the 
circumstances created by the ongoing conflict.  The ICTY’s initial struggle in 
establishing the grounds upon which successful trials could be built, and especially the 
unwillingness of states to arrest and transfer indictees to The Hague, was evidenced by 
the low-level perpetrators that were tried in the Tribunal’s first years. 
 Even before the ICTY was created, UN member states knew who the ‘big fish’ 
were in the conflict raging in the former Yugoslavia. Slobodan Milošević, Ratko Mladić, 
and Radovan Karadžić were recognized as the masterminds and instigators of the 
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atrocities. There was however, a significant delay between the establishment of the 
Tribunal and the announcement of the indictments issued for Milošević, Karadžić and 
Mladić. Mladić and Karadžić were not indicted until the end of 1995, when the Tribunal 
had been in operation for nearly two years.125  
It is generally agreed upon within the literature that the ICTY has successfully 
indicted and charged a majority of those most responsible for the planning and 
implementation of the atrocities committed in Yugoslavia. Importantly, only two 
indictees remain at large. Despite these successes, due to the chaotic circumstances in 
which the ICTY collected evidence, these three men and other high-level perpetrators 
were difficult to locate and apprehend. The ICTY’s first Chief Prosecutor, Richard 
Goldstone, did not hesitate in voicing his intention to target high-level indictees.  
However, prosecution of senior commanders requires sufficient evidence to prove 
command responsibility. Gary J. Bass comments that gathering this evidence “was no 
small task. Because the Serbs were utterly uncooperative…[m]any of the early 
indictments aimed low, at figures too uninvolved in the chain of command to incriminate 
the major leaders.”126  Additionally, in the early years of the Tribunal, low-level 
perpetrators were much more likely to be apprehended and extradited to The Hague. It 
was only later that commanders began to be prosecuted. The indictment and arrest of 
Milošević was a major accomplishment for the ICTY. The fact that Milošević stood trial 
was significant for a number of reasons.  He was the first head of state to be indicted and 
tried at an international criminal court.127  In addition, the crimes in which Milošević 
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participated were widespread and brutal: ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, deportation, 
murder, ethnic cleansing, torture, destruction and appropriation of property, plunder, 
forcible transfer, unlawful confinement, and more.  Given the nature and extent of his 
crimes it is certainly noteworthy that the process of bringing him to justice was initiated, 
although due to his death, not completed. 
The third obstacle, perhaps the most important to the preservation of lasting 
peace, is the widespread belief that the ICTY is a politically motivated institution that 
targets Serbs and Croats disproportionately.128 This belief is immensely complicated and 
warrants detailed analysis that cannot be provided here. Nevertheless, the perception of 
bias obstructs the ICTY’s ability to carry out prosecutions that are accepted as fair and 
legitimate by the affected population—victims and perpetrators alike. It is true that ethnic 
Serbs compose the majority of the indictments issued by the Tribunal. However, 
Akhavan points out that while there is a danger in over-prosecuting individuals belonging 
to only one group in a conflict, there is a parallel danger of misrepresenting who 
committed crimes.129 
Unfortunately, the view that the ICTY is a political tool used by the victors and 
the West to punish Serbia remains strong. Another criticism of the ICTY, unrelated to 
Serb nationalism, emphasizes the Tribunal’s refusal to investigate alleged war crimes 
committed by NATO, namely the indiscriminate bombing of civilian populations.  This 
refusal led to protestations that the ICTY favors the Western nations that played the main 
role in its creating and the funding of its operations.  Perceived lack of legitimacy has 
been the most persistent barrier to a favorable view of the ICTY. Perceptions of bias must 
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continue to be monitored to ensure that all people view the Tribunal’s decisions as 
legitimate. Serbian dissatisfaction with the Tribunal however, cannot be countered unless 
the rule of law is re-established in the region.  Most importantly, institutions responsible 
for supporting the military and spreading propaganda must be shut down.  This is at the 
heart of the Tribunal’s third objective. 
Rule of Law 
 To determine the success of the Tribunal in restoring rule of law to areas of 
conflict, I examine two elements: dismantling responsible institutions and supporting the 
national judicial system.  The ongoing conflict was significant in that it complicated the 
processes necessary to re-establish rule of law.  The geographically removed location of 
the Tribunal, a direct result of the ongoing conflict, also contributed to the ICTY’s failure 
to fully achieve this objective. 
Propaganda was used extensively during the conflict in the former Yugoslav 
territories. Milošević and Serb nationalists relied heavily upon media outlets that fueled 
the fires of Serb nationalism.  In 2004, The International Center for Transitional Justice 
reported, “widespread distrust of the Tribunal…is…fueled by state propaganda [which 
depicts the court] as anti-Serb.”130  The message of ethnic hatred that was encouraged by 
Milošević was part and parcel to many Yugoslav institutions, specifically the military. 
Law enforcement and the judicial system helped support Milošević’ campaign as well. 
Dan Saxon notes,  
The Milosevic era was…marked by the presence of criminal structures 
that permeated the police and other security institutions…in spite of the 
fact that Milosevic and many of his clique have been removed from formal 
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positions of power, these criminal structures reportedly still exist in Serbia 
today.131   
 
These institutions must be disabled before the positive impacts of the ICTY can be 
measured in the region.  Lustration policies are one of the most important steps in 
disabling structures that incite hatred.  These policies are most frequently carried out by 
national governments and involve removing state officials and military leaders who were 
involved in perpetuating the campaign of ethnic cleansing.  The ICTY cannot be, nor 
should it be, the primary tool for carrying out lustration policies.  However, by indicting 
culpable individuals in state institutions, the Tribunal could help disrupt the cycle of 
violence and hatred that fueled the conflict.  As discussed in the analysis of individual 
criminal responsibility, the ICTY did succeed in arresting and prosecuting a few of the 
key leaders of the mass violence in the former Yugoslavia.  Yet, in 2000 the International 
Crisis Group (ICG) reported that over 75 people directly connected to the perpetration of 
mass human rights violations, remained in positions of power in the Republika Srpska.  
This statistic is yet more evidence that the ongoing conflict negatively influenced the 
ICTY’s ability to locate and purge personnel who supported the violence. 
The decision to locate the ICTY in The Hague, the Netherlands, was practical 
considering the active conflict and decimated judicial system in the territories of the 
former Yugoslavia.  It is important to note that the location of the Tribunal was a direct 
result of the timing of the ICTY.  Had the Tribunal been established in the aftermath of 
conflict, chances increase that it be located closer to the ‘scene of the crimes’. Neil Kritz 
states, “[i]t is axiomatic that the weaker the connection between the international 
operation and the local population, the easier it will be for its work to be ignored or 
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dismissed as an alien effort irrelevant to the concerns of the country.”132  Proximity to the 
affected population is essential for a number of reasons, one of which is the hope that an 
international tribunal will contribute to the rebuilding of the national judicial system.133  
Many proponents of international criminal tribunals posit that tribunals play an important 
role in internalizing a respect for human rights in the judicial system of a state or region 
where mass human rights violations have occurred.134  In the case of the former 
Yugoslavia, members of the domestic judiciary were marginally involved in the justice 
process.  The geographic distance of the Tribunal created a situation where the pursuit of 
justice was largely removed from the populations most affected by the violence. The task 
of re-establishing the rule of law in the context of mass human rights violations is a 
monumental task, which must involve international and domestic efforts originating from 
many different sources.  The ICTY was crippled by the ongoing conflict and the many 
predicaments it presented.  How do you re-establish law in a region that is in the midst of 
atrocities and armed violence?  The ICTY’s failure to fully dismantle responsible 
institutions and impart norms of human rights to the national judiciary was directly 
related to the circumstances in which it was forced to operate. 
Creation and distribution of historical record 
 The creation and dissemination of an accurate historical record is the third 
objective sought by the ICTY.  As a judicial organ, the ICTY contributes to building an 
historical record in a number of ways. There are varying opinions about the ability of any 
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sort of legal institution to truly capture the horror of atrocities such as genocide.135  This 
argument has merit, but I believe that judicial organs do produce records that can 
contribute to acknowledging specific events that occur during mass violence. Legal 
prosecutions and the focus on personal criminal responsibility transfers guilt that may be 
placed on an entire group, to individuals.  A successful trial depends on evidence and 
witness testimonies.  The documents created by trials help to establish the overall context 
in which mass violence took place.  Legal records also reveal truth about victims’ and 
perpetrators’ personal experiences during the violence. In the case of the former 
Yugoslavia, the creation and distribution of such a record is of the utmost importance.  
The Tribunal must be viewed as legitimate, if properly distributed an accurate account of 
events reinforces the validity of the ICTY in the eyes of affected populations. Similar to 
the difficulties encountered in the ICTY’s attempt to re-establish rule of law, the ongoing 
conflict and the resultant location of the Tribunal negatively impacted its ability to 
achieve this third objective. To the extent that legal prosecutions help create an historical 
record, the ICTY achieved its goal.  Unfortunately, the ICTY has not been able to 
effectively distribute this record to those to whom it is most important—namely, the 
people residing in the region of the former Yugoslavia.  
 It is difficult to empirically measure the extent to which information on legal 
prosecutions in The Hague, have reached people in Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
etc.  Ideally, outreach by an international court would utilize a number of different tools 
including television, radio, newspaper publications, and live broadcasts of trials. Each of 
these helps to establish a connection between a distant tribunal and the people who 
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suffered, witnesses, or participated in the violence.  There is sufficient evidence to 
suggest that the ICTY has not done an adequate job of disseminating information that 
could offset perceptions of bias.  Akhavan states,  
[t]o the extent that peoples in the former Yugoslavia are denied access to 
proceedings of the ICTY, the truth exposed through the judicial process 
may have no appreciable impact on interethnic reconciliation...[a]s a 
result, the forces that fomented ethnic violence in the first place remain 
free to influence the way in which the work of the Tribunal is perceived.136 
 
It is generally agreed upon that the conflict in the former Yugoslavia was not one based 
solely on long-standing ethnic hatred.  Rather, Milošević and other leaders used the 
language of ethnic hatred to consolidate power in the hands of Serbian nationalists.  The 
ICTY’s mandate includes the restoration and maintenance of peace.  It is essential that 
the ethnic hatred that was so vigorously encouraged during the conflict be deconstructed.  
Trials, and the information they expose, can help counter those that deny the occurrence 
of events or their responsibility in perpetrating the crimes.137 In May 2002, the National 
Democratic Institute for International Affairs “found that eighty per cent of 1,300 Serbs 
believed the Tribunal prosecutes Serbs more vigorously than it does non-Serbs, while 
fifty-seven percent said they were convinced the trial was unjust.”138 These statistics, 
gathered almost a decade after the creation of the Tribunal, reveal that ICTY outreach 
attempts have not reached the necessary populations.  Studies conducted in 2004 and 
2005, by the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights and Strategic Marketing found that 
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approximately 72% of Serbs did not understand what the ICTY does.139  Part of this 
failure is due to the language barrier between the Tribunal proceedings (official 
languages are English and French) and the people in the region where the crimes were 
committed. In 1998-1999 the ICTY Outreach Program was created to address issues of 
accessibility.  Currently, the official website provides videos for viewing trial 
proceedings.140  The Program also translates court documents into the region’s native 
languages.  This is a major step toward alleviating the accusations of bias that continue to 
haunt the Tribunal.  However, trials are hardly accessible to the average viewer—they are 
long, opaque, and conducted in legal jargon that few people outside of the legal 
profession are familiar with.141  
The timing of the ICTY negatively influenced its ability to create and disseminate 
an historical record.  The ongoing conflict made it necessary for the ICTY to be located 
outside of the region in which the atrocities took place. The Tribunal thus suffered lack of 
access to evidence and testimony. Ultimately, the physical distance between the trial 
proceedings and the target population resulted in perceptions of bias that threatens the 
legitimacy of the Tribunal’s pursuit of justice.  Studies conducted in 2006, indicate that 
the Serb opinions of the Tribunal are beginning to improve.142  It remains to be seen 
whether the ICTY will be considered a legitimate instrument of justice in the years to 
come.    
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Deterrence 
 The ICTY’s ability to achieve deterrence—general and specific—was 
handicapped from the beginning.  The decision to implement the ICTY during conflict 
resulted in the extended mandate of the Tribunal.  As mentioned previously, the ICTY 
was charged with the restoration and maintenance of peace, as well as the pursuit of 
criminal justice.143  For a judicial organ with no real enforcement capabilities, operating 
in the midst of continued violence, this is a tall order. Ultimately, the ICTY did little to 
stop the continuation of atrocities. Lilian Barria and Steven Roper write, “The existence 
of the Tribunal and the possibility of being indicted did not seem to encourage an ending 
of hostilities and the examination of peaceful methods to solve the differences between 
the Bosnian Serbs, Croats and Muslims.”144  The ICTY was implemented approximately 
a year after the conflict in the former Yugoslavia began and thousands of people had 
already been killed. The July 1995 attack on Srebrenica is the most startling indication 
that the ICTY had no deterrent effect.  This attack, led by Mladić’s forces, resulted in the 
massacre of approximately 8,000 Muslim civilians. The ICTY was established two years 
prior to the Srebrenica murders.  It is evident that the threat of criminal prosecution did 
little to dissuade Serb forces from carrying out the massacre.  The ICTY’s failure to 
achieve its fourth objective is due, in large part, to its lack of enforcement capabilities. 
Kenneth Rodman suggests that any potential deterrent effect was significantly reduced 
since large-scale atrocities had already been committed.  He states, “by the time an 
international criminal tribunal asserts jurisdiction in an ongoing conflict, large-scale 
atrocities have already occurred and responsibility almost certainly resides in the top 
                                                
143 The ICTY’s mandate was laid out in UNSC Resolution 827, supra 93. 
144 Lilian A. Barria and Steven D. Roper, “How Effective are International Criminal Tribunals? An 
Analysis of the ICTY and ICTR,” The International Journal of Human Rights 9 (Sept., 2005): 358. 
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leadership of the governments and rebel groups”.145  By the time the Yugoslav Tribunal 
was fully operational there was little motivation for people such as General Ratko Mladić 
to stop committing atrocities.  
 It is important to note that the ICTY’s failure to achieve its final goal of 
deterrence is due, in large part, to its absolute lack of enforcement powers.  There is no 
ICTY ‘police force’ to ensure that the threat of prosecution is carried out. Rodman posits, 
“The ICTY’s contribution to stigmatizing extremists, and deterring ethnic violence, in 
post-Dayton Bosnia only became possible because of the NATO air campaign”.146 As 
will be seen in the remaining case studies the ICTY was not alone in its lack of 
enforcement powers or in its failure to achieve a deterrent effect.  
Conclusion 
The ongoing conflict in the territories of the former Yugoslavia made it more 
difficult for the ICTY to achieve its four objectives.  As the first ad hoc international 
criminal tribunal established by the UNSC, the ICTY confronted the multiple challenges 
of being the first of its kind. Yet, the challenges facing the ICTY were made more acute 
due to its implementation during ongoing conflict and continued atrocities. The case of 
the ICTY leads me to conclude that ongoing conflict negatively impacted the ability of 
the ICTY to achieve its four objectives. The timing of the Tribunal was significant 
because it complicated the ability for the ICTY to do the following: ensure the security of 
staff, personnel, and witnesses; collect evidence; gather witness testimony; apprehend 
suspects; and access the most affected population. The ongoing conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia made the activities necessary for an effective tribunal, difficult to complete. 
                                                
145 Rodman, “Limits of Deterrence,” 535.  
146 Ibid., 560.  
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Even before the ICTY was formally established, the conflict dictated the terms of the 
Tribunal.  Due to the violence that continued unabated in the former Yugoslavia, the 
ICTY was forced to operate from The Hague.  The distant location in turn, made it much 
more difficult for the ICTY to create and distribute an accurate historical record to the 
people who could benefit the most from the proceedings—the population who were 
witnessing, suffering, and participating in the atrocities. The case of the ICTY 
demonstrates just how important timing can be in influencing the conditions in which a 
tribunal operates.  The failures of the ICTY cannot all be attributed to its having been 
implemented during conflict.  The next case study examines the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, a tribunal that was established in the aftermath of conflict.  The 
case study of the ICTY demonstrates that ongoing conflict makes the challenges of 
pursuing justice more acute.  However, the case of the ICTR shows that even in the 
absence of conflict, problems remain.  
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Chapter III: The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
Pursuing Justice in the Absence of Conflict: 
The Influence of Delayed Implementation 
 
Introduction 
On 6 April 1994 Hutu extremists in Rwanda began a violent campaign to 
exterminate all Tutsis and their supporters.  For three months the massacre continued and 
resulted in more than 800,000 deaths—over ten percent of Rwanda’s total population. 
After a period of horror that defies description, the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Army147 
(RPA) gained control of Kigali, Rwanda, on 17 July 1994. The genocide left Rwanda 
devastated.  In September 1994, the Rwandese government requested that the UN create 
an ad-hoc international criminal tribunal to try those responsible for the genocide in 
Rwanda.  At the time of the government’s request, the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia was operational.  The ICTY served as a useful precedent; the 
United Nations Security Council heeded the Rwandese request and passed Resolution 
955, thereby creating the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).  The 
ICTR, located in Arusha, Tanzania, is currently in progress and is expected to complete 
all trials by the end of 2009.148 
 The establishment of the ICTR occurred in much different circumstances than that 
of its sister tribunal in the former Yugoslavia. In the former Yugoslavia, a tribunal was 
implemented in the midst of conflict and continued atrocities. In the case of Rwanda, it 
was only after the killings had ended that a tribunal was conceived of and implemented. 
                                                
147 The Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) refers to the military arm of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a 
Tutsi-dominated political party.  I distinguish accordingly.  
148 Located in Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania by United Nations Security Council Resolution 977, 
22 February 1995.  
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Serious consideration of creating a tribunal for Rwanda was only voiced in the wake of 
the massacres, by which time the RPF government was installed and in control of a 
relatively stable government in Rwanda. This difference in timing means that the Rwanda 
Tribunal provides an alternative lens through which to assess the effectiveness of 
prosecutorial accountability mechanisms. This chapter will focus on how implementation 
in the aftermath of conflict influences the ICTR’s ability to achieve the four objectives of 
accountability mechanisms.149  
The delayed timing of the ICTR’s implementation was significant in that the 
absence of conflict allowed for certain conditions to arise that proved favorable to the 
ICTR’s operations.  The absence of conflict allowed for the following: the installation of 
a new and stable government, a cessation of hostilities resulting in increased security for 
tribunal staff and personnel, and better access to evidence and witnesses. Due to the 
delayed timing, the RPF government was able to gain effective control of the political 
and military affairs of the nation.  The infrastructure of Rwanda was destroyed after three 
months of killing, yet the Rwanda Tribunal (unlike its predecessor in the former 
Yugoslavia) was not faced with some of the obstacles presented by pursing justice in 
ongoing conflict. The circumstances in which the ICTR was implemented clearly 
improved its chances of success. The ICTR’s implementation in the absence of conflict 
helped alleviate some of the problems that plagued the Yugoslav Tribunal’s operations.150 
However, establishing the Rwanda Tribunal in the aftermath of mass violence did not 
                                                
149 These objectives are: to pursue individual criminal responsibility; to establish the rule of law; to create 
and distribute an accurate historical record, and finally, to deter future atrocities in Rwanda and around the 
world. 
150 The case study on the ICTY illustrated some of these challenges, most notably: difficulty obtaining 
evidence due to active conflict and destruction of material evidence, lack of security for witnesses, judges 
and prosecutors, struggles in creating a legal record that is properly disseminated to affected populations, 
and low levels of perceived legitimacy. 
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resolve all the challenges confronted by the ICTY.  To this day, the ICTR must contend 
with certain difficulties caused by the existence of the RPF government.  The ICTR’s 
main challenge in this regard stems from Hutus who believe the RPF government wants 
to use the Rwanda Tribunal to seek revenge for Hutu crimes during the genocide.  This 
perception of ‘victor’s justice’ arises from the fact that the RPF government took power 
by disposing the previous regime. The Rwandan Patriotic Army, a rebel army composed 
mainly of Tutsis, successfully overthrew the extremist Hutu regime that had presided 
over the genocide.  Two main components contribute to the threat that the ICTR will 
carry out a limited victor’s justice.  First, after the RPF’s defeat of the extremist Hutu 
government, the RPF government’s subsequent request for the establishment of a tribunal 
proves to some (Hutu extremists) that the ICTR will be a cover for Tutsi-led vengeance. 
Its identity as a Tutsi-dominated party has major implications for the perceived fairness 
of the ICTR. Secondly, although the vast majority of genocide victims were Tutsi, 
targeted killing by the RPA is also well documented. In Alison Des Forge’s 
groundbreaking account of the Rwandan genocide, she reports that approximately 30,000 
Hutu were murdered during the RPF’s struggle to regain control of Rwanda.151 The 
failure of the ICTR to investigate crimes committed by the Rwandan Patriotic Army 
continues to be a point of contention and concerns have been raised that the Tribunal is 
helping to carry out victor’s justice.  
Despite the fact that the United Nations and the ICTR had no part in this victory, 
there is a danger that the justice rendered by the Tribunal will be negatively affected by 
this perceived bias. If Hutus believe the Tribunal is merely a tool for vengeance, it is 
                                                
151 Alison Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda, Human Rights Watch (March, 
1999): 537-551.  
 72 
unlikely that the divisions between Tutsi and Hutu will be healed.  As Mark Drumbl 
notes, the perceived legitimacy of the ICTR “is a key factor in determining whether the 
society remains postgenocidal or intergenocidal…societies are always over shadowed by 
the possibility that genocide may reoccur.”152 The ICTR case demonstrates that certain 
weaknesses of tribunals remain regardless of timing.  
The absence of conflict facilitated the ICTR’s ability to achieve the objectives of 
individual criminal accountability and the re-establishment of rule of law. Article 1 of the 
Statute indicates that individual accountability is achieved by prosecuting most 
responsible for the crimes committed. Responsibility extends to those who planned and 
instigated the violence as well as those who carried it out.153 The main boon to the 
Tribunal was the existence of the RPF government. Individual accountability was easier 
to attain because many of those who helped plan and carry out the genocide were 
captured when the RPF entered Kigali in mid-July. Security of witnesses, prosecutors and 
judges was better ensured. To evaluate the ability of the ICTR to establish rule of law, I 
examine two factors: 1) the Tribunal’s ability to dismantle institutions that contributed to 
perpetuating the genocide, and 2) the extent to which the Tribunal succeeded in 
supporting and augmenting the national judicial system by providing an alternative 
means of prosecutorial justice. The RPF victory also ensured that institutions guilty of 
inciting hatred (such as various radio stations) were shut down. The national judiciary 
                                                
152 Mark A. Drumbl, “Punishment, Postgenocide: From Guilt to Shame to Civis in Rwanda,” New York 
University Law Review 75 (2000): 1239. 
153 UN Security Council, Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda (as last amended on 13 October 
2006), 8 November 1994. Art.6 , available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,UNSC,INTINSTRUMENT,RWA,456d621e2,3ae6b3952c,0.html 
(accessed 18 July 2008), [Hereinafter ICTR Statute]. 
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benefited from the RPF’s willingness to work alongside the ICTR in holding individuals 
accountable.  
The last two objectives of the tribunal: the creation and dissemination of an 
accurate historical record and the deterrence of future atrocities did not fare as well. To 
assess the ICTR’s success in the creation and distribution of a historical record, I analyze 
two factors: 1) the extent to which the ICTR was able to create a full and unbiased 
account of the genocide and, 2) its success in disseminating this record to the population 
most affected—in this case, Rwandan citizens. I conclude that the creation of an 
historical record was hindered due to the perceived bias of the RPF government that had 
requested the establishment of the ICTR.  Additionally, the Tribunal was ineffective in 
disseminating information on the trials and activities of the Court. Two levels of 
deterrence are evaluated—specific and general. In the context of Rwanda, specific 
deterrence refers to the prevention of future atrocities committed in Rwanda by those 
affected by the violence.  This violence could be in the form of retaliation and revenge, or 
further anti-Tutsi murders. General deterrence suggests the prevention of all future 
atrocities.  The ICTR definitively failed in its attempt to deter future crimes, both general 
and specific. This failure demonstrates that problems continue to haunt international 
tribunals even without the complications presented by ongoing conflict.  
Although my findings focus on how absence of conflict influenced the ICTR’s 
effectiveness, I would be remiss in not considering another influential factor: structure.  
that influenced the ICTR.  I identify two additional factors that must be considered for a 
complete analysis of the ICTR’s effectiveness: the structure of the mechanism (ie: ad hoc 
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international tribunal) and the location of the mechanism154. The influence of structure on 
the effectiveness of ad hoc international criminal tribunals warrants further in-depth 
research.  This project does not spend considerable time analyzing its impact. 
Nevertheless, a brief overview will raise questions that should be considered and 
expanded upon in further research of international justice mechanisms. 
Genocide in Rwanda: Context and Events 
 On 6 April 1994, a plane carrying Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana and 
President Ntaryamira of Burundi was shot down.155 Both men died and over the next 
three months an estimated 800,000 people were killed in Rwanda.156 The killings in 
Rwanda were brutal and torture and rape were rampant during the three months in which 
the violence took place.  The genocide was planned, instigated and carried out by Hutu 
extremists against Tutsis and moderate Hutus, and a staggering number of ‘ordinary’ 
Hutu citizens also participated in the mass killings.  The atrocities ended when the 
Rwandan Patriotic Army, composed primarily of Tutsis operating out of Uganda, invaded 
Rwanda and took control of the government in mid July 1994.157 I provide a summary of 
                                                
154 A factor that I will not address but that deserves to be noted is the existence or non-existence of 
domestic justice efforts.  There is a growing body of research on the relationship between ad hoc 
international tribunals and domestic efforts to pursue justice and reconciliation.  Much of the literature 
focuses on the interaction between international tribunals and truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs). 
I choose not to engage this factor because I believe that a brief summary would not do justice to the issue. 
155 It remains unclear what group is responsible for shooting down the plane.  There is some evidence that 
President Habyarimana was shot down by members of his own government.  It is thought that these Hutu 
extremists used the death of the President as a catalyst for the begging of the mass violence that followed. 
See Mark A. Drumbl, “Sclerosis: Retributive Justice and the Rwandan Genocide,” Punishment and Society 
2 (2000): 387-308. 
156 Estimates of number killed range from 500,000 to over 1 million. 
157 Madeline H. Morris, “The Trials of Concurrent Jurisdiction: The Case of Rwanda,” Duke Journal of 
Comparative & International Law 7 (Spring, 1997): 350.  
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the relevant history of Rwanda158 and the important events of the genocide. I briefly 
examine the reaction of the United Nations before, during, and after the violence. 
 Like the majority of other countries in Africa, Rwanda was under colonial rule 
until independence in 1962.  Prior to World War I, present-day Rwanda was under 
German control. In 1923, Rwanda was placed under Belgian rule as part of the League of 
Nations mandate system. During its time as a Belgian-controlled colony, the social 
classes were highly stratified along ethnic lines. The familiar refrain of long-standing 
ethnic hatred between the Tutsis and Hutus was, according to the majority of 
contemporary scholars, one based on ethnic identities that were solidified and 
manipulated during colonial rule. On this subject, scholar Filip Reyntjens states “[a] 
number of interventions by the Belgian administration streamlined, reinforced and 
exacerbated ethnic belonging, and eventually turned the ‘ethnic groups’ into politically 
relevant categories.”159  European notions of racial superiority, which deemed the Tutsi to 
be of European ancestry, granted the Tutsi population privilege in positions in the 
education, military and governmental spheres.160 As far back as the 17th century, the 
minority Tutsi was estimated as 10% of the population, the Hutus comprised the majority 
of the remaining 80%161.  Tensions between the Hutu majority and the Tutsi minority 
continued to mount and in February 1957, Hutu elites issued the ‘Bahutu Manifesto’.  
                                                
158 For an in-depth history of Rwanda see: Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide, 
(New York: NY, Columbia University Press, 1995).  
159 Filip Reyntjens, “Rwanda: Genocide and Beyond,” Journal of Refugee Studies 9 (1996): 243. 
160 Helen M. Hintjens, “Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda,” The Journal of Modern African 
Studies 37 (1999): 253. See also: Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto, “International Justice for Rwanda Missing 
the Point: Questioning the Relevance of Classical Criminal Law Theory,” Bond Law Review (2001): 196. 
161 Christine L. Kellow and Leslie H. Steeves, Kellow, “The Role of Radio in the Rwandan Genocide,” 
Journal of Communication (Summer, 1998): 113. 
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This document “expressed the Hutu elite’s desire to end Tutsi dominance once and for 
all.”162 
  The proliferation of political parties prior to the Revolution was evidence of the 
massive strain between the Hutu and Tutsi populations.163 In 1959 a breaking point was 
reached. The Revolution of 1959 was initiated by the Hutus with the support of the 
Belgians, who in the late 1950s had ended its political alliance with the Tutsis.164 In 1962 
Rwanda gained its independence but the Hutu-led Revolution claimed approximately 
10,000 Tutsi lives.165 The violent Revolution caused a large number of Tutsis to flee 
Rwanda and seek refuge in neighboring countries. Some of those who fled Rwanda after 
the 1959 Revolution amassed in the neighboring countries of Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania 
and Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo). These refugees formed a number 
of armed groups, which then launched attacks on the Hutu-led government of Rwanda.166  
In 1973, Major General Juvenal Habyarimana seized power of the government in 
a coup.  Habyarimana, a Hutu, formed the National Revolutionary Movement for 
Development (MRND), which operated as the sole political party in Rwanda.  The 
policies adopted by the MRND and promoted by President Habyarimana sought to 
consolidate power in the hands of the Hutu.167 The Hutu elites also continued the 
Belgian-established practice of including ethnic origin on identity cards.168 Violence 
against the Tutsi minority was common during this period. Jose Alvarez notes, “[i]n 1990 
                                                
162 Hintjens, “Explaining the 1994 Genocide”, 255.  
163 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 47-54. 
164 Hintjens, “Explaining the 1994 Genocide”, 255. 
165 Kellow and Steeves, “The Role of Radio”, 113.  
166 Ibid., 114.  
167 Ibid., 114. 
168 In the 1930s the Belgians introduced identity cards in order to distinguish between Hutus and Tutsis. 
See: Alain Destexhe, Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century, (London: UK, Pluto Press, 1995), 
40.  
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to 1991, amid continuing massacres of Tutsis, the Rwandan army began to train and arm 
civilian militias known as the interahamwe”.169  The interahamwe, translated as “those 
who stand together” became a major player in the mass violence that enveloped Rwanda 
in the early 1990s. 
 On 1 October 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Front based out of northern Uganda, 
invaded Northern Rwanda.  The RPF was composed largely of Rwandan Tutsis who had 
fled the country in the wake of the Revolution in 1959.170  The invasion started a conflict 
between the RPF and the Hutu-led Rwandan government that did not quiet until 1992, at 
which time negotiation processes began.  The negotiations resulted in the short-lived 
Arusha Peace Agreements, signed in August 1993.171  The Agreements were lauded as 
the paradigm of conflict resolution, and contained provisions that required President 
Habyarimana to cooperate with demands for a multi-party system in Rwanda.  The 
Accords also included provisions for integration of Tutsis into the Hutu-dominated 
national armed forces, and addressed the issue of repatriation and resettlement of the 
peoples (mostly Tutsi) that had been displaced during and after the 1959 Revolution.172   
Unfortunately, the implementation of the Arusha Accords was entirely 
unsuccessful. The protocols set out by the Accords were immensely unpopular with the 
majority of the Hutu elites in Rwanda.  There was deep suspicion that the RPF would not 
                                                
169 Alvarez, “Crimes of States/Hate,” 389. 
170 Stef Vandeginste, “Rwanda: Dealing with Genocide and Crimes against Humanity in the Context of 
Armed Conflict and Failed Political Transition,” in Burying the Past, ed. Nigel Biggar, (Georgetown, MD: 
Georgetown University Press, 2001), 224.  
171 At different points in the negotiation process, the Arusha Accords involved numerous state parties.  
Uganda, Tanzania, Zaire, France, Belgium and the United States played roles (some smaller than others) in 
the successful negotiation of the Accords.  For details on various states’ involvement with the Arusha 
Accords see J. Stettenheim, “The Arusha Accords and the Failure of International Intervention in Rwanda,” 
in Words over War: Mediation and Arbitration to Prevent Deadly Conflict, eds., Melanie C. Greenberg, 
John H. Barton and Margaret E. McGuinness, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield: 2000). 
172 Vandeginste, “Rwanda: Dealing with Genocide,” 225. 
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uphold the cease-fire.  One of the most contentious issues of the Accords was the 
provision regarding the integration of the armed forces.  Joel Stettenheim notes that 
President Habyarimana’s government was prepared to offer a 20 percent quota to the 
RPF, but the RPF demanded a fifty-fifty split.173 Stettenheim cites political infighting, an 
ineffective security force and extremists’ plans for violence as important factors in the 
collapse of the Arusha Accords.  He particularly emphasizes that the “extremists’ plans 
was the development of a rural militia and the manipulation of ethnicity to create a 
climate of fear.”174  By the time President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down on 6 April 
1994, a climate of fear was in place.  Mass violence erupted the next day.   
Militias such as the interahamwe, the Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR) of the 
Presidential Guard, local ‘defense’ groups and individual citizens participated. Hundred 
of thousands of civilians who had never killed before, freely murdered their neighbors. In 
much of the literature, academic and personal accounts, the particularly personal nature 
of the genocide is noted. Alain Destexhe explains, “pupils were killed by their teachers, 
shop owners by their customers, neighbour killed neighbour and husbands killed 
wives”.175  The brutality of the genocide in Rwanda is well documented. In Mahmood 
Mamdani’s seminal work When Victims Become Killers he explains, “it required not one 
but many hacks of a machete to kill even one person. With a machete, killing was hard 
work, that is why there were often several killers for every single person”.176  Systematic 
planning was evident and the spread of anti-Tutsi propaganda helped spur the killing 
                                                
173 Stettenheim, “The Arusha Accords”, 231.  
174 Ibid., 232. 
175 Destexhe, Rwanda and Genocide, 31. 
176 Mahmood Mamdani. When Victims Become Killers, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).  
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on.177  The genocide continued until 19 July 1994, when the RPF successfully installed a 
new government in the capital of Kigali. The RPF government gained control of a 
country whose infrastructure was entirely destroyed by the killing. The Rwandan judicial 
system was in ruins and it is estimated that only sixteen lawyers were alive at the end of 
the killing.178  High-level leaders of the genocide who had not been killed during the RPF 
capture of Kigali were removed from government posts. Those who were not arrested or 
killed fled the country.  In the immediate aftermath of the genocide a large number of 
internally displaced peoples, refugees, and Hutus who feared retaliatory killings by the 
new government flooded into neighboring countries.  
In the extant literature, the genocide in Rwanda is recognized as a result of one of 
three factors: ethnic hatred (either created or inherent), a Hutu-led struggle for 
consolidation of political power, and a series of failed economic policies. It is unlikely 
that any one factor can be identified as the catalyst for genocide, and an answer to this 
query is not of vital importance to this thesis. A combination of one or more of the above 
factors seems the most likely explanation for an event whose horror resists human 
logic.179  
                                                
177 The deliberate nature of the genocide is proven in part by the massive propaganda operation that 
preceded it and continued for the duration of the violence. The most widely recognized propaganda tool 
was the radio. José Alvarez notes that the genocide was “the product of a heavily orchestrated 
campaign…dating back to the mid-1993 founding of Radio-Télévision Libre des Milles Collines 
(RTLM)…[w]ell before 1994, RTLM began broadcasting vitriolic appeals to private militias and 
individuals intended to incite killings of Tutsis” and moderate Hutus.  In a study on the effects of media on 
the genocide Christine Kellows and Leslie Steeves assert that the radio broadcasts prior to the outbreak of 
violence contributed to a type of psychological conditioning that paved the way for mass participation in 
the genocide. See Hintjens, “Explaining the 1994 Genocide”, 253; Kellow and Steeves, “The Role of 
Radio”, 113; Alvarez, “Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate”, 392.  
178 Roman Boed, “The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,” in Post-Conflict Justice, ed. M. 
Cherif Bassiouni, 487-499 (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers Inc., 2002). 495 
179 Many scholars have dedicated much time and importance to the study of causes of the genocide.  For 
more information on this issue see: Eugenia Zorbas, “Reconciliation in Post-Genocide Rwanda,” African 
Journal of Legal Studies 1 (2004); Peter Uvin, “Reading the Rwandan Genocide,” International Studies 
Review 3 (Autumn 2001); J. Stettenheim, “The Arusha Accords and the Failure of International 
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As the genocide in Rwanda was perpetrated, the world looked on and the primary 
bodies of global governance, namely the United Nations, did nothing. Some scholars and 
human rights advocates blame the colossal death toll in Rwanda on the inaction of the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC).  For the purposes of examining the ICTR, 
pointing fingers is not a productive exercise.  In the next section I will examine the role 
of the international community during the time period before, during, and after the 
genocide in Rwanda.  I probe this matter not in an effort to place blame, but rather 
because the international community and specifically the UNSC is inextricably linked to 
the creation and operation of the ICTR.  
 Security Resolution 872 established the United Nations Assistance Mission For 
Rwanda (UNAMIR) in October 1993.  Its primary responsibility was to oversee the 
implementation of the Arusha Accords.180 UNAMIR, initially composed of 
approximately 2,500 military personnel, was also responsible for monitoring the security 
during the time period in which the Accords would be carried out.181  UNAMIR was on 
the ground when the genocide began, and the United Nations’ decision to diminish its 
numbers in the midst of mass violence against Tutsis and Hutu moderates earned it much 
criticism. Central to this decision was a debate on the efficacy of an enlarged UNAMIR 
force.  Would a larger force be able to halt current violence and prevent further death? 
Or, were the peacekeepers essentially impotent in their ability to stem the killing?   The 
death of ten Belgian peacekeepers just one day into the violence, and Belgium’s 
                                                                                                                                            
Intervention in Rwanda,” in Words over War: Mediation and Arbitration to Prevent Deadly Conflict, eds., 
Melanie C. Greenberg, John H. Barton and Margaret E. McGuinness, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2000); Destexhe, Rwanda and Genocide.; Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers. This list is 
nowhere is nowhere near exhaustive, but will help to guide you to any further research you may desire.   
180 Alan J. Kuperman, “Rwanda in Retrospect,” Foreign Affairs 79 (January/February, 2000): 96. 
181 “United Nations Assistance Mission For Rwanda: UNAMIR (October 1993-March 1996) available at: 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unamir.htm (accessed 9 January 2009). 
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subsequent withdrawal of all their forces involved in UNAMIR, seemed to convince 
other nations that there was too much danger in sending reinforcements. After 
deliberation by the UN Security Council, the decision was made to diminish UNAMIR’s 
presence to a mere 270 military personnel.182  Michael Barnett explains that by 
significantly reducing UNAMIR the remaining “UN troops were instantly confronted by 
two increasingly untenable tasks: protecting the lives of civilians and defending 
themselves.”183 It is widely acknowledged that the UNAMIR commander, General 
Roméo Dallaire, made a valiant effort to achieve both tasks.  Ultimately, Dallaire and the 
rest of the UNAMIR personnel were thwarted by the mass violence overtaking the 
country and their skeleton crew of UN soldiers.  
 Throughout the UNSC deliberations, the word ‘genocide’ was notably absent.  
According to numerous scholars there was an extreme hesitancy to use genocide as a 
description of the atrocities being carried out in Rwanda.184 Barnett states, “the Security 
Council was reluctant to utter the word genocide. Its very mention had the raw, discursive 
capacity to demand action…there appeared to be a tacit understanding to avoid such 
inflammatory language.”185 Other scholars are more pointed in their observations on this 
topic. Hintjens suggests that the avoidance was far from tacit. She states, “US 
government employees were reportedly ordered to refrain from using the term ‘genocide’ 
in any official pronouncements on Rwanda.”186 Even human rights organizations did not 
                                                
182 In May this decision was reversed and it was determined that UNAMIR should receive an influx of 
5,500 troops.  However, due to UN member states’ reluctance to provide these reinforcements, they were 
never sent. 
183 Michael N. Barnett, “The UN Security Council, Indifference, and Genocide in Rwanda,” Cultural 
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describe the events in Rwanda as genocide until well into the second week of mass 
killings.187  By the time of this public recognition approximately 100,000 people had 
already been killed in Rwanda with many more to follow. 
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
 The Rwandan government’s request for the creation of a tribunal resulted in five 
months of investigation into the atrocities committed during the Rwandan genocide.  At 
the conclusion of the investigation, a commission of experts (established by the UNSC) 
recommended the immediate creation of a tribunal to try those responsible for the crimes.  
The report provided by the commission references the existence of “overwhelming 
evidence to prove that acts of genocide against the Tutsi group…constitute genocide.”188 
On 8 November 1994 the UNSC adopted Resolution 955, thereby establishing the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.189 The decision was made to base the 
Tribunal in Arusha, Tanzania.  This choice was dictated by the condition of Rwanda after 
months of mass violence.  The Rwandan justice system was decimated and the 
infrastructure of the country was in disarray. Most of the citizens who had judicial or 
legal experience were either dead or had already left the country. In this section I 
introduce basic information on the Rwandan Tribunal. I conclude by presenting the goals 
of the Rwandan Tribunal. 
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 The founding of the Rwandan Tribunal was influenced by the Yugoslav Tribunal, 
which was operating out of The Hague, The Netherlands.  Like the ICTY, the ICTR was 
established under the auspices of Chapter VII powers.  The Security Council deemed the 
situation in Rwanda to “constitute a threat to international peace and security”.190 Early in 
the process of creating the Rwandan Tribunal, it was decided that it would be closely 
linked to the ICTY.  Although the two tribunals would be separate, the Security Council 
determined that in order to preserve “a unity of legal approach, as well as economy and 
efficiency of resources” certain aspects of the tribunals, including the Appeals Chamber, 
would be shared between the two.191 Article 15(3) of the ICTR Statute asserts that the 
prosecutor of the ICTY will also serve as chief prosecutor for the Rwandan Tribunal, but 
may “have additional staff, including an additional Deputy Prosecutor to assist with 
prosecutions before the International Tribunal for Rwanda.” Proponents of this 
connection between the tribunals argued it would protect the continuity of international 
law and consistency of prosecution. This approach also sidestepped the protracted 
selection process involved with choosing a lead prosecutor and necessary judges. Critics 
contended that it handicapped the ability of the ICTR to fulfill its obligations.  Madeline 
Morris points out that with such a gargantuan task facing the Rwandan Tribunal, it 
seemed ill-advised to provide the ICTR with a relatively small staff that is divided 
between two vitally important judicial organs.192 There were also concerns that a shared 
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Prosecutor and Appeals Chamber would hinder the ability of the Tribunal to be duly 
relevant to the unique situation of Rwanda.193 
 Although the two tribunals share a Prosecutor and an Appeals Chamber, the 
nature of the conflict in Rwanda demanded slightly different definitions of the crimes the 
ICTR would prosecute. Instead of defining crimes against humanity as those committed 
“in armed conflict, whether international or internal in character, and directed against any 
civilian population”194, the ICTR Statute designates crimes against humanity as those 
committed “as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population 
on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds”.195  Prior to the Yugoslav 
Tribunal crimes against humanity were mainly recognized as applicable in international 
conflicts only.  The Statute of the Yugoslav Tribunal expanded this customary 
interpretation to include those crimes committed in the midst of internal conflicts. The 
ICTR Statute follows this precedent.  In addition to crimes against humanity, the ICTR’s 
subject-matter jurisdiction includes crimes of genocide.   Due to the non-international 
nature of the conflict, the ICTR also has jurisdiction over violations of Article 3 common 
to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II.196   
Article 7 of the ICTR Statute limits its temporal jurisdiction to those crimes 
committed in Rwanda from the 1 January 1994 to 31 December 1994.  1 January 1994 
was chosen by the Security Council in an attempt to include the planning and 
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organizational stages of the genocide. The end date was chosen in an effort to ensure 
jurisdiction over crimes committed after the Hutu government was ousted in July 1994.197  
Although seemingly specific, these dates are largely arbitrary and indicate compromise 
between the Rwandan Government and the Security Council198. The aforementioned 
compromise on the dates however, necessitates a brief discussion of the Rwandan 
Government’s involvement in the establishment and operation of the Tribunal. 
The Rwandan Government, as early as September 1994, requested a tribunal 
similar to that created for the former Yugoslavia.  In a letter dated 28 September 1994 
from the Representative of Rwanda to the President of the Security Council, the Rwandan 
government stated four justifications.  First, the Rwandan government emphasized, “the 
genocide committed in Rwanda is a crime against humankind and should be suppressed 
by the international community as a whole.”199  Second, the Rwandan government 
desired a tribunal because it wanted to avoid “any suspicion of its wanting to organize 
speedy, vengeful justice.”200 Third, the government believed that a culture of impunity 
could not be allowed to prevail.201  Finally, the Rwandan Government requested an 
international tribunal in the hopes that it would be “easier to get at those criminals who 
have found refuge in foreign countries.”202 Payam Akhavan explains that their 
enthusiasm for supporting a tribunal “resulted in part from the military defeat of the party 
responsible for the genocide, so that the successor government [the Rwandan Patriotic 
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Front]…stood to benefit from the punishment and political isolation of its 
predecessors.”203  
In spite of their initial enthusiasm for a tribunal, the Rwandan Government was 
ultimately dissatisfied with certain aspects of the proposed ad-hoc tribunal.  The 
government disagreed with the limited temporal jurisdiction of the court, believing it 
would not adequately cover the pre-planning and planning stages of the genocide.  The 
Rwandan government hoped for a tribunal that would extend from 1990 through to July 
1994.204  There was also a concern that the ICTR would be wholly ineffective if it were 
forced to share an Appeals Chamber and Prosecutor with the ICTY.205  The Rwandan 
Government voiced opposition to the location of the ICTR.  To locate it in Arusha, 
Tanzania, was to separate it from the people most affected by the genocide. According to 
Ralph Zacklin and Daphna Shraga the Rwandan government’s decision to vote against 
the creation of a tribunal was largely due to “the realization that the International 
Tribunal…was not responsive to the wishes of the Government, in particular that capital 
punishment be imposed on the former leaders and principal planners of the crime of 
genocide.”206 The government was wary of the possible disparity between those who 
were prosecuted nationally versus those criminals who were tried by the ICTR. In 
national courts the death penalty could be imposed on the lesser criminals, yet those 
prosecuted by the ICTR, presumably those ‘most responsible’ for the crimes committed, 
would never face the death sentence.  The Rwandan delegate suggested, “the 
establishment of so ineffective an international tribunal would only appease the 
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conscience of the international community rather than respond to the expectations of the 
Rwandese people and of the victims of genocide in particular.”207 Although Resolution 
955 passed without the vote of Rwanda, the Rwandan Government pledged to support the 
ICTR in accomplishing its objectives. 
The timing of the ICTR meant that the Tribunal had little to do in way of stopping 
active violence; after the RPF took power the killing was largely halted. Unlike the 
ICTY, the Rwandan Tribunal did not have to contend with an ongoing conflict in which 
atrocities were being committed daily. Nevertheless, the ICTR was implemented after a 
genocide that was ostensibly based on the extermination of one ethnic group and those 
who supported them. It would be false to claim that because the killing had ended, peace 
was inevitable. The ICTR’s desire to contribute to the maintenance of peace required it to 
seek the solution to such long-term goals as national reconciliation.  The ICTR also had 
to contend with a country whose infrastructure was completely devastated. 
In contrast to the ICTY, no fierce debate on the seeming disconnect between 
peace and justice ensued.  In Rwanda, the violence was over and so the pursuit of justice 
did not provoke as many concerns as it had during the creation of the ICTY. Due to its 
timing I argue that the ICTR’s challenges were less complex than those of the ICTY. 
From the outset the Rwandan Tribunal did not have to face the difficulties present when 
seeking justice during ongoing mass human rights violations.  This is not to say that there 
were no challenges facing the ICTR. Rather, I believe that the challenges manifested 
themselves differently due to the timing of the ICTR.  In particular, I conclude that the 
delayed timing allowed for the creation of certain conditions conducive to the 
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achievement of the first two goals of the tribunal, individual accountability and re-
establishment of rule of law.  In particular, the timing of the ICTR allowed the RPF 
government to gain effective control over the territory, thereby easing some of the 
processes necessary to the operation of the ICTR. It is important to note however, that 
although timing helped create certain favorable conditions the ICTR’s implementation in 
the aftermath of conflict cannot be directly linked to its failures.  
Analysis 
The ICTR faces four major challenges in rendering justice: the mass participation 
in the genocide, the decimation of Rwanda’s infrastructure—specifically the judicial 
system, the new government established by the victorious RPF, and the escape of 
perpetrators across the border into neighboring countries. These factors cannot be 
overlooked in an investigation of the effectiveness of the Tribunal. Akhavan helpfully 
summarizes the long list of challenges facing the Tribunal. He cites 
the recruitment and placement of qualified international staff on short notice; 
making logistical and security arrangements for criminal investigations in an 
impoverished country devastated by war…gathering the testimony of witnesses 
and victims who are severely traumatized, fearful of reprisals, and often hard to 
find among a massive population of displaced persons and refugees.208 
 
It was clear from the outset that it would be impossible for the ICTR to prosecute even a 
fraction of those who participated in the massacres in Rwanda. Mahmood Mamdani 
explains that the massacres “were carried out by hundred of thousands, perhaps even 
more, and witnessed by millions.”209  The reality of the situation meant that the ICTR, an 
organ created to pursue justice and end impunity, would be forced to concentrate on 
prosecuting those ‘most responsible’, in spite of the fact that this excluded hundreds of 
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thousands of citizens who participated in the genocide.  The second major challenge that 
faced the ICTR is directly related to its establishment in the aftermath of mass violence. 
All wars cause destruction, but the targeted nature of the killing in Rwanda resulted in 
complete devastation of all institutions and infrastructure within the country. The 
decision to operate the Tribunal out of Arusha, Tanzania, was a result of this destruction.  
In this section I provide analysis of the ICTR’s ability to achieve its four 
objectives.  Some goals, such as individual accountability and establishment of rule of 
law, were more successful than others. The creation of an accurate historical record and 
deterrence of future crimes were two goals that proved more elusive.  In the case of the 
ICTR the successes and failures of these objectives are largely due to the existence of the 
RPF government and the corresponding perception of victor’s justice.   The ICTR was 
implemented after conflict and this timing allowed for the creation and consolidation of 
the RPF government.  Due to the extent that the political situation in Rwanda impacted 
the ICTR, I frame my analysis in terms of the Rwandan government and its influence on 
the Tribunal’s effectiveness.  I outline both the hurdles and the advantages presented by 
the timing of the ICTR.  I conclude that the ICTR’s successes are due in large part to the 
timing of its implementation.  It has been particularly effective in its ability to achieve 
individual criminal responsibility. 
In the final part of my analysis I consider the impact of other factors that should 
not be overlooked.  I suggest that the ad-hoc international structure of the ICTR, its 
location in Arusha, Tanzania, and the concurrent national efforts at justice are three 
factors the were also important in shaping the successes and failures of the ICTR.  
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Individual Criminal Accountability 
 The first indictment issued by the ICTR was confirmed in late November 1995.  
In 2003, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1503 urging a 
completion strategy for the Rwandan Tribunal.210 The Security Council called for a 
resolution of trials by the end of 2008 and of all work by 2010.  It soon became clear that 
this time frame was unrealistic and the completion date for trials was revised. In a letter 
dated 21 November 2008, the President of the ICTR assured the Security Council that the 
Tribunal was on schedule to finish all trials by the end of 2009.211  Thus, the Rwanda 
Tribunal is in progress as I write. As of 2 February 2009, 41 cases are concluded and 48 
are in progress.212  The majority of cases brought before the ICTR involve more than one 
accused. Currently, 11 indicted criminals are at large. In this section I present the facts 
and figures of the ICTR.  I begin with a discussion of the early months of the Tribunal, a 
time when it struggled with lack of resources and subsequently the responsibility to take-
on such an overwhelming task.  I then introduce some of the most notable cases the ICTR 
has presided over.  I focus on what is known as the “Military I” trial.213  Military I is a 
single case composed of four accused: Colonel Théoneste Bagosora, Anatole 
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Nsengiyumva, Gratien Kabiligi and Aloys Ntabakuze.214  These men occupied positions 
of varying superiority during the time period in which the genocide took place. I also 
provide a summary of the trial of Jean Kambanda, former Prime Minister of the interim 
government in 1994.  The conclusion of these trials helped contribute to the ICTR’s 
success in achieving its goal of individual criminal responsibility.  
 In the early years of the Tribunal’s operation, resources were scarce.  The 
Security Council’s decision to link the ICTR with its predecessor in the former 
Yugoslavia meant that the human resources needed for such an undertaking were 
severely limited.  The process of issuing indictments, calling witnesses and holding trials 
was impaired by the shortage of staff.  The Rwandan genocide involved such a massive 
number of people and included such appalling destruction that careful investigations of 
cases was paramount to the Tribunals’ ability to ensure fair and efficient trials.  ICTR 
operations in the first months were based in The Hague, while everything was prepared 
for the move to Arusha, Tanzania.  In June 1995, the Tribunal judges held the first 
plenary session in The Hague.215  On 2 September 1998 Jean-Paul Akayesu became the 
first individual convicted by the ICTR.216 Akayesu’s conviction was the first ever in 
which rape was included as a form of genocide. 
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The Military I trial,217 which only recently concluded, is the best example of 
holding accountable those ‘most responsible’ for the events in Rwanda.  The trial, 
commenced on 2 April 2002.  Military I is significant not only in its success at rendering 
justice for crimes specific to Rwanda, but also as a much-needed signal that the ICTR 
could be an effective judicial organ.  Bagosora was tried alongside three others, all of 
whom were accused of multiple counts of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and 
genocide.  
Colonel Théoneste Bagosora was intimately involved in the planning and 
execution of the genocide.218 The formal indictment of Bagosora et al. explains, “The 
incitement to ethnic hatred and violence was a fundamental part of the plan…it was 
articulated, before and during the genocide”.219 Colonel Bagosora was an avid opponent 
of the Arusha Accords.  In the days before the genocide Bagosora, Nsengiyumva, 
Ntabukuze, and other members of the extremist Hutu wing of the government voiced 
their belief that the complete elimination of the Tutsi was the only viable path to lasting 
peace.220  All four men included in Military I distributed arms to the interhamwe and 
other militias that carried out the brutal massacres from 7 April 1994 onwards. Starting in 
early 1993, Nsengiyumva and other members of the military helped train these same 
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militias.221  After President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down, Théoneste Bagosora 
was in effective command of military and political affairs at the time of the genocide.  
Thus, he was deemed responsible for the killings of Prime Minister Agathe 
Uwilingiyimana, numerous opposition leaders and the hundreds of thousands of civilians 
murdered in 100 days.  The Military I trial lasted six years and on 18 December 2008 a 
judgment was handed down. Bagosora, Ntabakuze and Nsengiyumva were all found 
guilty of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, and were subsequently 
sentenced to life imprisonment.222  
Eight years prior to the Military I convictions Jean Kambanda, the former Prime 
Minister of Rwanda’s interim government from 8 April 1994 to 17 July 1994, appeared 
before the ICTR.  Kambanda’s trial, which began on 1 May 1998, was unique in that he 
admitted guilt immediately.223  Kambanda’s guilty plea ensured a quick trial and a 
sentence of life imprisonment was dictated on 4 September 1994.  The decision of the 
ICTR was evidence that no one, not even an acting head of state, was immune to 
prosecution in the face of mass human rights atrocities.   
The ICTR’s prosecution of those who bear the greatest responsibility for crimes 
committed in Rwanda is impressive considering the scale of the atrocities. Because it is 
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literally impossible (and perhaps not advantageous224) to prosecute all those who had a 
hand in the violence, the ICTR targets those who occupied high levels of command at the 
time of the genocide. The devastated infrastructure of post-genocide Rwanda presents the 
second greatest obstruction to the execution of individual accountability.  The national 
justice system, recognized by many scholars as severely limited before the genocide of 
1994,225 was completely destroyed during the violence. Lawyers, judges, college-
educated citizens and active members of the human rights community were 
systematically killed.  As a result the ICTR entered into a situation where Rwandan 
citizens qualified to be employed by the Tribunal, were scarce. Although the Rwanda 
Tribunal is international in structure, essential judicial activities such as conducting 
investigations, collecting evidence, and gathering witness testimonial are necessarily 
based out of Rwanda.  The lack of trained personnel handicapped the ICTR’s ability to 
efficiently complete the pre-trial stage of its prosecutions.  
Fortunately, the timing of the ICTR greatly eased the aforementioned challenges.   
Established in the aftermath of the killings, the Tribunal began its operations with the 
acquiescence and active cooperation of the RPF government.  In the context of fulfilling 
the objective of individual accountability, the RPF’s control over military and political 
affairs in Rwanda was a great advantage to the ICTR.  The willingness of the RPF 
government helped to mediate the hurdles presented by a collapsed infrastructure.226 
Apprehending perpetrators was made considerably easier by the lack of active conflict, 
and the ability of the Tribunal to carry out its operations without the constant threat of 
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armed conflict helped to ensure that individual criminal responsibility was effectively 
pursued.  The ICTR’s most tangible accomplishment is its prosecution of high-level 
officials who participated in the planning of the genocide.  Bringing such important 
suspects to trial helps to counter collective guilt that could be placed on the Hutu as a 
whole. By focusing on individual accountability, especially the prosecution of top 
leaders, single persons receive blame instead of entire sections of a population.227  
The RPA military victory and the subsequent installation of the RPF government 
effectively ended the genocide.  However, it also prompted Hutu extremists who were not 
captured by the military to flee into neighboring countries to avoid retribution for their 
crimes. Mamdani estimates that over two million people crossed the Rwandan border 
within a week of the RPF seizure of Kigali.228 Although not all who left Rwanda are 
complicit in the genocide, many are and it is impossible for the ICTR to arrest these 
people unless the countries in which they are now residing choose to relinquish them. 
Even more troubling is the fact that many of these extremists entered refugee camps in 
Uganda and Burundi where they continue to harbor anti-Tutsi sentiments. Some of these 
Hutu extremists have formed armed militias and political alliances and proceeded to 
launch cross border attacks on Rwandan civilians and the RPF government in Kigali.229 
Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto notes the negative impact,  
Thousands of unarmed civilians have been killed across the border…in an 
armed conflict involving several governments, including Rwanda, as well 
as various armed opposition groups, including Rwandese interahamwe 
militia and soldiers of the former Rwandese armed forces.230  
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The political implications of this situation are immensely complicated.  It is not within 
the scope of this chapter to delve into such issues.  Yet it is important to note that the 
continued attacks against the RPF government and the government’s subsequent 
responses will likely have future consequences for the stability of the Rwandan state. 
Rule of Law 
Due to the timing of the Tribunal, the ICTR’s second objective, re-establishing 
the rule of law in Rwanda, has been the easiest to fulfill.  The resolution of the violence 
in Rwanda was such that this goal was, for all intents and purposes, achieved before the 
Tribunal became active. The RPA’s military victory in Kigali led to the arrest and 
imprisonment of some of the people most responsible for the planning and 
implementation of the genocide. Akhavan explains, “the leading Rwandese perpetrators 
of genocide were defeated militarily, removed from state institutions and positions of 
leadership, and are either in refugee camps in neighboring countries or in exile 
elsewhere.”231 Those who were placed in custody of the RPF were easily transferred for 
trial in Arusha. The timing of the ICTR allowed time for the RPF government to 
consolidate power and remove the guilty from public office.  In stark contrast to the 
situation in the former Yugoslavia, the ICTR was not faced with the task of locating and 
investigating suspects in the midst of ongoing violence.  The RPA’s seizure of Kigali in 
mid-July ensured that any high-level Hutu extremists were ousted from positions of 
power. Had violence been ongoing, the Tribunal’s responsibility to dismantle institutions 
such as the radio stations inciting anti-Tutsi fervor, would have been severely limited.  
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Enhancing and rebuilding the national judicial system is one of the most 
important steps in establishing the rule of law in the aftermath of mass violence.  Without 
a functioning legal system it is unlikely that a new regime will retain credibility.  A 
strong judicial system allows the new regime to prosecute persons while maintaining a 
high level of impartiality and legitimacy.  The Rwandan judicial system is a topic that 
warrants (and has received) much attention.  In the time period since the end of the 
genocide there have been serious failures on the part of the national judicial system.  Due 
process has been violated repeatedly and there are thousands upon thousands of suspects 
in Rwandan prisons.  The current state of the national judicial system is lamentable and 
steps need to be taken to address its many failings.  In spite of this, it is undeniable that if 
the ICTR did not exist, the national judicial system would have collapsed under the sheer 
number of suspects. Schabas explains that in the months after the genocide there was 
danger that “the system will be at best distorted and at worst crushed by the demands of 
prosecuting some 87,000 people for genocide.”232 The ICTR cannot and should not serve 
as a tool to build the judicial system up from the ground.  The Tribunal has however, 
greatly alleviated the pressure on the Rwandan national system.233  Due to the mass 
complicity in the genocide, thousands upon thousands of people face prosecution by the 
national courts.  The poor quality of Rwandan prisons and the long periods of detention 
have already earned Rwanda criticism by human rights activists and international law 
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experts.  Although the ICTR is limited in the amount of people it can prosecute, its ability 
to prosecute leaders (whose trials are often the most complicated and intensive) serves as 
a pressure valve for the heavily overburdened national judicial system in Rwanda.234   
If the Tribunal had been implemented in the midst of the genocide, the 
establishment of rule of law would have been complicated exponentially.  Mass violence 
such as that which occurred in Rwanda defies all that is commonly recognized as part of 
a lawful society. The mass participation in the genocide and the rate of killings was 
evidence that the act of committing atrocities became the ‘normal’ course of action.235 
Journalist Philip Gourevitch raises the questions, “What if…murder and rape become the 
rule?” In the case of Rwanda, he concludes that “[d]uring the genocide, the work of the 
killers was not regarded as a crime in Rwanda; it was effectively the law of the land”.236 
It is indisputable that if the ICTR attempted to pursue justice during such violence, it 
would have failed miserably in its goal of re-establishing the rule of law.  
The relatively stable political situation in Rwanda allowed the ICTR the 
opportunity to achieve some measure of success in the pursuit of individual 
accountability and re-establishment of rule of law. However, although the RPF 
government was a boon to the Tribunal in some ways, the relationship between the 
national government and the ICTR proved detrimental in other respects. If the ICTR is to 
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successfully advance the fight against impunity, the issue of victor’s justice must be 
carefully examined and adequately addressed.  
It is essential that the justice the ICTR dispenses be perceived as legitimate.  This 
will be determined by its ability to render justice that is fair, efficient and impartial. The 
post-genocidal government in Rwanda poses a major obstacle to this realization. 
Scholars, advocates and critics alike, frequently reference victor’s justice as a serious 
threat to the overall effectiveness of the ICTR.  Zorbas notes that the concern is that, “the 
RPF, which won a decisive military victory on the one hand…[and] put an end to the 
genocide on the other, is erecting a veiled regime of victor’s justice and collective Hutu 
stigmatization.”237  It is typical that a political transition follows a period of mass 
violence.  In the aftermath of extended atrocities this transition between an oppressor 
regime and its successor is manifest in different ways.  A smooth transition has much to 
do with what principles and objectives the successor regime seeks.  Does the new regime 
want retaliation for past crimes? Is there a desire to prioritize national reconciliation over 
legal justice? Will the new regime make an effort to incorporate all political parties in 
justice efforts?  
Jeremy Sarkin categorizes the RPF government’s transition to power as a one 
based on the “overthrow model”.  In this paradigm, “the dominant forces [Hutu 
extremists] are staunchly opposed to reform and over time the opposition [RPF forces] 
gains significant political strength while the authoritarian regime loses strength.”238  The 
RPF government was not one based on the compromise and consent of warring factions 
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(in this case Hutu extremists versus Tutsis).  In 2000, the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees commented that the RPF government has done little to 
include Hutu in prominent positions within the administration and judicial system.239 
The exclusion of Hutu from the RPF government reinforces a perception of 
victor’s justice. This predominant view of bias on the part of the RPF government is 
especially troubling given the nature of Rwanda’s post-genocidal society. Mark Drumbl 
terms Rwanda’s postgenocidal society as dualist in nature.  He states,  
Rwanda can be studied as a dualist postgenocidal society in which the 
Tutsi, the minoritarian victim group that historically has exerted 
significant economic influence, controls power.  The fundamental paradox 
of a dualist postgenocidal society is that people who have suffered 
unimaginable horrors, in Kant’s phrase, “cannot avoid living side by 
side”.240  
 
The necessity of coexistence between Hutu and Tutsi Rwandans underlie the threat that 
the RPF government poses to the successful pursuit of justice.   Mamdani frames this 
dilemma as a question of “how to build a democracy that can incorporate a guilty 
majority alongside an aggrieved and fearful minority in a single political community.”241 
The ICTR and the Rwandan government are closely linked in the minds of many 
Rwandans.   Individual accountability and the re-establishment of the rule of law 
benefited from the RPF’s hold on power. Yet, the ICTR has also faced criticisms of 
partiality.  The ICTR may be perceived as too closely entwined with the RPF government 
to render unbiased justice.  On the surface, this view may be counter-intuitive since the 
RPF government specifically requested the creation of an international tribunal in order 
to avoid any accusations of victor’s justice.  Yet, many Hutus believe that the RPF 
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government was merely paying lip service to impartiality. Maogoto warns “that the ICTR 
is seen by Hutus, as international punishment by the victors, Tutsis with the blessing and 
support of the United Nations.  Tutsis may themselves see the Tribunal and the genocide 
trials they are conducting in Rwanda as their opportunity for revenge.”242  This is a deep 
concern since victims and perpetrators alike must view the ICTR as a legitimate 
instrument of justice. The ICTR’s failure to investigate and prosecute crimes committed 
by RPF forces both during and after the genocide perpetuates this perception of victor’s 
justice.  
The ICTR’s temporal jurisdiction is restricted to 1 January 1994 through 31 
December 1994.  This limited time frame means that any war crimes committed by the 
RPF forces or acts of retaliation by Tutsi civilians before or after this time, are excluded 
from prosecution.  This is troubling given the amount of evidence of such crimes.  Jose 
Alvarez explains, “the new Rwandan government’s effort to limit the ICTR’s jurisdiction 
to offenses committed before July 1994, if intended to secure impunity for revenge 
crimes committed by Tutsis, represents an example of an attempt to impose one-sided 
‘victor’s justice’”.243  In Alison Des Forge’s authoritative report, Leave None to Tell the 
Story: Genocide in Rwanda, she states, “The RPF killed thousands of civilians both 
during the course of combat…and in the more lengthy process of establishing its control 
throughout the country.”244  The crimes committed by the RPF, including the targeted 
murders of Hutus, will not be investigated by the ICTR.  The narrowed temporal 
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jurisdiction impedes the ICTR’s ability to provide an official record that accurately 
reflects the history of the events.245  
Creation and distribution of historical record 
Without considering the full spectrum of crimes, the historical account of the 
genocide in Rwanda will only tell part of the story. The chances for reconciliation and 
lasting peace decrease if Hutus in Rwanda and abroad feel that the ICTR is a tool the 
RPF government is using to consolidate power. Ascertaining and acknowledging the truth 
in the wake of mass atrocities is an essential forerunner to national reconciliation.  In 
recognition of this fact, the ICTR is responsible for the creation and dissemination of an 
official and accurate historical record. As a form of legal justice, the Rwanda Tribunal 
creates this record through public trials of perpetrators.  Each trial involves the collection 
and presentation of evidence, witness testimony, and arguments by the defense.  These 
factors each contribute to building a record of the genocide in Rwanda. The historical 
record produced by the ICTR is admittedly limited. Unlike a truth and reconciliation 
commission, prosecutorial accountability mechanisms cannot, nor do they seek to, create 
a record that provides a fully rounded analysis of the context of conflict.   
The lack of active conflict in Rwanda at the time of the ICTR’s implementation, 
made fact-finding was made significantly easier.  However, the existence of the 
victorious RPF government has hindered the perceived legitimacy of the Tribunal’s 
findings.  If it is thought that one-sided justice is being pursued, there will be little chance 
that the legal record will be deemed factual and authentic.  The timing of the ICTR 
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helped ease certain aspects of the Tribunal’s operations, but the factor of location had a 
far greater impact on the outcome of this objective.  
The geographic location of a tribunal such as the ICTR is a crucial aspect of the 
process of uncovering truths and acknowledging past horrors. In ideal circumstances all 
international tribunals would operate from the state in which the crimes took place. There 
is an advantage to remaining close to the so-called ‘site of the crimes’.  Steven Ratner 
and Jason Abrams explain that when “trials take place in the country where the offenses 
occurred the entire process becomes more deeply connected with the society, providing it 
with the potential to create a strong psychological and deterrent effect on the 
population.”246 The ICTR has encountered difficulties in creating an official record that 
reaches a maximum number of people.  That being said, in comparison to its sister 
tribunal in The Hague, the ICTR comes much closer to success.  
Arusha, Tanzania, is in relatively close proximity to the population and region 
that experienced the 1994 atrocities. In light of the country’s shattered infrastructure after 
the genocide, it was necessary the Tribunal be located outside the country.  Despite the 
necessity of its location, the ability of the ICTR to effectively access the citizens of 
Rwanda (arguably the most important segment of its audience) is diminished because of 
the Tribunal’s removal from the source location.  Location is particularly important in 
distributing information on the trials and proceedings that the ICTR is involved in. The 
justice the ICTR renders must be open and accountable to the public.  It is essential that 
Rwandan citizens, both victims and perpetrators, continue to be aware of the ICTR’s 
activities.  In December 2008, the ICTR launched a new website including live 
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broadcasts of trial proceedings.  There have been greater attempts to actively engage the 
Rwandan population through accessible written updates and radio transmissions.  These 
efforts show a growing awareness that disseminating information about the justice 
procedures of the ICTR is essential to its effectiveness. 
Deterrence  
The ICTR has failed to have a deterrent effect.  Measurements of deterrence 
usually focus on two types—general and specific.  General deterrence is determined by a 
tribunal’s ability to deter future atrocities from occurring.  These future atrocities are not 
particular to a location; rather it is hoped that the threat of punishment will prevent others 
from committing mass violations of human rights. Deterrence is an extremely elusive 
goal.  It is difficult to ascertain and measure a direct correlation between the existence of 
a prosecutorial accountability mechanism and deterrence—both general and specific. 
Ostensibly, in the case of Rwanda, success in the area of specific deterrence would mean 
the prevention of crimes of revenge and/or continuation of killings by Hutu extremists.  
The Rwanda Tribunal has had little if any deterrent effect on the occurrence of atrocities 
in the world in general, and in Rwanda in specific.  Two situations highlight this failure: 
continued killings by the RPF government and a continuation and expansion of the 
Rwandan conflict into neighboring states.  Each of these situations, especially the 
regional violence which contains traces of the past tension and violence in Rwanda, are 
important topics in and of themselves.  I focus primarily on how these two circumstances 
illuminate the ICTY’s failure to deter future crimes.  
 105 
Scholars, journalists, and human rights groups have reported on politically 
motivated killings by the RPF government in Kigali.247 These killings occurred during 
the RPF take-over of Kigali and are reportedly continuing today.  There is no evidence 
that the existence of the ICTR is linked to a decrease in these attacks. There were not 
huge numbers of retaliatory killings by civilians after the end of the genocide, but this has 
less to do with the Tribunal than it does with the control exerted by the RPF government.  
Hutu extremists across the border have not ceased armed attacks against Rwandan 
civilians and the RPF government forces. In the neighboring Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC), civilians are frequently killed by Hutu-extremists who fled Rwanda after 
the end of the genocide.248  Maogoto notes, “The Rwandese government continues to 
offer support to the rebel Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) part of the deal being 
permission to conduct military operations in the Congolese territory against Hutu 
extremists.”249  The ICTR was neither designed to nor is capable of ending regional 
instability. Yet, as an organ created in the spirit of advancing human rights and 
international criminal law, it was hoped that the justice rendered by the Rwanda Tribunal 
would, through legal prosecutions, ease the strife between Hutu and Tutsi. In light of the 
fact that Hutu extremists and the Rwandan government contribute to the escalating 
violence in the region, it seems reasonable to conclude that the ICTR has done little in the 
way of deterring future violence. Adam Roberts aptly notes that the “continuing bitter 
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conflicts in the African Great Lakes region, including Hutu-Tutsi killings within Rwanda, 
do not suggest that the Tribunal has yet had a significant effect”.250    
Timing did not seem to influence the ICTR’s ability to achieve a deterrent effect.  
In fact, the case study prompts me to argue that timing cannot even be convincingly 
factored into the failure of the ICTR in this respect.  Instead, I posit that the purely 
international structure of the Tribunal combined with its relatively distant location, 
proved to have a much more discernable affect on deterrence than timing did. The 
structure of the ICTR was such that there was very little involvement by Rwandan actors.  
By limiting participation in the judicial process to a foreign staff, the deterrent effect of 
legal prosecutions was muted by a sense of disengagement between Rwandan citizens 
and the ICTR’s search for justice.  The location of the ICTR, Arusha, Tanzania, meant 
that Rwandan citizens were distanced not only psychologically, but also physically.  
Although Arusha is significantly closer to the site of the genocide than the ICTY’s base 
in The Hague, the physical removal of the Tribunal may have contributed to a feeling that 
the ICTR was not directly relevant to the Rwandan citizens.  If the ICTR was perceived 
as a abstract justice mechanism instead of a tribunal that was present in the everyday 
lives of citizens, it seems that deterrence would be greatly hindered.  If the RPF 
government and Tutsis seeking retaliation, as well as those Hutu extremists still residing 
in and around Rwanda, feel disengaged from the Tribunal’s justice processes, there will 
unlikely be a deterrent effect strong enough to provide the impetus to cease continued 
hostilities. Even before the ICTR was officially created, the Rwandan government 
protested the suggestion that it be based in Tanzania.  The government warned that the 
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“deterrent effect of the trial and punishment will be lost if the trials were to held hundreds 
of miles away from the scene of the crimes”.251 These are issues worth considering and 
the above paragraph serves merely as an introduction.  Numerous scholars specialize on 
deterrence theory and I urge them to explore the influence that location and structure 
have on the deterrent effect of prosecutorial mechanisms.  
 Attempts to measure the ICTR’s deterrent effect raises fascinating questions about 
the moral implications of its timing.  The ICTR was implemented after the genocide in 
Rwanda, regardless of the fact that the UNSC, the body with the power to create such a 
tribunal, was aware of the brutal killings from an early date.  The question is raised: if 
UNSC member states had intervened (most likely through increased UNAMIR troops) at 
the first indication of ethnically motivated killing, would thousands of casualties been 
prevented?  It is troubling to think about the paradox presented by the creation of a court 
to try individual perpetrators and deter future atrocities, implemented only after hundreds 
of thousands of innocent people have been butchered while the world watched.  My case 
study of the ICTR leads me to conclude that the Tribunal’s establishment in the aftermath 
of mass violence helped bring about the conditions necessary to achieve individual 
criminal responsibility and rule of law.  Creating a tribunal after mass violence may 
contribute to its successes, yet if accountability mechanisms are not implemented even 
when there is overwhelming evidence of mass human rights violations, and if they are 
only employed after thousands of people are killed, tortured, and raped, what effect does 
the decision to not employ accountability mechanisms have on the credibility of these 
mechanisms and the advancement of human rights worldwide?  This is not a question that 
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this thesis attempts to answer.  However, it is an important issue that must be considered 
by scholars, advocates, and policy-makers.  A discussion of timing and the potential 
moral issues it raises warrants further research that would benefit from analysis by 
Political Scientists, Sociologists, Philosophers and others across academic disciplines.  
Conclusion 
 As the second international criminal tribunal established by the UNSC, the ICTR 
provides a different context through which to examine how timing may have influenced 
the outcome of such a prosecutorial accountability mechanism. The ICTR achieved 
moderate success in realizing its objective to pursue individual criminal accountability 
and re-establish rule of law in the wake of mass violence.  This is due in large part to its 
establishment in the aftermath of mass violence.  This delayed timing helped alleviate 
some of the immense challenges faced by the ICTY, a tribunal instituted during conflict. 
The ICTR case indicates that implementing a tribunal in the aftermath of conflict allows 
for certain elements to arise that contribute to its successful operation.  The ICTR 
benefited from a stable climate in which to pursue investigations, apprehend suspects, 
and re-establish the rule of law. By the time the ICTR began operations, a relatively 
secure government led by the RPF was installed.  The cooperation of the government as 
well as the government’s control of political and military affairs, proved advantageous to 
the ICTR. The existence of the RPF government also created difficulties for the Tribunal.  
Many Hutus in Rwanda are concerned that the RPF government is using the ICTR to 
carry out retaliatory prosecutions that help them consolidate power and do not advance 
justice or national reconciliation.  It is essential that the ICTR’s staff and independent 
groups (NGOs, IOs, and others) continue to monitor Rwandan citizens’ opinions on the 
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justice rendered by the Tribunal.  Perceptions of victor’s justice could severely damage 
the ICTR’s ability to successfully pursue justice that is deemed legitimate and fair.   
Despite the ICTR’s success in achieving the first two objectives, this case also 
demonstrates that problems remain even when justice is pursued in the absence of 
ongoing conflict. Like the ICTY, the Rwanda Tribunal struggled (and failed) to create 
and disseminate an accurate historical record and to serve as a deterrent effect. Some of 
the major problems plaguing the Yugoslav Tribunal, were due to the fact that it was 
forced to operate in the midst of ongoing conflict. Yet, the case of the Rwanda Tribunal 
indicates that the absence of conflict is not a cure-all.  Due to this conclusion, I suggest 
that the recently developed hybrid tribunals must be examined.  In the next chapter I 
present brief case studies of the Special Court in Sierra Leone and the Extraordinary 
Chambers for the Courts of Cambodia. These studies will allow me to examine whether 
or not hybrid structure has the potential to improve upon the Rwanda Tribunal.   
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Chapter IV: Hybrid Tribunals in Sierra Leone and Cambodia 
Benefits and Drawbacks of Mixed Composition and Location 
Introduction 
The ICTY and ICTR represent the most widely recognized form of international 
criminal justice—the ad hoc international tribunal.  The case studies of these two 
international tribunals revealed how the timing of a tribunal influences its ability to carry 
out its objectives.  The ICTY’s implementation in the midst of ongoing conflict resulted 
in increased challenges to its effectiveness. The Yugoslav Tribunal struggled to perform 
basic activities such as collecting evidence, due to the presence of conflict in the region. 
The case of the ICTR demonstrated that in the absence of conflict, some of the challenges 
faced by the ICTY were alleviated.  However, the ICTR case study also showed that 
despite some improvements, problems remain. The ICTY and ICTR are both set to 
conclude in 2010, and while they are still relevant and deserving of close scrutiny, a new 
generation of tribunals has emerged. Since it is clear that a change in timing cannot 
dispense with all challenges, proponents of international criminal justice must consider 
factors beyond timing that may help increase tribunals’ successes.   
This chapter looks at the hybrid tribunals located in Sierra Leone and Cambodia.  
Similar to the ICTR, both of these tribunals were implemented in the aftermath of mass 
violence.  The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) was established shortly after 
conflict ended, whereas the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) 
was implemented nearly three decades after the end of conflict.252  These two hybrid 
tribunals offer an effective method of comparison to the ICTR.  I argue that like the 
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ICTR, the hybrid tribunals benefit in certain ways from the absence of conflict. The brief 
case studies of the SCSL and ECCC allow me to examine other factors, especially 
structure, and their influence on the tribunals’ ability to achieve the four objectives of 
prosecutorial accountability mechanisms. Interestingly, the case of the ECCC lends an 
added element to the study of how timing influences a tribunal’s effectiveness. Although 
the absence of conflict is beneficial to the ECCC, the three-decade delay between the 
Khmer Rouge atrocities and the establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers, negatively 
influences its ability to collect evidence, gather witness testimony, and indict all 
individuals involved in the atrocities. The case of the ECCC suggests that establishing a 
tribunal in the aftermath of conflict is beneficial—up to a point.  As the ECCC case 
demonstrates, when there is a significant gap in time between the relevant atrocities and 
the accountability mechanism, the advantages of operating in the absence of conflict, are 
somewhat tempered. 
The ICTR case demonstrated that absence of conflict does not solve all problems.  
Hybrid tribunals have the potential to fix some of the challenges that implementation in 
the aftermath of conflict, could not. Specifically, the hybrid structure offers to potential 
improvements to a tribunal’s effectiveness. First, the mixed composition of hybrid 
tribunals allows for cooperation and collaboration between foreign and domestic judges.  
This interaction could potentially help augment national judicial systems that are often 
weakened after periods of mass violence (or never strong in the first place).  Second, thus 
far hybrid tribunals have been located in the country where the relevant crimes took 
place.  This proximity to the most affected population has the potential to increase the 
likelihood of achieving two objectives in particular: the creation and distribution of an 
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accurate historical record, and the deterrence of future atrocities. Before delving into an 
assessment of the SCSL and ECCC it is important to note that these case studies are brief 
and do not represent exhaustive research.  Rather, the case studies of the SCSL and 
ECCC allow me to conclude this project by broadening the scope of study to a different, 
and more recent, form of tribunal. The emergence of this ‘second generation’ of tribunal 
necessitates my research be extended.253  
Overview of Hybrid Tribunals 
Currently, hybrid tribunals exist in Sierra Leone, Kosovo, East Timor, and 
Cambodia254. I focus on the tribunals in Sierra Leone and Cambodia for two reasons.  
First, The Special Court in Sierra Leone is the most widely studied hybrid tribunal in 
existence today.  In comparison to the hybrid tribunals established in East Timor and 
Kosovo, there is an extensive amount of literature on the SCSL.  Given the limited 
number of hybrid tribunals I felt it to be important to choose one that provided a 
substantial amount of research on which to base my conclusions.  Second, I focus on the 
ECCC because it is the most recent hybrid tribunal to begin proceedings.  The 
Extraordinary Chambers became fully operational at the beginning of 2009, and is thus a 
highly newsworthy topic.255  In the following pages I provide a brief overview of the 
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hybrid structure.  I then present the two brief case studies on the Special Court and the 
Extraordinary Chambers.  I frame my analysis in terms of the same four objectives used 
to conduct my studies of the ICTY and ICTR.256  
I focus on three potential advantages that hybrid tribunals enjoy relative to purely 
international tribunals.257  First, all existing internationalized tribunals are located in the 
country in which the violations of human rights took place.258  Unlike the ICTY and 
ICTR, these courts are in close proximity to the population most affected by the mass 
violence.  The case studies of the ICTY and ICTR, demonstrated the problems raised by 
the distance between legal prosecutions and the most affected population.  Both the ICTY 
and ICTR suffer from legitimacy problems and both, particularly the Yugoslav Tribunal, 
have struggled to effectively educate the affected populations about the activities and new 
developments of the tribunals. Second, the structure of hybrid tribunals results in a 
prosecutorial body with mixed composition. By employing both international and 
domestic judges, there is an increased chance of contributing to the training of local 
judges—thereby augmenting the national judiciary, which is weak or virtually non-
existent in the aftermath of mass violence.  Unlike the purely international composition of 
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3) to create and disseminate an accurate historical record; 4) to provide a deterrent effect.  
 
257 Each scholar articulates the potential benefits in different ways.  For my purposes I will examine 
location, cost and the mixed composition of the tribunals.  Laura Dickinson, an expert on and proponent of 
hybrid tribunals ‘names’ these benefits in an alternative way. She identifies three potential benefits of 
internationalized tribunals, including: the potential to lend greater legitimacy to legal prosecutions, 
strengthen domestic institutions that support rule of law, and support the national legal system by training 
local judges and prosecutors who will internalize international human rights norms See: Dickinson, “The 
Promise of Hybrid Courts,” 296. 
258 Certain scholars have resisted the notion of a single definition of what constitutes a ‘hybrid tribunal’.  
For a thorough analysis of this issue see: Nouwen, “Hybrid Courts”.  
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the ICTY and ICTR, hybrid tribunals’ inclusion of foreign and domestic elements help 
connect the legal process to the people who suffered the atrocities.  Finally, hybrid 
tribunals offer a chance to pursue justice “on the cheap”.259 The 2008-2009 budget for the 
Yugoslav Tribunal is estimated at $342,332,300.  In January 2008, the UNSC approved a 
budget of $267,356,200 for the Rwanda Tribunal.  In contrast, the Special Court in Sierra 
Leone has an estimated cost of $40,684,600 for 2009-2010.260  The hybrid tribunal in 
Cambodia will cost approximately 20 million dollars, although that cost is expected to 
rise.261  My brief case studies show that it is not yet clear if the three potential benefits of 
hybrid tribunals—location, mixed composition, and reduced cost—will, in fact, fulfill 
their potential. However, I believe this structure will remain a viable option for 
prosecuting perpetrators of mass atrocities.  
The International Criminal Court (ICC) entered into force in 2002.  Some scholars 
suggest that this development will lessen the need for other types of tribunals.262  I 
disagree.  Despite the existence of the ICC, there are a number of reasons why I argue 
that hybrid tribunals will be implemented again. First, due to provisions set out in the 
Rome Statute, the ICC is unable to prosecute crimes committed before 2002.263  
Additionally, until the ICC gains widespread support, especially from the United States, 
it may be hindered in its ability to carry out its objectives. The ICC enjoys support from 
                                                
259 David Cohen, “Seeking Justice on the Cheap: Is the East Timor Tribunal Really a Model for the 
Future?”, East-West Center, No. 61, (August, 2002).  
260 The SCSL plans to complete all trials by the end of 2010. See: http://www.sc-
sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=eSgWkj%2fdxSU%3d&tabid=204 . (accessed 20 March 2009).  
261 See: http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/finances.aspx (accessed 23 March 2009).  
262 See: M. Cherif Bassiouni, “The Universal Model: The International Criminal Court,” in Post-Conflict 
Justice, ed. M. Cherif Bassiouni, 813-828 (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers Inc., 2002). 
263 For full text of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, see: http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/EA9AEFF7-5752-4F84-BE94-0A655EB30E16/0/Rome_Statute_English.pdf 
(accessed 2 February 2009).  
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many Western countries, but due to its lack of a self-contained enforcement mechanism it 
is dependent upon other states to help with apprehending and extraditing suspects.  The 
ICC has great potential and may well be an effective and efficient judicial organ in the 
future. It will no doubt be studied extensively in the years to come, especially in light of 
the recent arrest warrant issued for President Hassan al-Bashir of Sudan.  Nevertheless, 
scholars and experts must not be blinded to the potential contributions of hybrid tribunals. 
Extended study of hybrid tribunals is central to keeping abreast of new developments in 
international law.  The desire to end impunity for perpetrators of mass human rights 
violations cannot be fulfilled with a ‘one size fits all’ solution.  In order to advance 
justice through tribunals, a dialogue in the field of human rights and across academic 
disciplines must continue.  Difficult questions must be asked.  My brief examination of 
the hybrid tribunals in Sierra Leone and Cambodia seeks to start this discussion. 
The Special Court for Sierra Leone 
 The conflict that led to the establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
(SCSL) lasted for over a decade, spanning from March 1991-2002.264  This extremely 
complex conflict began when a rebel group known as the Revolutionary United Front 
(RUF) entered Sierra Leone through Liberia.  The Sierra Leonean government, headed at 
the time by Joseph Saidu Momoh of the All People’s Congress (APC) was quickly 
deposed, not by the RUF but by a group within the Sierra Leonean army led by Sergeant 
Valentine Strasser.  Strasser pledged to fight against the RUF and established the 
                                                
264 For a helpful, succinct background on the conflict in Sierra Leone as well as an overview of the SCSL, 
see: Nicole Fritz and Alison Smith, “Current Apathy for Coming Anarchy: Building the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone”, Fordham International Law Journal 25, (Dec., 2001): 391-430.  There is disagreement over 
the ‘end-date’ of the conflict in Sierra Leone.  I have chosen this date because most active violence had 
ended by mid-2002. 
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National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC).265 The war in Sierra Leone involved 
numerous actors including formal armies, private security firms, rebel groups, and 
citizen-led militias.266  On 25 May 1997, RUF forces entered the capital city of Freetown 
and formed the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC).  The AFRC immediately 
announced Operation No Living Thing, a campaign of violence whose intention was to 
kill civilians and destroy Freetown.267  The pro-government Civil Defense Force (CDF) 
also perpetrated numerous violations of human rights. By 2002, more than 50,000 people 
were dead.  Due to widespread amputations, sexual violence, and forced conscription of 
child soldiers, the violence in Sierra Leone gained worldwide media coverage.  After a 
few failed attempts to broker an end to the conflict, the RUF agreed to a ceasefire in 
November 2000.  The resulting Abuja Agreement led to a fragile peace in Sierra 
Leone.268 The brutality of the crimes committed in Sierra Leone prompted immediate 
discussion about the possibility of creating a tribunal to prosecute perpetrators. 
 The SCSL is a treaty-based tribunal, formed in a joint effort between the 
government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations.269 Its treaty-based status 
distinguishes it from the ICTY and ICTR, both of which were created under the Chapter 
                                                
265 William Reno, “Political Networks in a Failing State: The Roots and Future of Violent Conflict in 
Sierra Leone”, Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft 2 (2003): 58.  
266 Reno, “Political Networks,” 59.  
267 United States Department of State, Sierra Leone Atrocities Against Civilians, (Washington, DC, 12 
May 1998); United Nations, Second Progress Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations 
Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, 18 October 1998, 8.  
268 Michael O’Flaherty, “Sierra Leone’s Peace Process: The Role of the Human Rights Community,” 
Human Rights Quarterly 26 (2004): 29-62.  
269 United Nations Security Council. UN Security Council Resolution 1315 (2000) on the establishment of 
a Special Court for Sierra Leone, adopted by the Security Council at its 4186th meeting, 14 August 2000. 
Available at: http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/RES/1315(2000)&Lang=E (accessed 4 
March 2009).  
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VII powers of the United Nations.270 The SCSL is set to prosecute crimes committed 
after 30 November 1996.  The end-date to the Court’s temporal jurisdiction has been left 
open ended. This limited temporal jurisdiction resulted in part from the minimal 
resources afforded to the SCSL.  In contrast to the ICTY and ICTR, the Court in Sierra 
Leone is funded entirely by voluntary donations.271 As a hybrid tribunal, the SCSL 
combines aspects of domestic and international law.  Despite the mixed elements of law, 
the Special Court is not part of the domestic legal system—it is its own entity.  The 
combination of international judges appointed by the UN Secretary-General and judges 
appointed by the Sierra Leonean government results in a court of mixed composition. The 
Special Court is based in Freetown, Sierra Leone. As of 25 February 2009, the SCSL has 
convicted three senior leaders of the RUF, three senior leaders of the AFRC, two CDF 
leaders, and is in the midst of further trials.272  
Ostensibly, hybrid tribunals are the best of both worlds.273  The domestic element 
gives the affected population greater ownership of the pursuit of justice. The international 
component boosts perceived legitimacy, augments the national judicial system, and 
advances international humanitarian law. Chandra L. Sriram explains that hybrid courts 
represent “an attempt to address the limitations of domestic and of international models, 
                                                
270 The lack of Chapter VII powers is significant because, unlike the ICTY and ICTR, the SCSL will 
operate without the obligatory cooperation of third party states, which Chapter VII powers demand.  This 
could negatively affect its ability to apprehend perpetrators.  
271 The UN Secretary-General at the time of this decision, Kofi Annan, vociferously objected to depending 
on voluntary donations to fund the SCSL.  Instead, Annan proposed that the UN fund the Special Court.  
He submitted a proposed budget of $114 million budget for the first three years of the Special Court.  The 
Security Council rejected this proposition.  See: “Justice for Sierra Leone”, the New York Times, 17 April 
2001. 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F06E0DA1F31F934A25757C0A9679C8B63&&scp=6&s
q=Sierra%20Leone&st=cse (accessed 5 March 2009). 
272 For more information on these trials and the current activities of the Special Court, see its official 
website at http://www.sc-sl.org/HOME/tabid/53/Default.aspx.  
273 Laura Dickinson is one of the foremost scholars and proponents of hybrid tribunals.  See: Dickinson, 
“Promise of Hybrid Courts”. 
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utilizing a complex mix (determined on a case-by-case basis) of domestic and 
international law and domestic and international judges and staff.”274  Unfortunately, it is 
highly debatable whether the mixed nature of the Court has added significantly to its 
effectiveness.  This is in part why it deserves continued research. My case studies of the 
ICTY and ICTR revealed the timing’s influence on an international court. Like the ICTR, 
the SCSL was implemented in the aftermath of conflict, and thus enjoys some of the 
same benefits: access to evidence, witnesses, improved security for tribunal staff, greater 
interaction with the most affected population.  However, I argue that the hybrid structure 
of the SCSL has an even greater influence on its effectiveness than the absence of 
conflict. This is due to two elements of hybridity: mixed composition, and location.275  
Due to the brief nature of my studies I only examine certain aspects of the influences of 
structure and location on the four objectives sought by prosecutorial accountability 
mechanisms. I indicate what these elements are in each section. 
Individual criminal accountability 
 Like the ICTR, the SCSL276 was created in the aftermath of mass violence.  The 
basic operations of the SCSL were thus improved in much the same way as the ICTR.  
Activities such as collecting evidence and gathering witness testimony, both essential to 
                                                
274 Chandra Lekha Sriram, “Wrong-sizing International Justice?: The Hybrid Tribunal in Sierra Leone”, 
Fordham International Law Journal 29 (Feb., 2006): 474. 
275 There are other factors that influence the operation of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, perhaps the 
most important being the SCSL’s relationship with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Sierra 
Leone. I choose to forgo discussion of this relationship for two main reasons.  First, the TRC in Sierra 
Leone has different goals than the SCSL.  Given the differences between the objectives of the two and my 
focus on prosecutorial accountability mechanisms, I do not think this thesis is the appropriate forum for 
examining the relationship.  Second, the SCSL has had a far greater influence on the successes and failures 
of the TRC than the TRC has had on the Special Court.  For an overview of the relationship between the 
two see: Schabas, “Between Truth Commissions and International Courts,” 1035-1066.  
276 The SCSL is responsible for prosecution those who “bear the greatest responsibility” for the 
perpetration of abuses. See: “Sierra Leone: Ending Impunity and Achieving Justice”, Amnesty 
International’s Message to the National Victims Commemoration Conference (Amnesty International, 
Paper No. 51/004/2005), available at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR51/004/2005/en 
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an effective tribunal were more easily conducted due to the absence of conflict. Two 
elements of hybrid structure—the mixed composition of the court and the location of the 
tribunal—have the potential to alleviate some of the challenges that the timing of the 
ICTR, could not.  
 All existing hybrid courts are located in the country where the mass violence took 
place.  The SCSL’s base of operations in Freetown, allows it the benefit of closer 
proximity to evidence and witness testimony.277  Even more importantly, this information 
is easily accessible because of the mixed composition of the Special Court.  The 
hybridized structure of the SCSL results in a staff composed of both foreign and domestic 
employees.  The inclusion of local actors, who are familiar with the language, traditions, 
and history, makes the gathering of evidence and witness testimony more efficient.  The 
mixed composition of the Special Court helps alleviate those challenges encountered by 
the ICTR in its early years. Unfortunately, the potential benefits of the structure of the 
SCSL have also proved to be drawbacks in other areas.  
Perhaps the two greatest obstacles to the SCSL’s successful pursuit of individual 
criminal accountability arise due to its lack of Chapter VII powers and its voluntary 
funding mechanism.  The ICTR and ICTY enjoyed Chapter VII powers, a provision that 
made obligatory cooperation by third-party states. Due to the lack of these powers, the 
SCSL’s ability to apprehend suspects that have fled the borders of Sierra Leone is 
severely diminished.  The Special Court cannot depend upon the cooperation of third 
party states, “which would be bound to surrender persons within the court’s 
                                                
277 Beth K. Dougherty, “Right-sizing International Criminal Justice: They Hybrid Experiment at the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone”, International Affairs 80 (2004): 317. 
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jurisdiction”278.  This curtailment of power hinders the SCSL’s ability to achieve its 
objective of individual criminal responsibility. Equally as important as the lack of 
Chapter VII powers, is the lack of sufficient, reliable funding for the Special Court.  
The decision to fund the SCSL based on voluntary contributions was made in 
large part because of massive cost incurred by the ICTY and ICTR.279  Relying on 
voluntary contributions by United Nations member states necessarily results in a reduced 
mandate for the SCSL.280 The Special Court will likely prosecute only fifteen to twenty 
individuals, thereby making any successes in pursuing individual criminal accountability, 
limited.281  
Rule of law 
 Proponents of hybrid tribunals argue that one of their greatest benefits lies in their 
ability to strengthen the domestic judicial system, which is weakened or destroyed after a 
period of mass violence.282 Throughout this project I have evaluated two aspects of rule 
of law—the first is a tribunal’s ability to dismantle institutions implicated in the 
perpetration of the atrocities, the second is to augment and support the national judicial 
system.  In the interest of keeping this case study brief I focus solely on the SCSL’s 
ability to enhance the Sierra Leonean judicial system. Similar to the evaluation of 
individual criminal responsibility, the SCSL’s success at achieving rule of law hinges on 
the two factors of location and structure.  
                                                
278 Dougherty, “Right-sizing Justice,” 321.  
279 Kofi Annan, the United Nations Secretary-General at the time of the SCSL’s establishment, warned that 
the effectiveness and efficiency of the Special Court would suffer if it were funded only through voluntary 
donations.  Annan’s request for a more substantial and reliable budget was ultimately ignored.  
280 Sriram, “Wrong-sizing Justice,” 482-3. 
281 Dougherty, “Right-sizing Justice,” 320.  
282 See: Dickinson, “Promise of Hybrid Courts”. 
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The Special Court’s location gives it an advantage over the purely international 
tribunals, which were geographically distant from the relevant region. Local outreach 
programs, which are meant to educate the general population about the proceedings of the 
Special Court, are much easier to carry out because of the proximity of the SCSL to the 
Sierra Leonean people. By facilitating local outreach, it is much easier for the SCSL to 
“build basic legal capacity, to explain the role of the prosecutions and the procedure, and 
to include the rationale for due process and the need for defense attorneys.”283   
One of the major failures of the ICTR, was its inability to effectively engage those 
working within the Rwandan domestic legal system. Although the existence of the ICTR 
helped lessen the workload faced by the national judiciary, it did little to train local 
judges, prosecutors, and lawyers in international humanitarian law. The mixed 
composition of the SCSL helps to counter this shortcoming.  The involvement of 
international and domestic personnel raises the chances that the Sierra Leonean people 
involved with the domestic judicial system will benefit from the expertise that 
international judges bring to the hybrid structure.284  The ability for the SCSL to 
successfully pursue rule of law is, thus far, positively influenced by its hybrid structure.  
Capacity building efforts are enhanced when local and international necessarily consult 
one another during the course of investigations and trials.  The mixed composition of the 
SCSL increases its potential to have a lasting positive effect on the Sierra Leonean 
judicial system.  
 
 
                                                
283 Sriram, “Wrong-sizing Justice,” 498.  
284 Ibid., 499.  
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Creation and distribution of historical record 
 Location proves the most significant influence on the creation and dissemination 
of an accurate historical record.  The SCSL bases its operation out of Freetown, the site 
of some of the most brutal violence of the conflict.  Gathering witness testimony is one of 
the most important factors in the creation of an accurate historical record. The Court’s 
proximity allows for easier access to Sierra Leonean people who suffered from or 
participated in the atrocities.  By locating the Court in Freetown, the SCSL avoids the 
costs and difficulties associated with transfer of witnesses to a distant location.  Perhaps 
most importantly, the location of the Court makes the dissemination of information 
regarding the trials and proceedings considerably easier.  The outreach program 
employed by the SCSL is more effective than its counterparts in the former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda.  Sierra Leoneans, especially those who reside in Freetown, are in constant 
proximity to the Court and its activities.  Trials are open to the public and information is 
readily available. The activities of the SCSL are far more open and accessible to the 
Sierra Leonean people than the ICTR was to Rwandan citizens.  In April 2008, the Office 
of Outreach and Public Affairs was established to increase interaction and understanding 
between Sierra Leoneans and the Special Court. To date, the outreach program for the 
Special Court has conducted surveys documenting Sierra Leonean perceptions of the 
SCSL, held video screenings, utilized radio and television programming to broadcast 
trials, and training of domestic legal personnel.285    
                                                
285 For an exhaustive list of the activities undertaken by the Office of Outreach and Public Affairs see: 
http://www.sc-
sl.org/ABOUT/CourtOrganization/TheRegistry/OutreachandPublicAffairs/tabid/83/Default.aspx (accessed 
4 April 2009).  
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 The mixed composition of the SCSL boosts the Court’s ability to create and 
distribute an accurate legal record.  Domestic and international judges, prosecutors, and 
other staff work side by side to gather information, hold trials, and publish their outcome.  
Domestic personnel, many of whom resided in Sierra Leone during the conflict, are 
familiar with Sierra Leonean history and culture and prove valuable in translating witness 
testimony and collecting evidence.  
Deterrence 
 It is not yet clear whether the SCSL will have a deterrent effect.  Trials are 
ongoing and thus far it is difficult to assess what factors play a role in determining this 
outcome.  There is not enough concrete evidence to do anything other than offer 
informed conjectures.  I suggest that the Special Court will, like the ICTR and ICTY 
before it, be unable to achieve a deterrent effect.  This failure will be hastened due to its 
under-funding and lack of Chapter VII enforcement powers.  Akhavan astutely observes, 
“Post-mortem justice without a corresponding commitment of…political and economic 
resources significantly dilutes the message of accountability and undermines the long-
term viability of preventing crimes.”286 It may be that in the search for a less expensive 
alternative to the ICTY and ICTR, the UN helped create a mechanism that will have little 
or no power to deter future crimes.   
 The influence of the hybrid structure of the SCSL is largely positive.  Although 
difficult to measure quantitatively, by locating the Tribunal within the country where the 
atrocities took place, the likelihood of its activities reaching the affected population are 
increased.  Partial ownership of the Tribunal on the part of the Sierra Leonean people, 
                                                
286 Akhavan, “Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities?” American 
Journal of International Law 95 (Jan., 2001): 30. 
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suggests a greater ability for the SCSL to effectively disseminate information on 
proceedings, indictments, and convictions. Alain Pellet expounds on the advantages of 
proximity. A hybrid tribunal such as the SCLS enjoys “proximity to the place where the 
crime has been committed, proximity to the evidence, proximity to the population more 
directly concerned.”287 The separation between the SCSL and the domestic judiciary 
lessens the likelihood that government and political influence will influence the Court’s 
decisions.288 The hybrid structure of the SCSL does not address all the shortcomings of 
the ICTR.  As is evident even through my cursory case study of the SCSL, the hybrid 
structure brings problems of its own.  Lack of funding and no enforcement powers may 
hobble its ability to effectively pursue justice.  Despite these weaknesses however, the 
SCSL demonstrates that hybrid structure does address some of the major concerns raised 
by the ICTR. 
The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
 From 1975-1979, the Khmer Rouge regime289 led a campaign of starvation, 
forced labor, torture and killing, which resulted in approximately 1.7 million deaths—
nearly a quarter of the entire population.290 The Khmer Rouge targeted political 
opponents and carried out frequent summary executions.  Despite the widespread 
atrocities and brutal nature of the regime, no Khmer Rouge leader was ever prosecuted 
                                                
287 Alain Pellet, “Internationalized Courts: Better Than Nothing…” in Internationalized Criminal Courts 
and Tribunals: Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo, and Cambodia, eds. Romano, Cesare; Nollkaemper, 
Andre; Klefner, Jann K. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2004). 438. 
288 Sarah M.H. Nouwen,  “ ‘Hybrid Courts’—The Hybrid Category of a New Type of International Crime 
Courts,” Utrecht Law Review 2 (Dec., 2006): 203. 
289 Officially, the Khmer Rouge was part of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK).  During their time 
in power, Cambodia was known as Democratic Kampuchea.   
290Phuong Pham, Patrick Vinck, Mychelle Balthazard, Sokhom Hean, and Eric Stover, “So We Will Never 
Forget: A Population-Based Survey on Attitudes about Social Reconstruction and the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia”, Human Rights Center: University of California, Berkeley, January 
2009. [herinafter ‘Human Rights Center Survey’] 
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for crimes.291  Finally, in 1997, the Cambodian government requested that the UN assist 
them in creating a tribunal to prosecute the perpetrators of these crimes. The ECCC has 
the jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979.292 
A series of disagreements between the UN and the Cambodian government regarding the 
composition of the court led to protracted negotiations.  It was not until 13 May 2003 that 
such a mechanism was created.293 Thirty years after the demise of the Khmer Rouge 
regime, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) is finally 
operational.294 The ECCC is located on the outskirts of Phnom Penh, the capital city of 
Cambodia.  
Like the Special Court the ECCC is a hybrid tribunal that mixes international and 
domestic law.  However, while the SCSL is neither fully nor part of the United Nations, 
the ECCC is considered a part of the Cambodian judicial system.295  Although the 
process of establishing the ECCC began in 1997, a settlement agreeable to both parties 
was difficult to reach due to the Cambodian government’s insistence that domestic judges 
retain a majority in the tribunal.296  In contrast, the UN desired a tribunal that would have 
a majority of international judges, a safeguard to potential political influence over the 
                                                
291 The Khmer Rouge Tribunal. Edited by John D. Ciorciari, Documentation Centre of Cambodia. 12.  
292 Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of 
Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, NS/RKM/0801/12, adopted in its final 
version by the National Assembly on 11 July 2001, approved by the Senate on 23 July 2001, signed by the 
Cambodian king on 10 August 2001, first and third preambular paragraph, Arts. 1-8. Available at 
http://www.cambodia.gov.kh/krt/pdfs/KR%20Law%20as%20promulgated%20(Eng%20trans%206%20Sep
t%202001).pdf (accessed 5 March 2009).  
293 For more information on the details of the ECCC, as well as updates on its progress, see the Court’s 
official website: http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/default.aspx. (accessed on 2 March 2009).  
294 Some scholars assert that the Khmer Rouge did not fully relinquish control until 1999. See: Ben 
Kiernan, “Introduction: Conflict in Cambodia, 1945-2002”, Critical Asian Studies 483 (2002): 492-93.  
295 Nouwen, “Hybrid Courts: The Hybrid Category,” 203.  
296 Draft Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia concerning the 
Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kapuchea, U.N. GAOR 3D Comm., 
57th Session, Annex, Agenda Item 109(b), UN Doc. A/57/806 (2003).  [hereinafter ‘Agreement’] 
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decisions of the Court.  The compromise that resulted in the creation of the ECCC 
allowed Cambodian judges to occupy a majority in the two chambers of the Court—the 
Trial Chamber and the Supreme Court Chamber.297  In turn, the UN was allowed to opt 
out of its role in the ECCC if corruption and government influence became apparent.298 
The final agreement also mandated a ‘supermajority’ vote.  Any decision made by the 
Chambers requires a majority of judges plus one.  This provision ensures that at least one 
international judge supports Court decisions.299 Currently, the ECCC has five suspects in 
custody, all over the age of 66.300  The trial of the first defendant, Kiang Guek Eav 
(known as Duch), is in the pre-trial stage and is set to commence on the 30 March 
2009.301   
 Like the ICTR, the ECCC was implemented in the aftermath of conflict.  
However, the timing of the two (a month-long delay in the case of Rwanda and a decade-
long delay in Cambodia), can hardly be equated. Like the ICTR and SCSL, the 
Extraordinary Chambers benefits from operating in the absence of conflict.  However, the 
almost three-decade gap between the Khmer Rouge atrocities and the creation of the 
ECCC tempers these benefits. Thus, although I argue that structure of the ECCC proves 
                                                
297 The Trial Chamber is composed of three Cambodian judges and two international judges. The Supreme 
Court Chamber is composed of four Cambodian judges and three international judges. See the official 
website for further details on organization of the SCSL. Available at http://www.sc-sl.org/. 
298 The Agreement requires that Cambodia “comply without undue delay” the Court in any way requested 
by the judges or prosecutors. See: Michael Lieberman, “Salvaging the Remains: The Khmer Rouge 
Tribunal on Trial,” Military Law Review 186 (Winter, 2005): 164-187. 
299 The supermajority vote is a preventative measure.  It seeks to counter any political maneuverings on the 
part of the Cambodian judges (i.e.: purposeful delay of trials). 
300 Not including Duch, those in custody include: Nuon Chea (82 yrs.) chief ideologue, Khieu Samphan 
(76 yrs.) head of state, Ieng Sary (82 yrs.) former foreign minister, Ieng Thirith (75 yrs.), member of the 
Khmer Rouge Central Committee. 
301 Seth Mydans, “Trial Begins for Khmer Rouge Leader,” New York Times, 16 February 2009. Available 
at: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/17/world/asia/17cambodia.html?scp=2&sq=khmer%20rouge&st=cse 
. (accessed on 2 March 2009). During the Khmer Rouge’s time in power, Duch was in charge of the Tuol 
Seng prison where an estimated 14,000 people were tortured and killed.  
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most influential, timing also has influence on the Court’s effectiveness.  Due to the time 
lag between the time when the atrocities were committed and the tribunal established, 
some of the most prominent members of the Khmer Rouge have died or are aged and 
suffering from health problems.302  Pol Pot, the leader of the Khmer Rouge regime, died 
in April 1999, and will not be facing posthumous prosecution.303 There are also concerns 
that important evidence in the three decades since the atrocities were committed. Despite 
these influences, the hybrid structure of the ECCC proves to be a greater influence on its 
effectiveness.  The location of the Court, and its structure, in particular the provision 
ensuring that Cambodian judges maintain a majority in both the Trial Chamber and the 
Supreme Court Chamber, exercise the most influence on the effectiveness of the ECCC. 
In the next sections I assess the influences of location and structure on the ECCC’s ability 
to achieve its four objectives. 
Individual criminal accountability 
  The SCSL exists separate from the Sierra Leonean legal system. This does not 
hold true in the case of the ECCC, which is officially part of the domestic legal system of 
Cambodia.  Ideally, this status would give Cambodians greater ownership over the 
Extraordinary Chambers’ proceedings.  Thus far however, the decision to establish the 
ECCC as part of the domestic legal system may prove to be its greatest weakness.  Undue 
political influence exerted by the Cambodian government is the primary concern in 
                                                
302 Extant literature on the ECCC raises the question of whether justice delivered three decades after mass 
violence can be productive.  Is ‘late’ justice better than no justice? Most human rights organizations and 
many scholars believe that in the case of Cambodia, a tribunal, even one established so long after the 
atrocities occurred, is a necessary step toward societal reconciliation. For Cambodian attitudes toward the 
creation of a tribunal see the Human Rights Center Survey, supra note 12.   
303 Daphna Shraga, “The Second Generation UN-Based Tribunals: A Diversity of Mixed Jurisdictions,” in 
Internationalized Criminal Courts: Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo and Cambodia, ed. Cesare P.R. 
Romano, Andre Nollkaemper, and Jann K. Kleffner (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2004) 17. 
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bringing Khmer Rouge leaders to justice.  The fact that Cambodian judges retain a 
majority in the ECCC makes this concern even more powerful and valid.  Evidence 
gathered by human rights groups such as Human Rights Watch, as well as a report issued 
by the Secretary-General indicate that corruption is widespread in the national judicial 
system of Cambodian.304 The Cambodian judicial system, although officially independent 
from government influence, continues to be under the control of executive powers. 
Suzannah Linton observes, “the design [of the ECCC] is such that there is virtually 
nothing that can be done…without the approval of the Royal Government of Cambodia, 
directly or through those of its officials involved in the process.”305  This dangerous lack 
of judicial independence seems likely to severely undermine the ECCC’s ability to 
achieve its goal of individual accountability.  If the Cambodian judges choose to exert 
politically motivated influence on the Court proceedings, decisions handed down by the 
ECCC will lose legitimacy. 
Timing has different effects in the case of the ECCC than in the ICTR, but it is 
clear that it continues to exert influence on the search for individual criminal 
responsibility. The pursuit of individual accountability is hindered by the huge delay in 
establishing the ECCC.  The SCSL and ECCC were both established in the aftermath of 
conflict. Yet, the timing of the ECCC may negatively influence its ability to achieve the 
objective of individual criminal accountability.  Abrams and Ratner explain the impact of 
timing:  
                                                
304 See: “Cambodia: Government Interferes in Khmer Rouge Tribunal,” Human Rights Watch, 5 December 
2006, available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2006/12/04/cambodia-government-interferes-khmer-rouge-
tribunal. (accessed on 1 March 2009). See also: Report of the Secretary-General on Khmer Rouge Trials, at 
11, U.N. Doc. A/57/769 (2003).  
305 Suzannah Linton, “Safeguarding the Independence and Impartiality of the Cambodian Extraordinary 
Chambers”, Journal of International Criminal Justice 4 (2006): 340. 
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the length of time since the events and the relative paucity of 
records maintained by the regime seriously hamper the 
development and credibility of evidence. Memories will have 
faded; appearances will have changed; much physical evidence 
will no longer be available; and many witnesses are likely to be 
dead, difficult to locate, or afraid to provide information.306  
 
Due to the decades long gap between the Khmer Rouge regime and the creation of the 
ECCC, many of the most notorious perpetrators are dead or very old.  The five 
perpetrators who have been charged are well into old-age, the foremost leader of the 
Khmer Rouge, Pol Pot, is deceased, and many thousands of participants in the killings 
will not be brought to trial.  
Rule of law  
Early in the process a United Nations Group of Experts, responsible for 
investigating the need for a tribunal, concluded that “the Cambodian judiciary presently 
lacks three key criteria for a fair and effective judiciary: a trained cadre of judges, 
lawyers and investigators; adequate infrastructure; and a culture of respect for the 
process.”307 The hope that a hybridized judicial organ such as the ECCC can contribute to 
strengthening the future of the Cambodian judicial system has not yet been realized.  The 
potential benefits of the ECCC’s location and mixed composition are overshadowed by 
the many challenges these factors present.  If the ECCC is to achieve its objective of rule 
of law, it must first overcome a corrupt and inefficient national judicial system. Due to 
the fact that Cambodian judges retain the majority in both of the ECCC’s chambers, there 
is a danger that the structure of the Court will obstruct its ability to augment the national 
judicial system. 
                                                
306 Ratner and Abrams, Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities, 325. 
307 Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 
52/135, transmitted by the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/53/850, S/199/231.  
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In October 2005, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Human 
Rights in Cambodia reported that the “[t]he judiciary continued to be subject to executive 
interference and open to corruption.”308  As in the case of the SCSL, there is hope that the 
ECCC will help alleviate some of the problems plaguing the national judiciary.  Sarah 
Williams states,  
The deployment of international judges and personnel may help to 
improve the population’s perception of the independence of the judiciary, 
while creating a small body of Cambodian judges and personnel that have 
had experience both in operating within an independent and impartial 
environment and in applying international legal standards.309 
  
Unfortunately, there is little chance of the ECCC contributing to capacity building and 
judicial training if corruption is rampant in the national legal system. The location of the 
ECCC means that the Cambodian government has easier access to judges involved in the 
process.  Additionally, it is not yet apparent that Prime Minister Hun Sen, a former mid-
level member of the Khmer Rouge, is truly committed to the success of the ECCC.310 
Government resistance to the Court could severely undermine its ability to achieve a 
justice that is deemed legitimate and impartial. The case of Cambodia exhibits the danger 
of establishing mixed composition tribunals when the domestic judiciary suffers from 
widespread corruption, inefficiency and/or training. 
 The ECCC is not yet far enough along in the process to know if the corruption 
within the judicial system will be solved by the interaction between national and 
                                                
308 United Nations Special Representative for the Secretary-General for Human Rights in Cambodia, 
“Continuing Patterns of Impunity in Cambodia”, 2005, 34. Available at: 
http://cambodia.ohchr.org/download.aspx?ep_id=242 (accessed 8 March 2009).  
309 Sarah Williams, “The Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers: A Dangerous Precedent for International 
Justice,” The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 53 (Jan., 2004): 245. 
310 Lieberman, “Salvaging the Remains”, 167-9. No evidence has been produced that implicates President 
Hun Sen as a direct participant in the atrocities carried out by the Khmer Rouge regime.  
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international judges or if the corruption will lead to trials that will be perceived as 
illegitimate and biased.  
Creation and distribution of historical record  
In light of the challenges presented by the structure of the Extraordinary 
Chambers, the ECCC’s greatest achievement may be its ability to reveal the violent 
history of Cambodia—a history that is rarely taught in schools, and that many young 
people are almost entirely unaware of.311 A recent publication by the Documentation 
Centre of Cambodia explains the potential benefits of the ECCC trials.  The report states, 
“Hearing perpetrators, eyewitnesses, experts, and court officials elaborate upon the 
reasons for the atrocities will help Cambodian survivors achieve a greater degree of 
historical and personal closure”.312 The benefits of locating the ECCC in Cambodia 
mirror those experienced by the SCSL.  Proximity to the affected population is important 
for the creation of an historical record that is accessible to a general audience.  There are 
also hopes that locating the ECCC in Cambodia will confer some manner of legitimacy 
on the Court. Tara Urs notes however, that proximity does not necessarily lead to 
perceived legitimacy.313 
Deterrence 
 The ECCC has only recently started proceedings and thus it is too early to fully 
judge the deterrent effect of the tribunal.  Interestingly, timing seems the most likely 
factor to influence the ECCC’s ability to achieve its objective of deterrence.  The 
Documentation Centre of Cambodia notes that the significant time gap between the 
                                                
311 Dustin Roasa, “At Last, a Tribunal for Khmer Rouge Atrocities”, The American Scholar (Autumn, 
2007): 8. Available at http://www.theamericanscholar.org/letter-from-cambodia (accessed 5 March 2009).  
312 The Khmer Rouge Tribunal, ed. John D. Ciorciari, Documentation Center of Cambodia (2006): 26. 
313 Tara Urs, “Imagining Locally-Motivated Accountability for Mass Atrocities: Voices from Cambodia”, 
SUR—International Journal on Human Rights 4 (2007): 61-99. 
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Khmer Rouge regime and the establishment of the ECCC may undermine any potential 
deterrent effect. 
The ECCC is just beginning its proceedings and thus fully formed conclusions are 
difficult to make at this stage in the process.  Yet, even before the Extraordinary 
Chambers became operational, concerns were raised about its structure and composition.  
The greatest impediment to the effectiveness of the ECCC is the possibility of 
government influence over the trials. Trials have only recently begun and there is already 
well-founded suspicion that the Cambodian government will attempt to intervene in the 
Court’s decisions.  The composition of the court is such that Cambodian judges have the 
majority. This is concerning given reports that the domestic judicial system is weakened 
by corruption and inefficiency.  
Conclusion 
The brief case studies of the SCSL and ECCC do not fully engage with all the 
issues surrounding hybrid tribunals.  Nevertheless, even a cursory case study reveals that 
the complexities of international criminal justice are far from resolved.  There are high 
hopes within parts of the human rights community that hybrid tribunals will offer a new 
and improved approach to the prosecution of mass human rights violations. Whereas the 
distant locations of the ICTY and ICTR impeded their ability to adequately inform the 
affected population of ongoing proceedings and new developments, the hybrid tribunals’ 
proximity to the scene of the crime may help boost the legitimacy of the justice rendered.   
Although structure certainly presented problems for the operations of the ICTY 
and ICTR, it was not the major factor that impacted its successes and failures.  The brief 
study of the hybrid courts in Sierra Leone and Cambodia demonstrate that the structure of 
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prosecutorial accountability mechanisms, particularly its mixture of international and 
domestic judges, greatly influences the courts’ effectiveness.  The SCSL and ECCC have 
the potential to represent a new type of tribunal that is more cost efficient, less 
bureaucratic, and more connected to the population most affected by the crimes the courts 
seek to prosecute, than the international tribunals that preceded them.  It is clear however, 
that hybrid tribunals do not solve all the weaknesses associated with the ICTY and ICTR. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The 20th century witnessed multiple occurrences of mass human rights violations, 
most notably the Holocaust. As evidenced by the mass violence in Sudan and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, the 21st century has not ushered in an era in which 
human rights are universally protected.  Nevertheless, restorative and retributive justice is 
being pursued through numerous types of accountability mechanisms.  This project 
focuses on prosecutorial accountability mechanisms, and emerges from scholarly 
developments in the field of human rights, international criminal justice, and retributive 
justice.  Pursuing justice for mass violations of human rights presents multiple 
challenges.  Thus far, the ‘perfect’ justice mechanism does not exist.  Due to the many 
weaknesses of the prosecutorial accountability mechanisms employed in the past, the 
search for an effective tribunal must continue. 
A truly effective tribunal must achieve the four objectives of prosecutorial 
accountability mechanisms.  These are: 1) to pursue individual criminal accountability; 2) 
to re-establish rule of law; 3) to create and distribute an accurate historical record; and 4) 
to deter future atrocities from being committed. These objectives are central to the pursuit 
of justice in the wake of mass human rights violations.  Pursuing justice is not an easy 
task however. Tribunals confront numerous challenges, and in order to achieve the four 
objectives they must be able to do the following: initiate preliminary investigations, 
collect evidence, gather witness testimony, apprehend suspects, access the most affected 
population, disable institutions that contributed to the perpetration of atrocities, support 
or augment the domestic legal system, and hold fair and efficient trials. In order for a 
tribunal to effectively conduct these activities, it must employ judges, translators, 
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prosecutors, defense lawyers, others.  This staff must be competent and well trained.  
Effective tribunals must also have sufficient funding and resources to conduct 
investigations, apprehend and extradite suspects, and pay staff and personnel.  The 
demands on tribunals charged with prosecuting individuals for human rights violations 
are abundant, and the pursuit of justice is difficult in all circumstances.    
Multiple factors influence the overall effectiveness of a tribunal. This project 
develops from the desire to fill a gap in the literature on human rights, justice 
mechanisms, and retributive justice.  Scholarship in these fields tends to overlook the 
significant impact that active conflict has on a tribunal’s effectiveness.  In this project, I 
conducted in-depth studies of the ICTY and ICTR and brief case studies of the hybrid 
tribunals in Sierra Leone and Cambodia. The case studies of the ICTY and ICTR 
demonstrate how the circumstance in which a tribunal is implemented influences its 
ability to achieve certain of the four objectives. The case studies of the Special Court in 
Sierra Leone and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia are examples of 
a new type of tribunal, the structure of which offers a potential salve to some of the 
weaknesses of the ad hoc international tribunals that preceded them.  My findings for 
each of the case studies are presented below. 
ICTY case study 
In the case of the ICTY, the ongoing conflict in the territories of the former 
Yugoslavia disrupted the Tribunal’s ability to achieve the four objectives.  Even before 
the ICTY was officially created, the conflict raging in the former Yugoslavia prompted a 
debate on the seemingly incompatible goals of peace and justice. Specifically, the 
ongoing conflict and continuing atrocities negatively influenced the ICTY’s ability to 
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conduct the following activities: initiate investigations, locate and collect evidence, 
gather witness testimony, and effectively distribute information on the Tribunal.  The 
ongoing conflict also dictated the location of the Tribunal.  Due to the destruction 
wrought by the conflict and the lack of security, the UN Security Council decided to base 
the ICTY in The Hague.  All of these complications significantly impacted the overall 
effectiveness of the ICTY. Ultimately, the case study of the ICTY helped illustrate how 
the presence of conflict influenced its ability to achieve its objectives and maximize its 
overall effectiveness. 
ICTR case study 
The ICTR was implemented in the aftermath of mass violence. Thus, the Rwanda 
Tribunal provides a case through which to determine how absence of conflict influenced 
the ICTR’s effectiveness.  The delayed timing of the ICTR was significant in that it 
allowed for certain conditions to arise that proved favorable to the ICTR’s operations.  
The absence of conflict allowed for the following: the installation of a new and stable 
government, increased security for tribunal staff and personnel, and better access to 
evidence and witnesses.  The case of the ICTR demonstrates that its establishment in the 
absence of conflict, allowed it to avoid some of the obstacles confronted by its sister 
tribunal in the former Yugoslavia. The conditions that arose due to the absence of conflict 
specifically facilitated the ICTR’s ability to pursue individual accountability and re-
establish the rule of law.   
 The ICTR benefited greatly from the existence of the RPF government.  The 
government’s control over the military and political affairs in the country eased the 
ICTR’s ability to conduct investigations, collect evidence, and apprehend perpetrators. 
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When the RPF successfully deposed the Hutu-extremist government, they also removed 
from office and arrested numerous high-level officials involved in the genocide.  This 
was a boon to the ICTR, because the task of re-establishing rule of law was significantly 
diminished due to the RPF’s actions. The ICTR’s establishment in the absence of conflict 
helped it succeed in certain respects.  However, the timing of the ICTR did not alleviate 
all the problems apparent in the ICTY.   
Even in the absence of conflict, the Rwanda Tribunal was far from perfect.  The 
main obstacle to the ICTR’s ability to create and distribute an historical record resulted 
from the decision to base the ICTR’s operations from Arusha, Tanzania.  Although the 
distance between Rwandan citizens and the Tribunal was less than the distance between 
the population in the former Yugoslavia and The Hague, its removed proved to be a 
negative influence. Lack of engagement with the most affected population impeded the 
overall effectiveness of the Rwanda Tribunal.  Additionally, like the Yugoslav Tribunal 
before it, the Rwanda Tribunal failed to have any discernable effect on deterring future 
crimes in the region and the world. The findings prompted by the ICTR indicate that 
although the timing of a tribunal is significant in some ways, it does not alleviate all the 
weaknesses of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals.  Due to the many imperfections 
of the ICTR, I suggest that the newest form of tribunal, hybrid tribunals, provide the next 
best chance for improving the effectiveness of prosecutorial accountability mechanisms. 
SCSL and ECCC case studies 
The case studies of the ICTR and ICTY led me to conclude that the circumstances 
in which a tribunal operates influences its overall effectiveness.  However, the ICTR 
demonstrated that even in the absence of conflict, the Tribunal was unable to fully 
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succeed in achieving its objectives.  The ICTY and ICTR are the only ad hoc 
international criminal tribunals in existence, and thus my findings must be kept up-to-
date on the newest developments in prosecutorial accountability mechanisms. Hybrid 
tribunals represent the newest development.  Due to the fact that the timing of the ICTR 
did not solve all problems, it is beneficial to examine how a different factor, structure, 
affects a tribunal’s ability to achieve its four objectives. For this reason, this project 
concluded with brief case studies of the hybrid tribunals in Sierra Leone and Cambodia.   
These two tribunals are similar to the ICTR in that they both were established in 
the aftermath of mass violence.  This similarity allowed me to examine how the hybrid 
structure of the SCSL and ECCC influences effectiveness. Two elements of the hybrid 
structure were particularly influential on both tribunals’ ability to achieve their 
objectives.  These are: the location of the tribunals, and the mixed composition of the 
tribunals.  First, all existing hybrid tribunals are located in the country in which the 
crimes to be prosecuted, were committed.  The case studies of the SCSL and ECCC 
indicate that this proximity to the most affected population may prove beneficial in their 
ability to achieve two objectives in particular—the creation and dissemination of an 
accurate historical record, and the deterrence of future atrocities.  Second, the case studies 
show that the mixed composition of hybrid tribunals allows for interaction and 
cooperation between domestic and foreign judges.  This could prove advantageous to 
augmenting the domestic judicial systems in Sierra Leone and Cambodia. The potential 
benefits of proximity and mixed composition may prove helpful in developing future 
tribunals that improve upon the ICTR. 
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The case study of The Special Court in Sierra Leone demonstrates that its hybrid 
structure positively influences its ability to conduct the following activities: collect 
evidence, gather witness testimony, and engage with and educate the Sierra Leonean 
people.  Thus, the SCSL has had the most success in the creation and distribution of an 
accurate historical record.  Unfortunately, the hybrid structure has also hindered the 
SCSL’s ability to fully achieve individual criminal accountability.  As a hybrid tribunal, 
the SCSL does not enjoy Chapter VII powers, nor does it receive sufficient funding. The 
lack of Chapter VII powers has negatively affected its ability to apprehend perpetrators or 
demand that third party countries extradite suspects to be tried in the Special Court.  
Insufficient funding also restricts the resources available to the SCSL and damages the 
likelihood of prosecuting the maximum number of people. The SCSL’s staff, although 
ostensibly composed of a mixture of domestic and international personnel, is in actuality 
dominated by foreign staff members.  There is a lack of well-trained Sierra Leonean 
judges and prosecutors. 
The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia was established over 
three decades after the crimes it seeks to prosecute.  Similar to the SCSL and ICTR, the 
ECCC was established after conflict.  However, whereas the cases of the ICTR and SCSL 
demonstrate that post-conflict tribunals enjoy certain benefits, the ECCC indicates that 
these benefits are tempered when there is a significant delay between when the relevant 
crimes occurred and when the tribunal was established. In the case of the Extraordinary 
Chambers, the delayed timing particularly influences its ability to achieve the objective 
of individual criminal accountability.  With such a large passage of time between the 
crimes of the Khmer Rouge and the establishment of the ECCC, evidence is invariably 
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lost and witnesses and perpetrators have died. However, while timing did influence the 
ECCC’s ability to achieve the first objective, the remaining three objectives were more 
greatly influenced by its hybrid structure. The ECCC only recently commenced its first 
trial, but the case study demonstrates that the mixed composition of the tribunal and its 
location pose benefits and drawbacks to the effectiveness of the ECCC.  First, the mixed 
composition of the ECCC is such that Cambodian judges retain a majority in both 
chambers.  Concerns have been raised about the independence of the Cambodian 
judges—how much influence does the Cambodian government have on their decisions?  
Despite this worry however, certain provisions such as the ‘supermajority’ vote 
requirement may ease concerns. Second, the case study of the ECCC demonstrates that 
by locating the tribunal in Cambodia, the Cambodian people have greater ownership over 
the proceedings.314 I argue that its hybrid structure, particularly the element of location, 
may facilitate the ECCC’s ability to create and distribute an accurate historical record to 
the Cambodian people. 
Implications of findings 
 This project is significant for two main reasons. First, this project explores the 
effectiveness of prosecutorial accountability mechanisms from a previously inadequately 
studied angle.  In this project I asked two principal questions: 1) How does implementing 
a tribunal during conflict influence its ability to achieve its objectives? 2) How does 
implementing a tribunal after a conflict has ended influence its ability to achieve its 
objectives? My findings, summarized above, are based on deep case studies of the ICTY 
and the ICTR.  These two tribunals were both established in the early 1990s, in response 
                                                
314 See: The Khmer Rouge Tribunal, ed. John D. Ciorciari, Documentation Center of Cambodia (2006).  
 141 
to mass human rights violations, by the UN Security Council. Despite these similarities 
however, the ICTY was implemented in ongoing conflict and the ICTR was implemented 
in the aftermath of conflict.  This project sought to explain the influence that these 
circumstances had on the tribunals’ effectiveness.  Second, the case studies conducted in 
this paper contribute to the existing literature on tribunals and international criminal 
justice.  The two major case studies of the Yugoslav Tribunal and the Rwanda Tribunal 
include in-depth analysis of its four objectives.  These case studies will hopefully serve as 
a resource for other scholars interested in pursuing studies that examine the effectiveness 
of existing accountability mechanisms. My specific focus on timing provides an 
alternative lens through which to assess existing tribunals.  
This project has practical implications for the development of future 
accountability mechanisms.  With the entry into force of the ICC, it is likely that 
indictments will be more frequently issued during ongoing conflict.  It is essential that 
scholars and policy-makers alike understand the implications that timing has on the 
effectiveness of the judicial organ. This project’s analysis of how presence and absence 
of conflict influence a tribunals’ ability to achieve its objectives, helps build the 
foundation upon which other studies can be conducted. Additionally, all four case studies 
revealed some of the strengths and weaknesses of each tribunal.  In order to create more 
effective and efficient tribunals in the future, we must first understand the source of a 
tribunal’s shortcomings.  This project suggests that the circumstance, in which a tribunal 
is implemented, is one such source.  
This project does not merely contribute to existing scholarship; it also raises 
important moral questions about the implications of implementing accountability 
 142 
mechanisms for mass human rights violations.  My paper argues that ongoing conflict 
and continued atrocities hinders a tribunal’s ability to achieve its objectives. This raises a 
troubling dilemma: if there is sufficient evidence of mass human rights violations and 
there is the political will to implement a tribunal, must an accountability mechanisms be 
established even if it may achieve less due to the ongoing violence? If tribunals are not 
implemented until atrocities have ceased, by which time many thousands of people will 
have been murdered, raped, and tortured, then prosecutorial mechanisms and the fight to 
enforce human rights may be de-legitimized. This is a serious consideration that cannot 
be ignored. The factors that influence the effectiveness of tribunals must be examined and 
understood. But in the search for a more efficient and effective tribunal, we cannot lose 
sight of the human beings for whom justice is pursued.    
International judicial organs such as the tribunals examined in this project, are 
immensely complicated and must contend with the interaction of numerous factors. The 
development and use of new forms of accountability mechanism depends upon our 
knowledge of those in existence today.  None of the tribunals in Rwanda, the former 
Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone, and Cambodia are without faults.  However, they are also not 
without promise.  Understanding the influence of timing is one important step toward the 
establishment of a truly effective prosecutorial accountability mechanism for mass human 
rights violations.  
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